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ABSTRACT 
This study focuses on corporate governance in Japan during the period from 1989 
to 2007 when Japan had come under global pressure to change its culturally 
specific corporate governance system and converge with the Anglo-American 
corporate governance system. From a critical theoretical perspective the study 
explores how the U.S. administration, pursuing a neo-liberal agenda, put pressure 
on the Japanese government to change the laws relating to corporate governance. 
The study shows how the Japanese government, in recognition of trade 
dependencies and in pursuance of its on neoliberal agenda, reacted to the demands 
of the U.S. administration. The study also provides insights into how the Japan 
Corporate Governance Forum in an attempt at self-regulation aimed to establish a 
set of Corporate Governance Principles that would constitute good practice for 
Japanese companies. The empirical analysis indicates that despite the pressure from 
the U.S. and the economic crisis that Japan experienced during the period from 
1989 to 2007 capture was not complete. Japanese companies are now allowed by 
law to follow either the Japanese or Anglo-American corporate governance model, 
but as they have a choice, the majority of Japanese companies still follow the 
Japanese model of corporate governance. Similarly, the Japan Corporate 
Governance Forum had to revise its Corporate Governance Principles, which had 
advocated the Anglo-American model and to include the Japanese model into their 
set of principles to reflect contextual developments. The analysis also indicates that 
in the context of pressure to converge with the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model the Japanese way of life came under threat because of the 
different values underpinning the Anglo-American corporate governance model. As 
a consequence of changing employment practices, emanating from a change in the 
governance system, more uncertainty was introduced that negatively impacted 
upon the people living in Japan. The study concludes that any attempt to change the 
Japanese corporate governance system should adopt a holistic perspective and be 
concerned to enhance well-being. In this context it is important to also consider the 
impact that possible changes to the Japanese corporate governance system might 
have on well-being globally. 
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CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance is high up on the agenda of governments, regulators, 
corporations and the accountancy profession. Especially since the 1990s, a period 
that witnessed corporate failures on a global scale, corporate governance has 
become a key concern of public debate. 1 Failures in corporate governance have 
posed threats to the hegemonic socio-economic order worldwide. Attempts have 
thus been made at the level of the nation state as well as at the global level to 
implement control systems that would ostensibly provide appropriate frameworks 
for the proper governance of corporations (Clarke, 2007; Solomon, 2007; Monks 
and Minow, 2008). 
Developments in the socio-economic and political spheres have significantly 
impacted upon corporate governance. The opening up of new markets since the end 
of the Cold War coupled with an increasing globalizing tendency has ostensibly led 
to moves to work towards prescriptions for corporate governance systems that 
would ostensibly facilitate the operation of the global economy. A key focus in this 
context are apparent moves to converge rules and systems towards a global 
standard, which on the face of it amounts to Anglo-American corporate governance 
1 This interest in corporate governance is also reflected in the literature. The journal Corporate 
Governance: An International Review was launched in 1993 and Corporate Governance: The 
International Journal of Business in Society in 2001. Noteworthy are also special issues on corporate 
governance such as, for example, Accounting and Business Research in 1993 and the recent special 
issue of Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal in 2008. 
1 
practices (Gallhofer and Haslam, 2007). Policy makers, accountancy professions 
and governments of individual nation states have on the face of it come under 
varying pressure to change their corporate governance systems so as to reflect this 
glo bal standard. 
This study focuses upon corporate governance in Japan during the period from 
1989 to 2007 in the context of the above developments. Japan is an especially 
worthwhile focus as its conventional economic success after the Second World War 
has attracted much interest, from academics and practitioners alike, in what was 
perceived to be the 'Japanese way' of business management.2 There had emerged a 
sense that Japan is different and that the differences have enhanced its economic 
success. This perception of Japan, however, changed when the country's economic 
boom (at its highest by the end of 1989) came to an abrupt halt with the bursting of 
the bubble economy in 1990 and with the Japanese economy subsequently going 
into recession. In the context of this economic crisis, which lasted until the 
beginning of the twenty-first century (Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008), with large 
Japanese companies liquidating and illegal payoff cases being exposed (Cooke and 
Sawa, 1998) and coupled with an increasing concern with the interdependencies of 
what is now perceived a global economy, the Japanese corporate governance 
system had become subject to critique from inside as well as outside of Japan 
(Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001, p. 1). When the various corporate scandals emerged3, 
2 See, for example, Clegg and Kono (2002, p. 272), who refer to 'many books in praise of Japanese 
management' having been published during the 1980s. 
3 For example, the collapse of Yamaichi Shouken (Cooke and Sawa, 1998). 
2 
questions were raised about the traditional4 Japanese corporate governance system. 
The system, which had been praised as having been a major contributor to 
facilitating the growth of the Japanese economy, now came to be seen as a 
contributory factor to the crisis of the early 1990s and the difficulties succeeding it 
(Cooke and Sawa, 1998). The questioning of the Japanese corporate governance 
system further intensified in light of corporate failures in the Japanese financial and 
a growing worldwide concern with corporate governance (Jackson and Miyajima, 
2008). Because of the above contextual developments, the period from 1989 to 
2007 has been chosen as the period of focus for this study. This period, which 
witnessed the height of the bubble economy, a severe economic crisis and the 
height of neoliberal reforms - in many ways a crisis context - can provide 
interesting insights into how corporate governance practices and context interrelate. 
Further, it can show how changing one part of the corporate governance system 
because of pressure to do so can variously affect other systems (for example, the 
corporate system) and how this in turn can impact on a country's culture and on 
people's well-being. 
Critics of the Japanese corporate governance system put particular emphasis on the 
following characteristics of the Japanese corporate system, which for them 
impacted negatively on the effectiveness of the corporate governance system: the 
powerful role of and influence upon management by the banks as the major 
4 The Japanese corporate governance system that had developed since the nineteenth century and that 
was in place in 1989 is variously referred to as the "traditional" or "conventional" Japanese corporate 
governance system (for example, Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001). This study uses these terms 
interchangeab ly. 
3 
providers of capital, the cross-shareholdings, and, the system of corporate and 
external auditors as specified by the Commercial Code (Cooke and Egawa, 1998). 
By the end of the 1990s the specific concerns about the Japanese corporate 
governance system and the Japanese corporate system had developed into a 
concern about the Japanese economic system more generally. Hoshi and Kashyap 
(2001) comment on these developments as follows: 
By the late 1990s many analysts were arguing that Japan's problems could 
not be solved using the policies that have become commonplace during 
the preceding four decades of mostly boom. To some observers, this 
means Japan should drop everything that characterized its "traditional" 
economic system. All the "Japanese" aspects of the system were to be 
purged, so that the economy could become more open, free, and 
international. In short, it is common to assert that Japan's economy must 
undergo a "globalization", which often is meant as the equivalent of 
"Americanization". (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001, p. 1) 
The same argumentation was made in relation to the Japanese corporate 
governance system with apparent global pressures on Japan to change its corporate 
governance system in line with practices developed in Western economies such as 
the US and the UK, governance systems that are reflective of Western cultural 
values and ways of organising socio-economic life (ibid.). 
Focusing on the context outlined above, the aims of this study here are twofold: 
first, to gain insights into how in a global context pressure was exercised on Japan 
to change the Japanese corporate governance system and to converge with the 
Anglo-American corporate governance system, and, second, to gain insights into 
how constituencies that were variously affected by changes in the Japanese 
4 
corporate governance system responded to the pressure to change. In particular, 
this research explores the following and related questions: What happens to the 
specific characteristics of the traditional Japanese corporate governance system and 
its related corporate system in the context of global pressure to change and adopt 
the Anglo-American system of corporate governance? What are the threats to and 
opportunities for the local including culturally specific aspects of the Japanese 
corporate governance systems in the context of global pressures to adopt a 
corporate governance system underpinned by different cultural values reflecting the 
prevalent global hegemony? What are and will be the consequences of the 
implemented and proposed changes on the well-being of the people living in 
Japan? And, what are possible ways forward for the Japanese corporate governance 
system in the context of global pressures to adopt the Anglo-American corporate 
governance system? 
These questions are explored in two case studies: first, an analysis of the way in 
which corporate governance issues featured in the bilateral trade negotiations 
between Japan and the U.S. during the period from 1989 to 2007, and, second, an 
analysis of the Corporate Governance Principles of the Japan Corporate 
Governance Forum and their various amendments during the period from 1997 to 
2006. In order to better embed these two case studies in the public debate on 
corporate governance in Japan during the period from 1989 to 2007, an analysis of 
the key issues featured in the reporting on corporate governance of Japanese 
newspapers and in public corporate governance pronouncements of Japanese 
5 
constituencies is also carried out. Employing a critical theoretical perspective on 
corporate governance, the study offers a holistic analysis of corporate governance 
as a social practice embedded in both a specific national corporate and socio-
economic and political context and a global socio-economic and political context. 
The critical theoretical perspective, which informs the analysis, draws particular 
attention to different power relations in the global context, addresses tensions 
between local (in the case of the study here, Japanese) cultures, practices and 
traditions and the global hegemonic (in the case of the study here, U.S.) culture, 
practices and traditions, and is concerned to consider ways forward. Having 
outlined the focus and aims of the study, the remaining part of this chapter provides 
a brief overview of the contents of chapters two to nine. 
Chapter two elaborates the critical theoretical perspective underpinning the analysis 
of the empirical material. It summarises the main characteristics of this theory 
showing its roots in Frankfurt School theorising and more recent amendments, 
which reflect a response to some aspects of postmodern critique. The chapter also 
provides an overview of the two key perspectives on corporate governance that can 
be found in the literature: the agency theory perspective and the stakeholder theory 
perspective. The chapter then outlines a critical theoretical perspective on corporate 
governance. 
Chapter three offers a review of the literature. In this review key trends, issues and 
themes in the literatures in the English and Japanese language on corporate 
6 
governance in Japan are identified and summarised. Reflecting the interdisciplinary 
character of this study, the chapter discusses contributions to the literature from a 
variety of disciplines, including, accounting and finance, economics, management, 
human resource management, law, politics, sociology, international relations and 
Japan Studies. The chapter offers a critical appreciation of the English as well as 
the Japanese literature and considers the way in which both literatures relate to the 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance as well as to the Japanese model 
of corporate governance. The chapter ends by outlining the contribution to 
knowledge of this study. 
Chapter four addresses issues of methodology and method from a critical 
theoretical perspective. It provides some methodological considerations and 
outlines how theory, methodology and method are interrelated and offers a brief 
elaboration of ontological and epistemological assumptions. The chapter also 
explains the choice for the particUlar case study methodology adopted in this study 
and briefly outlines its main characteristic. The chapter ends with a brief overview 
of the methods employed in the analysis of the empirical material and offers a 
rationale and brief overview of the sample of newspapers analysed in this study. 
Chapter five provides insights into the development of the Japanese corporate 
governance system with reference to the context in which it is embedded. The 
chapter covers the period from the nineteenth century to 2007. Appreciation of this 
period in the history of Japan is of importance for an understanding of the issues 
7 
currently informing current debate on corporate governance in Japan. Particular 
emphasis in this chapter is placed on the way in which developments in the socio-
economic and political context have led to changes in the corporate governance 
system. The analysis also emphasises the cultural dimension of Japanese corporate 
governance. 
Chapter six provides insights into the broader corporate governance context of 
Japan during the period from 1989 to 2007. It initially offers a critical comparison 
of the Anglo-American corporate governance system with the Japanese corporate 
governance system. This comparison highlights the way in which the 
characteristics of both corporate governance systems are shaped by their respective 
contexts and the philosophies and ethics that underpin them. The chapter also 
offers a brief outline of the characteristics of the Japanese corporate system and 
Japanese capitalism. Based on an analysis of documents, the chapter then 
elaborates the key issues that were addressed in the corporate governance 
pronouncements of various Japanese constituencies and summarises the key issues 
addressed in the public discourse based on the insights gained from a content 
analysis of general and financial Japanese newspapers. 
Chapter seven explores how corporate governance issues were embedded in the 
bilateral trade negotiations between Japan and the U. S. in the period from 1989 to 
2007. It gives particular attention to the pressure placed upon Japan by the U.S. to 
change its specific accounting disclosure practices and corporate governance 
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system so as to reflect the (U.S. orientated, Anglo-American) global standard. The 
chapter indicates the sense in which in the context of trade negotiations from the 
late 1980s onwards, the U.S. administration has consistently put pressure on Japan 
to converge with this global standard and offers an interpretation of how the 
Japanese government has responded to such pressure. Adopting an historical 
perspective, it unravels how demands made by the U.S. administration found their 
way into Japanese law. Revisions of the 1993 Commercial Code, for example, 
reflected a response to U.S. demands. Most importantly, the 2002 revision of the 
Commercial Code allowed Japanese companies to either follow the Japanese or 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance. The chapter explains that 
although it appears that the U.S. administration had been successful in changing the 
Japanese corporate governance system, capture was not complete. A key reason in 
this respect is the choice of governance system that the law allows. As a 
consequence, many Japanese companies have not yet adopted the Anglo-American 
corporate governance system. This can be understood as a form of resistance to 
global hegemonic pressure and an attempt to preserve local practices. 
Chapter eight analyses the developments and amendments of the Corporate 
Governance Principles of the Japan Corporate Governance Forum. The Principles, 
which constitute an attempt of self-regulation by a private group of industrialists, 
academics, lawyers and journalists, provide interesting insights into how the 
pressure to change the Japanese corporate governance system so as to reflect the 
Anglo-American system was perceived by a key Japanese constituency, namely the 
9 
Japan Corporate Governance Forum. The Japan Corporate Governance Forum, in 
aiming to arrive at a set of principles that would constitute good corporate 
governance practice for Japan, achieved international recognition, most importantly 
from CaIPERS. It has also been argued that its Principles were reflected in the 2002 
revision of the Commercial Code. Through an analysis of the various revisions of 
the Principles the chapter provides insights into how the differences between the 
two corporate governance models were articulated and what were perceived to be 
reasonable ways forward in the context of pressures to change. The chapter also 
shows how in light of contextual developments the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model was variously embraced. In the first draft of the PrinCiples there 
was a clear concern to preserve at least some particularities of the Japanese 
corporate governance and corporate system, such as for example, life-long 
employment and to improve others, such as for example, the board of corporate 
auditors. The emphasis, however, shifted towards an embracing of the Anglo-
American system, which was advocated as best practice in 2001. Interestingly, 
because of further contextual developments, most importantly the 2002 revision of 
the Commercial Code, the Principles had to be amended. To advocate the Anglo-
American corporate governance system as best practice had become unattainable in 
a context where companies were allowed to either follow the Japanese or Anglo-
American model. Reference was thus made again to the Japanese model in a new 
version of the Principles. In addition and reflecting contextual development, 
corporate social responsibility was included in the Principles. 
10 
Chapter nine summarises the insights of the analysis of the empirical material 
especially with reference to changes to the Japanese corporate governance system 
in the context of global pressure to change and to converge with the Anglo-
American corporate governance system. It considers the threats to and 
opportunities for the culturally specific aspects of the Japanese corporate 
governance system emanating from the pressure to change and to adopt a corporate 
governance system that is underpinned by different values. The chapter is also 
concerned to consider manifest and potential consequences on the well-being of the 
people living in Japan emanating from changes to the Japanese corporate 
governance system. And, the chapter offers suggestions for possible ways forward 
for the Japanese corporate governance system in the global context. It also points to 
the need for the West to critically reflect upon its own practices and begin to 
question and challenge the taken-for-granted supremacy of the Anglo-American 
model of governance. In concluding, the chapter points to further areas of research. 
11 
CHAPTER 2 
TOWARDS A CRITICAL THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
This study pursues a critical theoretical perspective on corporate governance. The 
basic character of a critical theory of society and society's practices (including its 
practices of governance and accounting) was expressed by Marx in his famous 
dictum that philosophers have aimed to understand the world but the task, however, 
is to change it. This basic perspective, which encompasses both understanding and 
intervention, is substantively influenced by Hegelian thought with its emphasis on 
context, tensions and dynamics. This line of critical thinking, which is critical and 
interpretive (Bernstein, 1976; Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Held, 1980), has been 
refined in various ways since Hegel and Marx (Alvesson and Willmott, 1996, p. 67; 
Roslender, 2006). A key moment in the development of such critical theorising has 
been the emergence of the Frankfurt School, where a supradisciplinary approach, 
concerned to focus on wide-ranging themes, was promoted (Held, 1980). This 
perspective has been concerned to be open and non-dogmatic and to grow through 
engagement with other perspectives and refinement (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000). In 
substance, following this critical theory, a critical supradisciplinary approach 
informs this analysis. The structure of the chapter is as follows: a brief historical 
overview of the main influences that have shaped the critical theory mobilised in 
this study; an outline of the key elements of this critical theory; an elaboration of 
12 
the way in which this particular critical theory shapes the view taken on corporate 
governance in this study. 
2.1. ELEMENTS OF THE CRITICAL THEORY APPLIED IN THIS STUDY 
In 1923 the Institute for Social Research was founded in Frankfurt. The founders 
and subsequent members of the Institute for Social Research have become known 
as the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory (Calhoun and Karaganis, 2006). The 
Frankfurt School and social theorists associated with it (for example, Max 
Horkherimer, Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse) and further developing it 
(such as, for example, Jurgen Habermas) are often collectively referred to in terms 
of Critical Theory. Alvesson and Willmott (1996, p. 67), for example, note that 'the 
term Critical Theory is used to refer to scholars and commentators who are closely 
related, or strongly sympathetic, to the work of the Frankfurt School'. Calhoun and 
Karaganis (2006, p. 179), however, see limitations in such a specific and narrow 
usage of the term: 
The core members of the early Frankfurt School included Max 
Horkheimer, long-time director of the Institute, Theodore Adorno and 
Herbert Marcuse. While the label 'critical theory' is sometimes used 
synonymously with their work (and they sometimes claimed to be the only 
truly critical theorists of their generation), it is misleading to use the label 
for the Frankfurt School exclusively. This makes critical theory appear to 
be much more rigid and fixed than it ever was or can be. Not only are 
there innovations by new generations of theorists - as with any vital 
theoretical tradition - the Frankfurt School founders insisted on a 
conception of critical theory as always embedded in processes of historical 
change, providing both an analytical perspective on the present and a 
lever on the future. 
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Calhoun and Karaganis (2006, p. 181) further elaborate upon the position taken by 
the Frankfurt School regarding the development of theory: 
The first generation of Frankfurt School critical theorists always insisted 
on the historical embeddedness of theory. They recurrently criticized those 
who presented theory as though it could adopt a position outside of history, 
and those who imagined that theory would somehow explain social change 
without itself being transformed by it. 
In their overview, Calhoun and Karaganis (2006, pp. 179-180) Critical Theory 
distinguish between the first generation of the Frankfurt School, which 
encompasses the initial founding members of the Institute of Social Research; the 
second generation of the Frankfurt School, which offered 'direct extensions of the 
Frankfurt School legacy' (ibid., p. 180), the most well-known member being 
Jurgen Habermas; and, a third generation with the most well-known members 
being the German theorist Axel Honneth and the U.S. theorist Seyla Benhabib. 
Latterly, researchers aligned to or working out of a Critical Theoretical perspective 
have engaged with and refined their work through engagement with postmodern 
thought (Best and Kellner, 1991; Agger, 1998; see also Gallhofer and Haslam, 
2003). Highlighting the diversity of positions taken by Critical Theorists, Calhoun 
and Karaganis (2006, pp. 1 79-180) also point out that other theorists have engaged 
and aligned themselves with the Frankfurt School without ever having been 
members of the Institute of Social Research (for example, Walter Benjamin). The 
study here is cognisant of the argumentation developed by Calhoun and Karaganis 
and therefore uses the construct critical theoretical perspective in the broad sense 
of including Frankfurt School theorising and later refinements of Frankfurt School 
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theorising especially through an engagement with postmodern insights (see below) 
(Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003). 
According to Alvesson and Willmott (1996, p. 67), a core concern may be 
identified within Critical Theory despite the diversity of positions taken by its 
representatives: 
At the core of Critical Theory is a concern to develop a more rational, 
enlightened society through a process of critical reflection upon the 
organization and efficacy of existing institutions and ideologies. The 
considerable diversity of the School is integrated around a common desire 
to mobilize the potentials of critical reasoning to question and transform 
oppressive features of the modern world by means of 'a non authoritarian 
and non-bureaucratic politics' (Held, 1980: 16; cited in Alvesson nad 
Willmott, 1996, pp. 67-8). 
As was noted earlier, there is continuity between Frankfurt School theorising and 
left-Hegelian (especially Marxist) theorising in terms of the critical dimension of 
the research and the concern to engender change (Alves son and Willmott, 1996, pp. 
68-9). They differed, however, from Marx in terms of who they perceived to be the 
agent for change. Although believing in possibilities of emancipatory change, for 
members of the Frankfurt School the proletariat did not necessarily have the 
required power and vision to become the key agent for change as envisaged by 
orthodox Marxism (Alvesson and Willmott, 1996, pp. 68-9; see Gallhofer and 
Haslam, 2003). Alvesson and Willmott (1996, p. 69) argue: 
Declining to align themselves with interests ascribed to the proletariat by 
orthodox Marxists, members of the School nonetheless identified 
themselves with the critical, emancipatory intent [emphasis in the original] 
of the Marxian tradition. But. .. instead of focusing upon the revolutionary 
potential ascribed to the proletariat. attention \vas directed to any and all 
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individuals who - feeling frustrated, oppressed and confused by the 
contradictory claims, perverse priorities and' divisive effects of modem 
capitalist societies - were potentially receptive to the revitalization of 
Enlightenment ideas about autonomy and the development of responsible 
citizenship. 5 
The emphasis on an emancipatory commitment of the researcher distinguishes 
Critical Theory from positivist theory: research reflecting an emancipatory intent is 
explicitly value-laden and contrasts with positivist research, which claims to be 
neutral (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). It is this critical, emancipatory intent of 
Frankfurt School theorising that is a key orientation of the critical theory utilised in 
this study. Implied by the emancipatory intent is a concern with change, that is, a 
general concern to make things better, to improve things (Gallhofer and Haslam, 
2008). Having delineated a key orientation of critical theory informing this study a 
brief discussion of the main themes of this critical theory is offered. There are two 
parts to this discussion of key themes: first, themes developed by the first 
generation of the Frankfurt School are summarised; second, themes emerging out 
of or coming to be emphasised after an engagement with postmodem theorising 
and postmodern critique are elaborated. 
Social practices are understood to be political, cultural and ideological phenomena, 
which are embedded in a particular socio-economic, political and cultural context. 
Context and social practices interact with each other, that is, the context influences 
and is reflected in social practices and social practices affect and shape the context. 
5 The Frankfurt School hung on to a concern to pursue a rescuing critique of the Enlightenment and 
modem ways (Held, 1980). 
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Critical Theory is interested in gaining insights into the interrelationship of social 
practice and context. As Gallhofer and Haslam (2008, p. 12) have explained: 
Critical theorising encourages a critical [emphasis in the original] 
standpoint vis-a.-vis the phenomena and practice studied as well as the 
context in which they are located. This implies recognition that social 
phenomena and practices and contexts have negative as well as positive 
potentialities the realisation of which depends on the particular 
interrelationship between phenomena, practices and contexts. It is the task 
of the researcher to identify the positive or what we term enabling or 
emancipatory [emphasis in the original] potentialities through critical 
social analysis and to consider their realisation in projects concerned to 
work towards a better world for all, that is, to enhance well-being globally. 
Critical Theory is critical of the status quo, which includes context as well as social 
practices. Of particular concern are unequal power relations, which impact on the 
way in which an individual or a group of individuals are able to pursue their own 
perceived interests and realise their potential. Critical Theory, however, is not only 
concerned 'to point to deficiencies in a particular society, including its dominant 
thought patterns, but to identify as yet unrealized potentials that are locked, as it 
were, within existing institutions and stocks of knowledge' (Alvesson and Willmott, 
1992, p. 10). 
Critical Theory also challenges seemingly neutral and taken-for-granted practices, 
such as, for example management and accounting. According to Alvesson and 
Willmott (1992, p. 10) 'CT insists on the political nature of what is seemingly 
neutral or technological and highlights the dangers of technocracy for human 
autonomy and responsibility'. 
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Critical Theory questions instrumental rationality, that is, a means-end rationality 
whereby the means become more important than the initial goals. And, relatedly, 
there is a concern to challenge the notion that everybody should pursue their own 
narrow interest so as to somehow leave everybody better off (Held, 1980). 
Critical Theory puts an emphasis on the relevance of historical analysis. It sees 
potentialities in an understanding of the past and holds that history deepens an 
understanding of the present as problematic (Gallhofer and Haslam, 1993). As has 
been elaborated above, members of the Frankfurt School have pointed to the way in 
which theory develops within a context and thus changes as the context changes. 
Here an attempt is made 'true to the tradition of Critical Theory, which has always 
encouraged creative borrowing from diverse empirical and philosophical 
disciplines' (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992, p. 3) to engage with developments in 
social theorising and to consider how Critical Theory may be modified so as to 
better facilitate the analysis of social phenomena. 
Researchers have argued that aspects of more recent theorising, especially 
postmodern, postcolonial and feminist theorising, may be usefully applied to refine 
Critical Theory (Kellner, 1989; Best and Kellner, 1991; Agger, 1998; Gallhofer and 
Haslam, 2003). The three key issues in this respect are: a critique of problematic 
universal theorising, the notion of giving the other a voice and a kind of dialectical 
thinking termed continuum thinking in the context of worrying about universalism. 
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Postmodern theorising has argued that theories influenced by Enlightenment 
thinking - including Critical Theory - have tended to use universal categories and 
favoured grand narratives. Emancipation, the key emphasis of Critical Theory, 
according to postmodern theorising is an example of a universal category: As a 
universal category emancipation in the context of Critical Theory thus fails to 
recognise the multiplicity of oppressions and repressions and hence emancipations 
(Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003). Relatedly, it was argued that the universal view of 
emancipation reflected Western, and especially continental European, thinking and 
values. Based on their critique of universal theorising, many postmodern theorists 
concluded that universal categories and associated grand narratives should no 
longer be employed in research and policy. Instead, the emphasis should be on the 
particular and judgment should be reserved to those being part of the particular. 
Critical Theorists have responded to this challenge of postmodern theorising in a 
way that still makes it possible to have emancipation as a key guiding principle of 
Critical Theory but at the same time aims to avoid the negative side of universal 
theorising as outlined by postmodern theorists. In this respect, Gallhofer and 
Haslam (2003) have argued that the notion of differentiated universal is a way of 
aligning the universal with the particular without losing its radical political 
dimension. Seeing emancipation as a differentiated universal would imply the 
following. The notion of emancipation, as the act/process of freeing oneself from 
repression, oppression and alienation, is still a universally applicable notion for all 
human beings. According to this line of argument, emancipation would still lead to 
an increase in well-being, that is, making things better, a main concern of Critical 
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Theory. Within this universal there is, however, difference in terms of the types of 
repressions, oppressions and alienations and emancipations that people experience. 
The difference in repressions, oppressions and alienations and emancipations is the 
result of, for example, different contexts (such as, cultures, histories, political 
systems, states of the economy) and individual experiences and characteristics 
(such as, for example, age, gender, sexual orientation, race and ethnicity) of human 
beings (Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003). 
Strands of postmodern, postcolonial and feminist theorising have also pointed to 
the way in which Critical Theory tended to silence the other or the local, especially 
through being Westerncentric and universal in theorising and prescription for 
change. Relatedly, Western institutions and practices have been seen as 
imperialistic and thus as facilitating repressive relationships between the imperial 
power and its dependent colonies. Further, such dependence, it has been argued, is 
sustained even after independence of colonies through Western institutions and 
practices (Calhoun, 1995; Gandhi, 1998; Loomba, 1998; for the case of accounting 
and the accountancy profession see, for example, Annisette, 2000, 2004; Abdul-
Rahaman, 1998). It is especially important to facilitate and listen to local voices 
and to appreciate the insights of different cultures in our current global context in 
which there is a tendency to see Western ways as more advanced and superior. 
Further, open engagement with the other should be also emphasised as such co-
operation facilitates the envisioning of a better world and strategies for change that 
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will better ensure that well-being is enhanced globally (Gallhofer and Haslam, 
2003, 2009). 
A further insight of recent theorising that is applied here to modify Critical Theory 
is continuum thinking in the context of change and difference. As Gallhofer and 
Haslam (2003) have explained, this concept, which was especially mobilised by 
feminist theorists, may helpfully be employed in further enhancing the way in 
which Critical Theory engages with change. Continuum thinking in terms of 
change means that we move on a continuum from the status quo to a desired future 
state. This view emphasises the need to go beyond the revolutionary tradition and 
contrasts with a revolutionary notion of change where one can move immediately 
from the status quo to the desired future state. Gallhofer and Haslam (2003) also 
point out that as one moves along a continuum towards the desired future state the 
characteristics of the envisioned future state changes itself. 
2.2. DELINEATING A CRITICAL THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN 
This part of the chapter is concerned to delineate a perspective on corporate 
governance, which reflects the general themes of the Critical Theory outlined 
above. In order to show how this perspective builds upon and goes beyond current 
perspectives on corporate governance a brief overview of the two perspectives on 
corporate governance given most emphasis in research (conceived of in terms of 
21 
the agency theory perspective and the stakeholder theory perspective) is initially 
offered. Based on a critique of these perspectives, which highlights their limitations, 
a critical perspective on corporate governance is outlined. 
2.2.1. Agency Theory and Corporate Governance 
Although Clark (1998) pointed to a lack of an integrated theory on corporate 
governance, two main positions may be identified that underpin research on 
corporate governance: an agency theory perspective and a stakeholder perspective. 
As Letza et al (2004) have argued, most of the research on corporate governance in 
the English language reflects either an agency theory perspective or a stakeholder 
theory perspective. According to Mallin (2004), an agency theory perspective on 
corporate governance has manifested as the mainstream approach with the 
stakeholder perspective being seen as an alternative to an agency theory 
perspective (see also Letza et aI, 2004). 
The emergence of agency theory here is linked to developments in the SOCIO-
economic sphere. The development of capitalism coupled with significant socio-
economic changes has led to the emergence of the large joint-stock corporation 
since the Industrial Revolution. In the context of significant changes in the 
structure and ownership of corporations a critique emerged of the neoclassical view 
of the firm. In neoclassical economic thought a firm had been seen as a 'black box' , 
that is an entity, which attempted to maximise its profit (Jensen and Meckling, 
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1976). Neoclassical economists' pnmary concern was the role of the market 
because they conceived the market as a mechanism functioning to distribute and 
redistribute wealth and therefore they did not take an interest in the function and 
structure of the firm (Kikuzawa, 1997). Berle and Means (1932), however, in their 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, developed an argument against this 
notion whereby a firm attempted to always maximise its profit. They argued that in 
a modern large corporation share ownership was spread among a large group of 
individual investors and none of these investors could hold enough shares to be 
able to control the firm. As a consequence of dispersed ownership' [c ]ontrol is held 
by a self-perpetuating and unaccountable group of top managers, even though its 
own shareholdings may be negligible' (Leech, 1987, p.536). Berle and Means 
(1968) further argued that the interests of managers and the interests of the owners 
of the corporation might differ (see also Bricker and Chandar, 2000). Their 
research and argumentation has had a far-reaching influence on studies of 
corporations. 
More than forty years after the publication of Berle and Means' (1932) seminal 
work, Jensen and Meckling (1976) built upon and further developed Berle and 
Means' elaborations upon the modern corporation. The theory they developed in 
this context has become known as agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 3) 
defined the agency relationship as '[a] contract under which one or more persons 
(the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the 
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agent'. This relationship is different from the employer-employee relationship 
because according to their definition, the principal(s) devolve(s) power to the agent. 
In the employer-employee relationship, the employer can instruct the employee 
whenever he or she wants; however, in the principal-agent relationship the 
principal cannot constantly direct the agent. Jensen and Meckling (1976) thus 
postulate that all participators in a company try to maximise their own benefit, that 
is, the agent does not always act so as to maximise the principal's wealth. Based on 
this argumentation it is therefore important for the principal to induce the agent to 
pursue the principal's interest. Jensen and Meckling (1976) call this the 'agency 
problem' and the expenditure to resolve the problem 'agency cost'. They identified 
three types of agency costs: 'the monitoring expenditures by principal', 'the 
bonding expenditures by agent', and 'the residual loss' (ibid., pA). They claim that 
although it is impossible to reduce agency costs completely, it is possible to reduce 
them to a low level by accepting to bear certain costs. According to agency theory 
'establishing appropriate incentives for the agent' and 'incurring monitoring costs' 
(ibid., pA) bring about a solution to agency problems. In addition to the problems 
identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976), other problems have subsequently been 
pointed out, such as, for example, different attitudes towards risk and information 
asymmetry (Mallin, 2004). Although agency theory has been criticised for reducing 
the complex web of relationships constituting the firms into only the relationship 
between two participants, reducing the costs and conflicts between managers and 
shareholders became the central issue in research and policy debates concerned 
with making firms more efficient entities. 
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Agency theory as outlined above has been especially developed by researchers 
from Anglo-American countries, such as the U.S., the U.K., Canada and Australia 
because as Turnbull (1997) has argued the agency problem considered in its own 
terms is more serious in Anglo-American countries than in continental Europe and 
Japan. 6 Turnbull (1997) refers to four reasons in this context: first, shares are 
widely spread in Anglo-American countries; second, there has been no supervisory 
board in these countries; third, the laws even tend to impose legal controls upon 
shareholders not to stand together to urge managers to improve their policy; and, 
fourth, the insider trading law also limits access to certain information that may be 
helpful for monitoring and supervising the board of directors. 
Agency theory has significantly impacted upon and framed debates and research on 
corporate governance. Key to the debates on corporate governance from an agency 
theory perspective is the assumption that managers are not willing to pursue 
shareholders' interests because of several reasons. Denis (2001, p. 193), from the 
point of view of a financial economist, refers to three possible reasons for why 
conflict may arise between managers and shareholders: first, '[m]anagers' desire to 
remain in power'; second, '[m]anagerial risk aversion'; and, third, '[fJree cash 
flow'. 'Managers' desire to remain in power' refers to managers' attempts to stay 
in their position as long as possible. This can lead to a serious conflict between 
managers and shareholders when the management team proves to be inefficient in 
6 For an overview of the application of agency theory in accounting research see Subramaniam (2006). 
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terms of increasing corporate value. 'Managerial risk aversion' suggests that as the 
manager of the firm is responsible for everything happening in the firm and 
belonging to the firm, the manager is generally circumspect in making decisions. 
Shareholders, in contrast, nowadays have spread their investment over several 
industries and, therefore, one single project does not necessarily constitute a 
significant risk in terms of affecting shareholders' wealth substantially. As a 
consequence, shareholders want managers to invest in 'positive net present value 
(NPV) projects' (Denis, 2001, p.194), whereas, managers are concerned with 
projects' prospects and risks so as to avoid damaging their firms. Judging from 
these attitudes, it is evident that managers and shareholders have different interests, 
which can bring about a conflict of interest between them. 'Free cash flow' is 
defined by Jensen 'as cash flow generated by the firm in excess of the amount 
required to fund all available positive NPV projects' (Denis, 2001, p. 194). Free 
cash flow may lead to another conflict between managers and shareholders because 
shareholders wish for a part of the free cash flow to be returned to them through 
either dividends or the purchase of treasury stock. Managers, however, may want to 
keep any free cash flow or prefer to reinvest it into another project because they 
may want to grow the companies rather than maximise shareholders' wealth (ibid.). 
Another argumentation of agency theory, which has significantly impacted upon 
debates and research in corporate governance, is Jensen and Meckling's (1976) 
claim that it is possible to mitigate agency problems by establishing a monitoring 
system and by giving managers incentives. In connection with the monitoring 
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function it has been argued that assuring the independence of the board of directors 
through board membership of non-executive directors is essential in mitigating 
agency problems (see, for example, Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
This View is reflected in the 1992 report of the UK committee on corporate 
governance chaired by Sir Cadbury. The Cadbury report recommended 'to 
decentralise power within the firm and to increase the role and independence of 
non-executive directors in the monitoring of executives' (Keasey et aI, 2005, p.5). 
The Cadbury Report further advised that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) should 
not also act as the chairman of the board of directors (ibid.). In the U.S., the New 
York Stock Exchange has required audit committees to be created that consist of a 
majority of outside directors since 1978 and the Security Exchange Commission 
(SEC) also has required establishing compensation committees since 1992 (Blair, 
1995). These series of changes had been introduced so as to enhance the status and 
effectiveness of the board of directors as a device for monitoring executives and 
management. There are, however, some critical views on the issue of the 
effectiveness of the board of directors within agency theory's own terms. Tamura 
(2002), for example, points to four issues, which in his view negatively impact 
upon the effectiveness of non-executive directors: first, many non-executive 
directors are busy because many of them are incumbent CEOs of other companies 
and therefore might not be able to spend enough time and energy on the duty as 
non-executive director; secondly, they have a desire to remain in their office 
because in the U.S. to serve as a large company's director is regarded as a great 
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honour and therefore they might tend not to raise objections to the CEO so as to 
secure their position; third, there is a high probability that CEOs might appoint 
their close friends to the position of non-executive director. Tamura (2002) remarks 
that the above issues may lead to the malfunction of the board of directors, even if 
the board also consists of outside directors (ibid.). Similarly, although Blair holds 
that W[i]ndependent" in principle, these outsiders may in fact know little about the 
business of the firm and are therefore very dependent on the CEO and other senior 
officers of the company to tell them what is going on' (Blair, 1995, p.78). She 
further argues that' [0 ]ne of the most important problems impairing the function of 
boards is the lack of consensus not only about their goals, but also about whose 
interests they should serve' (ibid, p.79). 
Research and debates on corporate governance reflect the argumentation of agency 
theory that in order to reduce agency problems agents should be given incentives. 
Research and policy makers have in this context considered the usage of stock 
options as an appropriate incentive mechanism. Stock options, which can be 
defined as 'the right to purchase shares (stock) at a specified exercise price over a 
specified time period' (Mallin, p.lll), are seen as a means of encouraging 
management to increase the value of the firm. This line of argument has, however, 
been subjected to criticism. Keasey et al (2005), for instance, make the point that in 
the 1990s the dynamic growth of the stock market in the U.S and the U.K. brought 
benefits not only to management who performed well but also to management who 
did not perform well as they were able to manipulate share prices so as to achieve a 
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higher share price just before the exercise date of their stock options. Researchers 
have thus argued that these particular remuneration arrangements can have 
unintended behavioural effects (see, for example, Keasey et at, ibid). 
A more basic critique reflects uncertainty and controversy about the purpose of a 
firm as defined in agency theory. In the context of agency theory a firm is 
understood to be an organisation that is required to maximise shareholder wealth. 
Yoshimori (2004), however, points to an ambiguity concerning the phrase 'to 
maximise shareholder wealth'. He argues that it is impossible to put together all 
shareholders as if they were a homogenous group because each shareholder has 
different ideas regarding their investment. He thus identifies three shareholder 
groups: investors, speculators and owners. According to Yoshimori (2004), 
investors and speculators basically act identically with the objective of making 
profit from buying and selling their shares frequently and therefore they do not 
show interest in investing in the firm's long term benefit and its future course of 
events. In contrast to investors and speculators, owners are interested in the long 
term growth and market share of the firm. The different objectives of the various 
shareholder groups thus cause a problem in today's context where shares of large 
firms are widely dispersed with the majority of shareholders being either investors 
or speculators. 7 He further argues that short-term investors can easily diversify 
their investment and also exit by selling their shares so as to avoid risk. For the 
management and the employees of a firm, however, dispersing risk is not as easy as 
7 Tirole (200 I, p. 2) points out that '80 percent of the trading of shares is done by institutions, 
which hold them for an average of 1.9 years'. 
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it is for investors. According to Y oshimori (2004) there is little reason to consider 
shareholders as the central stakeholder based on the argumentation that they are the 
only risk bearers. 
Reflecting an agency theory perspective researchers and policy makers have 
offered various delineations of corporate governance. In the following two 
delineations of corporate governance that reflect an agency theory perspective are 
provided as illustrations. 
Sheifer and Vishney (1997) explain: 
Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment 
(Sheifer and Vishny, 1997, pp. 73 7). 
Denis (2001) in his delineation of corporate governance refers to the agency 
problem, which is a central concern of agency theory: 
Corporate governance, then, encompasses the set of institutional and 
market mechanisms that induce self-interested managers (the controllers) 
to maximize the value of residual cash flows of the firm on behalf of its 
shareholders (the owners) (Denis, 2001, pp.192). 
The above delineations of corporate governance are limited in that their focus is the 
basic agency relationship between shareholders as the owners of the company and 
management as their agent. Related to this is the assumption that shareholder 
wealth maximisation not only benefits shareholders but society as a whole. The 
narrow focus of the agency theory perspective of corporate governance has been 
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understood by some to fail to address the wider impact of companies on a whole 
range of other stakeholders in addition to shareholders. The narrow focus of the 
agency theory perspective of corporate governance has come under criticism from 
researchers and policy makers influenced and guided by the ideas of stakeholder 
theory. In the following a brief overview of the emergence and characteristics of 
stakeholder theory and a stakeholder perspective on corporate governance are 
outlined. 
2.2.2. Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Governance 
The development of stakeholder theory in the sense of at least the use of the 
construct is credited to Edward Freeman's seminal book Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach (1984) (Nasi, 1995, Carroll and Nasi, 1997). The substance 
of a stakeholder approach has a longer history as one might reasonably suppose. 
According to Imanishi (2003), for example, the idea and concept of stakeholder, 
however, had already been proposed by the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) in 
1963. They had defined stakeholders as: '[T]hose groups without whose support 
the organization would cease to exist' (Freeman 1984, p.31, quoted in Turnbull, 
2007, p.183). Building upon and reflecting this definition, a wider and more 
extended definition of stakeholder can be developed: 
'A stakeholder, then, is an individual or group that asserts to have one or 
more of the kinds of stakes in business. Just as stakeholders may be 
affected by the actions decisions, policies, or practices of the business firm, 
these stakeholders also may affect the organization's actions, decisions, 
policies or practices. With stakeholders, therefore, there is a potential two-
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way interaction or exchange of influence.' (Carroll, quoted in Nasi, 1995, 
p.22) 
The term stakeholder, according to those supporting this kind of argumentation, 
includes '[0 ]wners, management, employees, customers, suppliers, government, 
community, media, unions, consumer groups and environmental groups' (Nasi, 
1995, p. 22). 
Freeman and McVea (2001) explain that the Stanford Research Institute's view is 
aimed at companies attempting to succeed in a long term perspective. In order to 
achieve long term success, managers have to be aware of stakeholders' interests 
and secure broad support from all stakeholders. Although the Stanford Research 
Institute initially defined the term stakeholder and other researchers further 
advanced the concept, Imanishi (2003, p.69) holds that it is reasonable to argue that 
the stakeholder approach in the context of corporations had not been very 
comprehensively developed until Freeman's seminal work. 
A stakeholder approach or, as commonly referred to in the accounting 8 and 
corporate governance literature, stakeholder theory developed out of a critique of 
agency theory. The main point of the critique of agency theory that stakeholder 
theory responds to is the narrowness of focus of agency theory. While managers 
according to agency theory are required to only maximise shareholders' wealth in 
agency, stakeholder theory in contrast requires managers to adopt a wider view 
8 For an overview of the application of stakeholder theory in accounting see Alam (2006). 
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point, which takes into account a whole variety of stakeholders that are affected by 
or engage with the business organisation. According to Freeman and McVea (2001), 
the central task of managers from the perspective of stakeholder theory is to take 
into account the various interests of all participants and to develop relationships 
with them. They comment that existing strategies employed by management (and 
reflecting agency theory) ignore a whole range of stakeholders. Freeman and 
McVea (2001) make the point that those strategies will function under a stable 
business environment, however, under unstable conditions they will show 
limitations. They then put forward a proposal for a stakeholder approach as an 
alternative to a shareholder approach and indicate that it has some conspicuous 
features. A Stakeholder approach serves 'strategic management' to help decide the 
future course of a company: in the process of that management has to take account 
of the environment within which it operates. This approach also helps the company 
to survive, a crucial aim, because the manager is required to know its stakeholders 
who affect the company and are affected by the company, and to secure support 
from them so as to change the direction of the company. The stakeholder approach 
as elaborated in this context and typically in the literature does not seek to be 
driven by maximising shareholder's wealth. What is recognised is that it is vital for 
the manager to be acquainted with the stakeholders and gain their support in order 
to survive. This approach aims at long term success. If all stakeholders hold values 
in common it is possible that they may be coordinated via a stakeholder approach 
(Freeman and Mcvea, 2001). 
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According to Keasey et al (2005), the essence of stakeholder theory is that 
stakeholder theory attempts to broaden the scope of the related parties that have 
mutual relationships with the company and to satisfy all of them, whereas 
shareholder theory limits the extent to only maximize shareholder's wealth. 
Agency theory assumes that the shareholders risk their investment and face the 
possibility of no 'residual value' and shareholders, therefore, have priority over 
other stakeholders (Freeman and McVea, 2001, p.197). This is even if one might 
argue that those bearing the greatest risk are the employees whose livelihood 
depends on the firm: and while shareholders can dissolve the relationship (contract) 
with the management by selling their shares through a 'more liquid market, other 
stakeholders face a less liquid market (ibid.). 
Many recent research studies have focused on the stakeholder approach (Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995; Carroll and Nasi, 1997). It has become a dominant or key theory 
for both in academics and professionals. (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Carroll and 
Nasi, 1997). Mallin (2004), however, states that' [T]he definition of a stakeholder 
is much less clear and along with this lack of clarity comes an opaqueness 
regarding the role of stakeholders and the protection of their rights' (Mallin, 2004, 
p.44). 
The scope of and gravity given to stakeholders highly depends on countries in 
which the companies operate. Letza et al. (2004, p. 205) refer to Donaldson and 
Preston's 1995 categorisation of stakeholder theory, which identified the following 
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three types of stakeholder theory: 'normative, instrumental, and descriptive'. Of the 
three types of stakeholder theory the normative and instrumental type are the main 
types employed in research (ibid.). 'Normative' study regards the company as an 
'end' because of the outcome of separation of ownership and control. No single 
investor can own and control a company and that makes it an independent entity 
with great influence on the community. This approach views a corporation as a 
single independent social entity that has a legal personality with its purpose and 
obligations rather than viewing the corporation as a group of persons, and therefore 
the manager is here liable for pursuing all company stakeholders' welfare (Letza et 
aI., 2004). Characteristic of the 'normative' approach is that it is based on moral 
issues. This differs from the 'instrumental' approach, which views stakeholders as 
'means' so as to ensure that the company achieves its objective. Stakeholder theory 
takes various related parties stated above such as shareholders, employees, 
customers, suppliers, government, community, unions into consideration and 
attempts to pursue not only the maximization of shareholder's wealth, but also 
satisfying stakeholders' interests. 
There is criticism that stakeholder theory does not offer a developed theory of the 
firm. In this respect Learmount (2004, p. 12) has argued that 'the development of a 
rigorous and useful "Stakeholder Theory" of the firm still seems a long way off. 
And he makes the point that '[m]ost work in this field continues to be preoccupied 
with justifying a stakeholder approach to the firm, rather than the construction of 
systematic theory to describe more adequately contemporary organizational 
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practices' (Learmount, 2004, p.12). A major limitation of many attempts to develop 
a stakeholder theory according to Learmount (ibid.) is their heavy reliance on 
economic theorising. He refers to Jones (1995) as an example of an attempt to 
combine stakeholder thinking with aspects of economic theorising, such as 
contractual situations, in order to achieve a reduction in transaction costs. 
Learmount (2004, p. 12) points out that Jones (1995) suggested an 'instrumental 
theory of stakeholder management' as he was concerned about the significant 
absence of testable theory in the stakeholder approach. Further, Jones (1995) stated 
that agency theory focused on reducing the conflicts between managers and 
shareholders by applying technical means such as monitoring systems and 
incentives schemes. Introducing stakeholder thinking into this situation therefore 
would help to reduce conflict as moral codes can reduce opportunistic behaviour 
and thus conflict. Such an approach would be more effective than just relying on 
technical means. Learmount (2004, pp. 12-13) is critical of Jones' argumentation as 
it is embedded in economic theory and works with the assumption that moral codes 
function well in the business realm. 
Although there are some flaws to stakeholder theory it has become the dominant 
theory among academics and professionals. According to Clark (2005) even in the 
U.S., which is seen as the major embracer of agency theory, stakeholders are given 
considerable emphasis in this context. He also states that some countries such as 
Japan, as well as Germany, that are regarded as more stakeholder approach oriented, 
are taking shareholder's wealth into account much more than before. The 
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developments globally indicate that although countries have different governance 
systems that reflect their particular cultures and histories they seem to adopt 
aspects of corporate governance systems from other countries. In light of these 
developments Clark (2005, p. 189) comments that 'a likely outcome is increased 
diversity within an overall trend towards convergence'. 
Reflecting a stakeholder theory perspective varIOUS definitions of corporate 
governance have been offered. In the following two delineations of corporate 
governance that reflect a stakeholder theory perspective are provided as 
illustrations. 
Aguilera and Jackson (2003) explain in referring to Aoki (2000): 
Corporate governance concerns "the structure of rights and responsibilities 
among the parties with a stake in the firm" (Aoki, 2000, p. 11 quoted in 
Aguilera and Jackson, 2003, p. 447). 
Aoki (2008) further elaborates: 
We can then identify a firm's corporate governance mechanism with a set 
of rules (formal or informal) that regulate the action choices of the 
stakeholders contingent on the value stake of the firm. In particular, the 
crux of such a mechanism may be in the manager's behavioral beliefs 
regarding the plausible strategic reactions of other parties in the depressed 
corporate-value state. Such beliefs would in turn constrain and discipline 
his or her action choices ex ante ... (Aoki, 2008, p. 435). 
The above discussion of stakeholder theory has indicated that there are a variety of 
approaches in the literature, which point to the need of management to be 
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accountable and to pursue the objectives of a whole range of stakeholders rather 
than just privilege shareholders as the only stakeholder group that matters. The 
various stakeholder approaches to corporate governance, however, differ in terms 
of the emphases they put on the various stakeholder groups. Although stakeholder 
theory goes in an important way beyond agency theory by acknowledging a whole 
variety of stakeholders, as typically presented in the literature, it still has significant 
limitations when viewed from the critical theoretical perspective outlined earlier in 
this chapter. The key limitations are: a lack of recognition that corporate 
governance is an embedded social practice; a limited consideration of the unequal 
power relations between the various stakeholders; and, a neglect of issues of 
change and strategy and the emancipatory/enabling potential of corporate 
governance practices. Without a thorough appreciation of context, to conceive of a 
stakeholder approach may be close to an empty endeavour. Indeed, SInce a 
shareholder approach also has to give some attention to stakeholders (it is a 
condition of profit making or wealth production that an entity at least survives, for 
instance), any distinction between the stakeholder and shareholder approaches will 
blur towards the point of rendering the distinction without meaning. Only when a 
thorough understanding of context is arrived at is it possible to begin to assess the 
significance of a mode of corporate governance in its particularities including the 
significance of its orientation to either a shareholder or stakeholder approach. 
Moreover, in accordance with this perspective, the better understanding is a critical 
one. For instance, from a critical perspective an organisation's survival is not an 
adequate indicator of its social worth. This may be explained by structural and 
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ideological problematics, for instance. And critical theory mobilised here attempts 
a subtle appreciation of other ambiguities and dynamics. The precise consequences 
and character of a given mode of governance are complex. They may not be 
summarised by alluding to notions of 'shareholder' and 'stakeholder' approach 
alone. One may here think of many actual and possible stakeholder approaches that 
also change over time. Below an attempt is made to delineate corporate governance 
from the critical theoretical perspective outlined above and to show its implications 
for an analysis of corporate governance in Japan. 
2.2.3. Critical Theory and Corporate Governance 
Critical Theory reminds us that social phenomena are embedded in a SOCIO-
economic, political and cultural context. An analysis of corporate governance has 
to thus carefully consider the characteristics of the context in which corporate 
governance is embedded. A key feature of the current context is globalisation, 
which has significantly impacted upon the way in which businesses - and 
organisations more generally - are governed. A critical theoretical perspective on 
corporate governance aims to gain insights into how global developments in the 
area of corporate governance impact upon and constitute threats and opportunities 
for local (as well as global) practices. For the study of corporate governance in 
Japan this implies an understanding of the Japanese system of corporate 
governance and also of the corporate governance system, currently gaining 
dominance globally. This may then form the basis for an assessment of how the 
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push for a global corporate governance system (i.e. the push for convergence of 
national corporate governance systems with the emerging global system) impacts 
upon the national Japanese corporate governance system and engenders threats and 
opportunities. The assessment of the impact needs to consider the threats to what 
are perceived local particularities of the Japanese corporate governance system. At 
the same time this also implies a critique of the current Japanese corporate 
governance system and a consideration of opportunities arising in the context of 
global challenges to address aspects that might be improved in the Japanese system. 
There are related threats and opportunities from a global perspective. 
A critical theoretical approach would especially be concerned to understand how 
national contextual characteristics have impacted upon and shaped Japanese 
corporate governance practices and how in tum Japanese corporate governance 
practices can reinforce or threaten national contextual characteristics. The cultural, 
the political and the socio-economic dimensions of context are of importance here. 
In analysis one has to be aware of the pitfalls of ethnocentrism, that is, an attempt 
has to be made to avoid viewing and assessing the Japanese corporate governance 
system from the perspective of the corporate governance system of one's own 
country.9 At the same time, an attempt has to also be made to understand the 
Japanese corporate governance system without viewing it through the lens of the 
9 Ethnocentrism, of course, is not a problem if one analyses the corporate governance system of one's 
own country. In this case, however, there is the danger of another form of distorted view: one might 
see the practices of one's own culture through rose-tinted spectacles and idealise rather than critically 
appreciate these practices. The countering of this is at least an emphasis of the critical theoretical 
approach. 
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globally dominant corporate governance system, which is the Anglo-American 
corporate governance system. 10 In other words, one has to avoid the pitfalls of 
Westerncentrism. 
Understanding corporate governance practises In their context also means 
understanding how they developed in interaction with their context. The study of 
corporate governance in Japan thus has to also include an historical account of how 
the particular Japanese corporate governance system has emerged. Such an account 
of the development of corporate governance will facilitate insights into the factors 
at play in the emergence and change of the particular Japanese corporate 
governance system. Such an understanding can contribute to a better understanding 
of current tensions within the system and between the Japanese corporate 
governance system and the emerging global corporate governance system. 
An important aspect of Critical Theory is its concern with unequal power structures, 
which impact on what, for example, a person, a group of people or a nation state 
can and cannot do. In the context of corporate governance that means recognising 
that, for instance, stakeholders have not equal power and that this might lead to the 
privileging of certain stakeholder groups that are more powerful. This neglect of 
the interest of particular stakeholder groups might significantly impact upon their 
well-being or well-being more generally. In an analysis of Japanese corporate 
10 GaIlhofer and Haslam (2007) have argued for the case of International Accounting Standards (lASs) 
and International Financial Reporting Standards (lFRSs) that they reflect the Anglo-American 
tradition. The same argument can be made for the emerging corporate governance practice. 
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governance one therefore has to carefully consider the various stakeholder groups 
and identify to what extent their interests are addressed in the Japanese corporate 
governance system. Similarly, there needs to be a consideration of how changes to 
the system might threaten the interests and well-being of stakeholder groups. 
Further, the analysis also has to explore the extent to which Japan, as a nation state, 
is itself in unequal power relations with other nation states and the significance of 
this for the Japanese corporate governance system. 
A key focus of Critical Theory is emancipatory change and relatedly the 
emancipatory/enabling potentialities of social practices. An analysis of corporate 
governance has to therefore explore possibilities for emancipatory change of 
national governance systems (and beyond) and the way in which corporate 
governance might be usefully mobilised to engender and facilitate emancipation. 
One has to aim to gain insights into the emancipatory/enabling potential of the 
Japanese corporate governance system. And of particular interest in the global 
context is an exploration of how aspects of the Japanese corporate governance 
system might be usefully employed in improving the global Anglo-American 
system with a view of enhancing well-being globally. 
Based on the above theoretical elaboration for this study an understanding of 
corporate governance would be as follows: Corporate governance as a holistic 
construct encompasses all the influences on organisational processes organising the 
production and distribution of goods and services. It includes focusing on the 
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processes involved in arriving at regulations and frameworks that impact on the 
design and implementation of corporate governance systems at the level of 
particular organisations. Corporate governance should properly serve the public 
interest and thus well-being, unrestrained as far as possible by convention or 
dominant understandings. In practice its functioning and consequences reflect (and 
indeed help constitute) the problematic context. But it is also ambiguous and 
embracing of more positive potential. 
2.3. SUMMARY 
Chapter 2 has provided a brief overview of the main characteristics of the critical 
theoretical perspective mobilised in this study. It has also offered a delineation of a 
critical theoretical perspective of corporate governance. This perspective was 
developed out of an appreciation of what are ostensibly the main perspectives in 
corporate governance research and policy debate, namely, the agency theory 
perspective of corporate governance and the stakeholder theory perspective on 
corporate governance. The next chapter, chapter 3, provides a critique of the 
literature on corporate governance in Japan and is informed by the critical 
theoretical perspective outlined in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN 
The growing interest in corporate governance in Japan especially over the last two 
decades is also reflected in the academic literature. There is now a significant body 
of literature in the English and Japanese languages that summarises, explores and 
comments upon the Japanese corporate governance system and the challenges this 
system has been facing since the late 1980s. Given the interdisciplinary character 
of corporate governance, the contributions to the literature come from a variety of 
disciplines, including, accounting and finance, economics, management, human 
resource management, law, politics, sociology, international relations and Japan 
Studies. Although these studies approach corporate governance in Japan from their 
own perspectives and emphases they all provide interesting insights into and 
contribute to a holistic understanding of the corporate governance system of Japan, 
its development, the challenges it faces today and the corporate system and the 
wider context it is embedded in. The review of the literature identifies key trends, 
themes and assessments and critically reflects on the shortcomings of research to 
date. I I It thus helps to show the contribution of this PhD thesis and also provides 
insights into key issues of concern and contextual developments which will inform 
the analysis of the empirics. The emphasis in the review here is on the literature 
11 Given the vast number of papers and books focusing on corporate governance in Japan and the 
constraints of a PhD thesis, the review of the literature highlights the main issues addressed and 
provides illustrations of contributions and their insights. 
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what focuses upon the period of the late 1980s to 2007, which is the period focused 
upon in this PhD. In discussing the literature a distinction is made between the 
literature in the English language and that in the Japanese language. Such 
categorisation helps to highlight differences and similarities between the English 
and the Japanese literature. This is of particular interest as it can facilitate insights 
into two types of academic discourse about the Japanese corporate governance 
system and the challenges it faced during the period from the late 1980s to 2007: 
one discourse in Japanese and thus inside of Japan, that is, a perspective especially 
for those inside and for those few who can access the inside via command of the 
Japanese language; and, another discourse in English and thus outside of Japan, 
that is, a perspective reflecting the perceptions of those looking into Japan from the 
outside.12 Based on the overview and discussion of the literature the chapter then 
outlines the contribution of this PhD thesis. The structure of the chapter is as 
follows: a summary of the themes and issues addressed in the literature; a critical 
elaboration upon the insights of and gaps in the literature; and, an elaboration of the 
contribution of this PhD thesis to the literature. 
12 It is recognised that like any categorisation this categorisation has its problematic side: it can set up 
boundaries where there is fuzziness and overlap and create a sense of unity where there is diversity 
and difference. A particular case here would be the very few instances where a text was written in 
English by a Japanese researcher working in Japan. It is, however, reasonable to argue that if one is 
aware of such limitations a discussion of the literature according to this categorisation is helpful in 
attempts to identify general trends in the literature on corporate governance in Japan during the period 
of the late 1980s to 2007. 
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3.1. THEMES AND ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE LITERATURE ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN 
This section of the chapter provides a general overview of the main trends and 
themes and issues addressed in the English and Japanese literatures and a 
discussion of their similarities and differences. 
3.1.1. The English Literature on Corporate Governance in Japan 
Two broad groups may be identified in the English literature on corporate 
governance in Japan: first, papers and books that provide a general overview of the 
Japanese corporate governance system and the various changes to this systems 
during the period from the late 1980s to 2007, and, second, papers and books that 
focus on particular aspects of the Japanese corporate governance system during this 
period. The contributions in both groups are concerned to explore how contextual 
changes have impacted upon and changed the Japanese corporate governance 
system. Some, if not all, contributions also offer an assessment of the direction of 
change of the Japanese corporate governance system. Below, this literature is 
discussed in more detail. 
Contributions to the English literature that aim to provide a general overview of the 
characteristics of the Japanese corporate governance system and its development 
over the last two decades highlight how specific characteristics of the Japanese 
46 
corporate system have shaped the Japanese corporate governance system. This is a 
tendency that Luo (2005, p. 19) has identified for international corporate 
governance and accountability research more generally: 
International corporate governance and accountability research whether 
from a political science, economics, finance, or accounting perspective, 
has thus far predominantly focused on the comparison of corporate 
governance schemes in different countries and on the investigation of 
institutional parameters that determine these schemes. 
Learmount (2004), for example, offers a detailed analysis of the corporate 
structures and practices of fourteen Japanese companies. The author's objective is 
to gain insights into what can be learnt from these practices. In case studies he 
focuses on the main characteristics of the Japanese corporate system, such as the 
role of shareholders, the company-main bank relationship, the role of the 
employees and the role of the Japanese directors as key determinants of the 
Japanese corporate governance system. He also points to the relevance of an 
understanding of the context in which the firms are operating. Yafeh (2000) studies 
the historical developments of Japanese corporate governance mechanisms in order 
to identify what has shaped today's Japanese corporate governance system. 
According to Yafeh, 'monitoring and intervention by large shareholders' and 
'monitoring and intervention by creditors, typically banks' were two factors that 
played an important role in the development of Japanese corporate governance 
(Yafeh, 2000, p.75). 
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Books and papers more generally concerned with the Japanese corporate 
governance system have also aimed to show how changes in the socio-economic 
and political context since the late 1980s have impacted upon the Japanese 
corporate system and the Japanese corporate governance system. These studies 
have identified the strong impact of the Anglo-American corporate governance 
system in shaping the Japanese system (see below). 
A key, if not the maIn, focus of the literature is the changes in the Japanese 
corporate governance system that may be observed since the 1980s. Researchers 
from various disciplines (including law, management, economics, finance, politics, 
human resource management, politics) and employing a variety of research 
approaches have aimed to document and assess these changes. The central question 
in these studies relates to convergence, that is, is the traditional stakeholder 
oriented model of Japanese corporate governance converging with the Anglo-
American shareholder oriented model. Researchers have come to various 
conclusions. Some have interpreted the changes in the law, the structure of the 
board of directors and the increase in the number of independent directors as an 
indication that convergence is taking place and that it is only a matter of time until 
this process is completed. Jackson and Miyajima (2007) summarise developments 
in Japanese corporate governance since the early 1990s. They elaborate how 'well-
known features of the Japanese firms, such as the main bank system, cross-
shareholdings, boards dominated by insiders, and lifetime employment have 
undergone significant crises' (ibid. p. 1), which has resulted in changes in the 
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system (see also Dore, 2005; Aoki, 2006; Yoshikawa and McGuire, 2008). They 
discuss these changes in the Japanese corporate governance system and argue that 
'many changes suggest a step toward more market-oriented corporate governance 
as found in countries like the United States or Britain' (ibid). Aoki (2006) analyses 
how changes in the context in which Japanese corporate governance is located have 
shaped corporate governance in Japan. He especially points to changes in the 
political arena (change of government) and the economic sphere (the end of the 
bubble economy). Given the contextual challenges, Japanese firms have changed 
their corporate governance structures, which Aoki (2006, p. 3) interprets 'as a 
possible transition from the traditional bank-oriented [Japanese] model to a hybrid 
model'. Dore (2005, p. 441), in a comparative study of Japan and Germany, argues 
that 'pressures in both Japan and Germany for revamping of the corporate systems 
along Anglo-Saxon lines have been intense in recent years'. He states that this is 
the result of internationalization and 'steady convergence of Japanese elites on 
American value' and 'half a century exposure to US cultural dominance' (ibid, 
p.441). Others have highlighted continuity as well as change and are less certain 
that convergence with the Anglo-American model will occur. Yoshikawa and 
McGuire (2008), for example, in their paper 'Change and Continuity in Japanese 
Corporate Governance' also focus on recent changes in the context and their effect 
on corporate governance. They identify continuity as well as change in Japanese 
corporate governance and urge researchers to take into account 'unique institutional 
arrangements' (ibid., p. 5) in analyses of the changes of the Japanese corporate 
governance system. Jackson (2005) refers to German and Japanese labour 
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management practice and their participation by way of example of typical countries 
where stakeholder-oriented corporate governance is dominant. The author 
acknowledges that there is a pressure in these countries for convergence toward the 
market-oriented model and insists that Germany and Japan should cope with this 
phenomenon. He concludes that convergence towards a single model seems to be a 
global trend; however, as 'convergence on a single model remains far away', 
Germany and Japan can modify their employment system and prepare for changing 
circumstance. 
Within the contributions to the English literature that constitute group two for the 
purposes of this literature review and that focus on particular issues and themes in 
relation to corporate governance, several key focuses can be identified: corporate 
performance; executive compensation; the board of directors; the banks as 
providers of capital; ownership structure; accounting disclosure; Japanese style 
employment practices; and, change and convergence. This literature also aims to 
explore specific changes related to aspects of the Japanese corporate governance 
system in the context of changes in the corporate system and wider contextual 
changes. 
Several studies in the English literature focus on the interrelationship between 
corporate governance and corporate performance. Watanabe and Yamamoto (1993) 
in an early study on the interrelationship between corporate governance and the 
performance of Japanese firms argued that the Japanese corporate governance 
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system had not adequately adjusted to contextual changes of the 1980s and that the 
'current economic recession gripping the country can be called a "governance 
recession'" (ibid., p. 208). In considering how the low profitability of Japanese 
companies might be improved they explore the advantages and disadvantages of 
implementing characteristics of the US corporate governance system in Japan. 
They point out that 'ultimately, perhaps the most important element of corporate 
governance is how society at large assesses corporate performance' (ibid., p. 225). 
This in the end will have a significant impact on how managers deal with the 
performance of their companies. Yoshimori (2005) compared the performance of 
Toyota and Canon with that of GM and Xerox. He finds that the performance of 
Toyota and Canon is better than that of their competitors. He thus concludes that 
'higher performance is possible without resorting to US-style corporate 
governace ... [as] ... corporate values, culture and strategy are equally vital 
ingredients of corporate success' (ibid., p. 447). Bauer et al. (2008) based on a data 
set provided by Governance Metrics International explore if Japanese firms with 
many corporate governance provisions achieved a better performance and what 
types of provisions where most significant. Their results indicate that firms, which 
are well-governed show better performance and that remuneration, financial 
disclosure and shareholder rights positively effected share prices. Colpan et al. 
(2007) explored the impact of changes in corporate governance that had taken place 
on a corporate as well as institutional level on corporate performance. They 
observe that' shifts in terms of stock ownership, corporate control and managerial 
organizations' (ibid., p. S89). Their insights in terms of the impact of changed 
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ownership composition and changes in the corporate governance system were 
inconclusive in terms of their impact on corporate performance. The authors thus 
conclude that their 'findings validate the current transitional state of Japanese 
corporate governance, where some firms are trying to adopt new practices in form 
only or with modifications to suit local and firm-specific context, may bring 
unintended performance consequences from what such practices were originally 
designed for (ibid., p. 110). 
Researchers exploring the relationship between executive compensation and 
company performance have arrived at a variety of insights. Basu et al. (2007) in 
their study of 174 large Japanese companies during 1992-1996 found that 'excess 
pay related to ownership and monitoring variables is negatively associated with 
subsequent accounting performance', which they identify as being consistent with 
an agency problem. Interestingly, their results did not show 'an association 
between excess pay and subsequent stock returns' (ibid., p. 56). Kato et aI's (2005) 
study of about 350 companies, which had employed stock options as part of 
executive remuneration between 1997 and 2001, finds evidence of an improved 
operating performance of these companies. They thus conclude that 'well-designed 
incentive compensation plans are consistent with the creation of shareholder value' 
(ibid., p. 436). Kubo (2005) analysed the effect of pay policy on the performance of 
Japanese companies and found that companies with high performance-pay 
sensitivity to not show higher performance. Ferris et al. (2007) investigated the 
relationship between weak corporate governance and managers' ability to design 
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executive compensation that is advantageous to them. They found that strong 
corporate governance, especially small board size and high percentage of 
independent directors, are important mechanism of control that influence 
management in the design of stock-option compensation schemes. 
Papers focusing on the board of directors have explored the interrelationship 
between the size and composition of the board of directors of Japanese companies 
and corporate governance. The emphasis in these studies is on firm performance 
and the protection of shareholder interests. Early studies (Viner, 1993; Kaplan and 
Minton, 1994; Davis, 1996) especially highlight the differences between the 
Japanese board of directors and the American board of directors. Viner (1993, p. 
112), for instance, argues that the interests of shareholders of American public 
corporations are well protected as 'independent outside directors today constitute 
the majority of board members at major American public corporations'. He 
contrasts this with the situation of shareholders of Japanese public corporations in 
arguing that 'outside shareholders' considerations such as dividend payout and 
share price are of no more relevance to Japanese boards than the weather in 
Antarctica' (ibid., p. 113). The study by Kaplan and Minton (1994), which 
explored factors determining the appointment of outsiders to the boards of directors 
of Japanese companies, found that in the context of poor performance former 
employees from banks were appointed. They conclude that in contrast to the U.S. 
'banks and corporate shareholders play an important monitoring and disciplinary 
role in Japan' (ibid., p. 227). Later studies, reflecting changes in Japanese law that 
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allowed companIes to either follow Japanese style corporate governance or 
American style corporate governance, focused on changes in the composition of the 
board of directors. Wailerdsak and Suehiro (2004) found that despite the discourse 
of a change in composition of the board of directors 'the ratio of internally 
promoted directors and executives remains high' (ibid., p. 85). Papers investigating 
the relationship between board composition and performance of Japanese 
companies come to inconclusive results. Bonn et al. (2004), for example, found that 
board size and age of directors had no impact on the performance of the firm. In 
contrast, Bebenroth and Donghao (2007) found that Japanese companies who had 
adopted a US-style committee structure showed the best performance. Gilson and 
Milhaupt (2004) who investigated the extent to which companies switched from the 
Japanese style board structure to the U.S. style and the impact of this on their share 
price found no significant share price changes. Similarly, the empirical evidence in 
the Yoshikawa and Phan (2003) study suggested that 'the increase in the ratio of 
outside directors, the separation of the board members and executive officers, and 
the reduction of borad size were not related to firm performance' (ibid., p. 698). 
The study of Aoki (2004), which investigated the effect of the introduction of the 
executive officer system on firm performance, did not find any positive correlation. 
Masui and Kakabadse (2002) discuss the adopting of the officer system by 
Japanese companies from the perspective of improving management. They argue 
that introducing an officer system will not improve the way companies are 
managed as the aim of the introduction of the officer system is to reduce costs 
through avoiding the risks arising from lawsuits by shareholders. 
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Corporate governance issues in the context of Japanese banks have attracted the 
interest of researchers from several disciplines but especially from those in the 
areas of finance, financial economics and economics. Studies have broadly focused 
on two areas; first, the role of Japanese banks in the corporate governance systems 
of Japanese firms and, second, the corporate governance systems of Japanese banks 
themselves. The main emphasis in research was initially on the former as the key 
role of Japanese banks as providers of capital with its associated monitoring 
function significantly differed from that of Anglo-American banks. Studies have 
explored the development of the Japanese banking system and highlighted the 
important monitoring role of Japanese banks. Sheard's (1989) analysis of the 
Japanese main bank system, for instance, argued that the close relationship between 
company and main bank acted as a substitute for the '''missing'' takeover market in 
Japan' (ibid., p. 399). Based on their analysis of a sample of Japanese firms, 
Morck and Nakamura (1999) found that the monitoring role of the banks does not 
constitute a form of governance that is concerned with shareholder wealth 
maximisation as banks also may act in the interests of a broader range of 
stakeholders. Nakamura (2002) investigated whether the increase in public debt 
issuances in the context of the recent crisis of the banking sector has led to a 
decrease in the corporate governance role of banks. His empirical results suggest 
that Japanese banks still seem to play an important corporate governance role. 
More recently, and in the context of the Japanese banking crisis, researchers have 
begun to explore the corporate governance systems and practices of the banks 
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themselves. The maIn focus here was on the effectiveness of the corporate 
governance system of Japanese banks (Hanazaki and Horiuchi, 2000). Hanazaki 
and Horiuchi (2003) point to the difficulty of monitoring banks in the context of 
relationship banking. They argue that the inability of outsiders, such as the capital 
market and the government, to exercise control and restrict imprudent bank 
management played a significant role in the banking crisis. Hossain (2005) also 
suggests that the weaknesses of the Japanese corporate governance crisis are the 
key factor in explaining the banking crisis. Similarly, Dinc (2006) points to the 
inability of shareholders to discipline bank managers in the context of cross-
shareholdings and relationship banking. Anderson and Campbell (2000) in a study 
of internal and external corporate governance at Japanese banks found that before 
as well as after the banking crisis of the 1990s external governance (for example, 
mergers) appeared to be inactive whereas internal governance especially after the 
beginning of the banking crisis appeared to be especially active (for example, non-
routine turnover of bank presidents). In contrast to the above studies, which 
employed an agency theory perspective in their analyses, Wan et al. (2005) adopted 
a social exchange perspective in their analysis of the Japanese banking system and 
restructuring attempts within the sector. They hold that although economic factors 
are important in understanding corporate governance and corporate restructuring a 
consideration of the social embeddedness of corporate governance practices 
provides a better understanding of the processes at work. 
56 
The ownership structure of Japanese companies and changes to it has been another 
focus in the English literature. Research reflecting an agency theory perspective 
has investigated the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance. Prowse (1992) found that ownership concentration of firms who are 
members of a corporate group (keiretsu) does not lead to higher returns whereas it 
does in the context of independent firms where shareholders exercise more control 
over management. The study by Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) showed that 
equity ownership by banks acted as a control mechanism and thus positively 
affected firm performance. This contrasts with firms with a high level of 
intercompany shareholding, which 'insulate[ s] firms from their own problems, at 
the expense of firm performance' (ibid., p. 239). Hu and Izumida (2008) also report 
that corporate performance is significantly affected by ownership concentration. 
Seki (2005) elaborates upon recent changes in ownership of Japanese companies 
and the law. These changes have led to increased shareholder activism, especially 
by foreign institutional investors and thus increased the awareness of managers of 
corporate governance issues. Suto and Toshino (2005) in a study based on a 
questionnaire survey found that the corporate governance role of Japanese 
institutional investors is limited because of the short-time bias of fund managers to 
represent themselves in the best light for marketing purposes. Suto and Toshino 
(2005, p. 466) thus conclude that 'institutional investors' behaviour thus 
contradicts their role as shareholders'. 
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It is somewhat surprising that little research has been done that analyses accounting 
as an important component of the corporate governance system in Japan. 13 
Although there are studies, which provide a historical perspective on the 
development of financial accounting in Japan, the recent changes in the legal 
framework for accounting and the adoption of International Accounting Standards 
(lASs) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) they do not link 
such developments to wider concerns about corporate governance. An exception is 
the book by Demise et al. (2006), which offers a discussion of corporate 
governance in )apan from the viewpoints of management, accounting and the 
market. The chapter on "Accounting and Disclosure in Japan" by Nakoshi (2006) 
offers a brief description of the disclosure in Japan that is related to corporate 
governance, for example, the requirements of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. She also 
indicates that there is demand from shareholders for accounting disclosure but that 
many firms are reluctant to provide this information. 
Another significant focus of the English literature is the interrelationship between 
Japanese style employment practices and corporate governance. Abe (2002) 
explores the impact of Japanese corporate governance structures on the 
employment practices of Japanese firms. Based on financial data for companies 
listed on the Japanese stock markets he focuses on the interrelationship between the 
rate of employment and adjustment and corporate governance structure in place. He 
concludes that the speed of employment adjustment in Japanese firms is directly 
\3 In this chapter only the literature that specifically and explicitly focuses on accounting disclosure in 
the context of corporate governance is discussed. 
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linked to characteristics of the Japanese corporate governance system. These 
characteristics are cross shareholdings and existence of large shareholders. Abe and 
Shimizutani (2007) examine the interrelationship between Japanese style 
employment practice and corporate governance structure in the context of recent 
significant changes in the ownership structures of companies and the composition 
of the board of directors. The paper shows that decisions to reduce labour costs 
depend on inside and outside directors. Outside directors tend to prefer layoffs and 
voluntary or early retirement schemes whereas inside directors prefer not to take 
new employees and protect existing employees. Buchanan (2007) offers an outline 
of a dimension of Japanese corporate governance structure as 'internalism': the 
members of the board of directors are appointed by internally promoted former 
employees. He finds that many managers in large Japanese companies do not seem 
willing to have external members on the board of directors as these external 
members do not have relevant knowledge of the company and therefore they doubt 
the efficacy of outside directors. Even if companies implemented external 
supervision they still largely maintain their internal management system. Jackson 
(2005) highlights 'how changes in corporate governance impact labour 
management, particularly in the countries with stakeholder-oriented corporate 
governance' (Jackson 2005, p. 419). The paper by Jacoby et al. (2005) investigates 
the differences between the role and positioning of HR executives in Japanese and 
US companies and the impact of this on corporate governance. The main insights 
from this study are that changes in the role of HR executives in both countries have 
taken place but at different pace. The US experienced quicker change than Japan 
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and this in tum had a different impact on the corporate governance structures of 
both countries. In the US, where the finance function and a strong shareholder 
ethos dominate HR, executives are less likely to be prominent on the boards. In 
contrast, in Japan, where there is less of an emphasis on the finance function and 
the shareholder ethos, it is more likely for HR executives to be included on the 
board. 
Having summarised the key issues focused upon in the English literature on 
corporate governance in Japan the next section offers a summary of the key issues 
focused upon in the Japanese literature. This is followed by a critical evaluation of 
both literatures. 
3.1.2. The Japanese Literature on Corporate Governance in Japan 
There is a large body of literature on corporate governance in Japan in the Japanese 
language that focuses on the period of this study. Similar to the English literature, 
the Japanese literature on corporate governance can also be divided into two 
groups: first, those works that offer a general discussion of issues facing corporate 
governance in Japan and the development of the Japanese corporate governance 
system, and second, those works that focus on specific corporate governance issues. 
The contributions to the literature in the Japanese language are especially 
concerned to assess the appropriateness of the changes proposed to the Japanese 
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corporate governance system or those changes that have already been implemented. 
Below the main insights of this literature are discussed and summarised. 
The papers of the first group, which provide a general overvIew of corporate 
governance issues in Japan, make an attempt to identify the key areas of concern. 
These papers also present attempts to explain the background to the corporate 
governance debate in Japan, that is, when and why corporate governance became a 
hotly debated issue in Japan. More specifically, papers aim to identify from various 
viewpoints the origins of the problem(s) facing the Japanese corporate governance 
system in the context of a changing environment (ltoh, 1994; Kawamura et al., 
1994; Uetake, 1994; Demise, 1997; Koyama, 1998; Kagono, 1999; Hatta 2005; 
Hirata, 2002a, b). They also offer explications and analyses of the characteristics of 
the Japanese corporate system and an evaluation of the Japanese corporate 
governance system in this changing context (Ariakwa et al., 2006; Udagawa, 2000). 
There are two broad positions evident in the literature: first, the view that the 
traditional Japanese corporate governance system can appropriately deal with the 
changing environment and care should therefore be taken in replacing it with a 
corporate governance system from a different cultural and socio-economic context; 
and, second, the view that the Japanese corporate governance system is not 
appropriate anymore because of the significant changes globally and that it 
consequently needs to be changed. In addition, several papers make an attempt to 
assess the Japanese corporate governance system and to offer possible future 
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models for Japanese corporate governance (Sakai, 2005; Sasaki, 2001; Sato, 2002). 
Illustration of the argumentation in these studies is provided below. 
There is general agreement in the literature that corporate governance became an 
important issue during the 1990s in Japan. Hirata (2001) makes the point that 
although the issue of corporate governance has developed into a hotly discussed 
issue in the areas of accounting, economics, finance, law and securities globally, 
there were only six researchers in the area of business management in Japan who 
did research on corporate governance in the first half of the 1990s. This situation, 
however, changed dramatically in the latter half of the 1990s, as researchers in the 
business management area had been stimulated by the findings in the academic 
disciplines mentioned above. Hirata (2001) reviews the studies published by the six 
Japanese researchers as well as the activities of the Japanese government, the 
Liberal Democratic Party and the recommendations published by Japanese business 
organisations in order to assess current developments in the Japanese corporate 
governance system. Hirata (2001) points to an important difference in the reasons 
for the concerns with corporate governance in Western countries, such as, for 
example, the U.S, the UK and Germany, and Japan. Western countries, according 
to Hirata (2001), had already overcome the problem of corporate scandals in the 
early 1990s and the main concerns in these countries in terms of corporate 
governance had moved to a concern with the relationship between governance and 
business competitiveness. In contrast, corporate governance problems in Japan 
arose from frequent corporate scandals during the 1990s, and as a consequence the 
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main focus in relation to governance in Japan was thus on the accountability of 
management rather than corporate performance. Hirata (2001) argues that there 
were eight areas that had a significant impact on the emergence of the corporate 
governance debate in Japan: unprotected shareholders' wealth resulting from the 
separation of ownership and control in modem large corporations; the necessity of 
coordinating the interests amongst various interest groups; recurring corporate 
scandals after the bubble economy had burst; weak performance of corporations in 
the post bubble economic context; awareness of shareholders of shareholder 
activism; simplification of derivative lawsuits; necessity of agile management of 
companies; and the need for efficient management of companies in the context of 
corporate glo balisation. Hirata (2001) claims that the first three issues can be 
observed globally whereas the remaining five issues are unique to Japan (ibid., 
p.82). Uetake (1994) argues that the rise of institutional shareholders was the key 
impetus for the growing corporate governance debate. The author further highlights 
that under recent economic growth and the advancement of globalisation, which 
has led to increased pressure for market liberalisation, Japan has also been urged to 
change its corporate governance system. Studies in the Japanese language have also 
attempted to describe the Japanese corporate governance and corporate system and 
to identify the key components of these systems. Itoh (1994), for example, in his 
general discussion of corporate governance, has pointed to key issues in the 
corporate governance debate as being the board of directors, including composition 
and size of the board; the monitoring system, such as, for example, the board of 
corporate auditors; and, accounting and disclosure. Relatedly, Saito (1994) in his 
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study identified cross shareholding, lifelong employment, seniority based 
promotion, main bank system and industrial group (keiretsu) as the key 
components of the Japanese corporate system that significantly shape the Japanese 
corporate governance system. 
Koyama (1998) illustrates that the recent transformation of the Japanese corporate 
governance system is the result of depressed corporate performance accompanied 
with the prolonged recession after the bubble economy had burst. He argues that 
the once praised Japanese corporate system has become an obstacle for change and 
makes the point that change is inevitable for Japanese companies. He further states 
that the number of foreign investors has become significant and that Japanese 
companies therefore have to justify their systems, including their corporate 
governance systems. Koyama (1998) makes the important point that these systems 
do not need to be the same as the corporate governance systems of foreign 
companies. He holds, however, that Japanese companies have failed to convince 
investors, including foreign investors, of the appropriateness of the Japanese 
system more generally and the corporate governance system more particularly. He 
reviews efforts of Japanese companies to design new Japanese management 
systems and practices and reaches the conclusion that it is difficult to establish 
better systems that are consistent with Japanese tradition and culture. Writing in 
1998, he argues that although the reform of the Japanese corporate governance 
system has just started, this reform will significantly impact upon companies and 
decide their future prospects. Further, he urges Japanese companies not to confuse 
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the American standard with a global standard when aiming to improve Japanese 
systems. Egawa (2003, 2005) focuses on the interrelationship between the current 
economic crisis and the specific characteristics of the Japanese corporate 
governance system and corporate system with a focus mainly on Japanese human 
resource management. He argues that the recession of the 1990s was not the 
problem of the particular management style and employment policies of Japanese 
companies but rather a decline of demand for Japanese products. Egawa thus 
positively supports Japanese employment practices such as lifelong employment 
and seniority based promotion and payment as they contribute to the development 
of Japanese economic growth. He explains that it has become fashionable to see the 
U.S. corporate governance system as an ideal mechanism for checking and 
controlling management in the context of a rapidly expanding globalisation. He, 
however, objects to introducing U.S. corporate governance systems to Japanese 
companies as U.S. systems only effectively work in the U.S. context, for which 
they have been designed. Sudo (2006) investigates the Japanese human resource 
management system and the Japanese corporate governance system, especially 
focusing on the lifelong employment system. He argues that Japanese capitalism 
differs from U.S capitalism. In Japan, the manufacturing sector is more important 
than the financial sector and it is thus essential for companies to protect their 
employees who have company specific knowledge and skills, which they have 
obtained through their work experience. He points out that Japanese corporate 
practices including the lifelong employment system, face changes because of the 
low economic growth after the bursting of the bubble economy. Sudo (2006) 
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concludes that Japanese companies should design corporate governance systems, 
which are based on the customs and set of values rooted in Japanese culture and 
society. Okabe (2002) explores recent trends of corporate governance research in 
Japan and states that the area of corporate governance should not be considered 
only within one discipline as it is complex and relates to various disciplines, such 
as, for example, microeconomics, business management studies, accounting and 
law. He stresses that research on corporate governance in Japan should focus on 
ownership structure because of the unique ownership structure of Japanese 
companies, namely cross shareholding. He also makes the point that the rise of 
foreign and institutional investors and the reforms of Japanese employment 
practices may lead to a transformation of Japanese corporate governance systems. 
Further, he claims that in order to be able to propose relevant corporate governance 
systems for these countries researchers should consider each country's historical, 
social and cultural context. 
Within the contributions to the Japanese literature that constitute group two for the 
purposes of this literature review and that focus on particular issues and themes in 
relation to corporate governance, several key focuses may be identified: the board 
of directors; executive compensation; the executive officer system; the banks as 
providers of capital; ownership structure; accounting disclosure; internal control; 
the law; management practices; accountability and ethics. This literature also aims 
to explore specific changes related to aspects of the Japanese corporate governance 
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system in the context of changes in the corporate system and wider contextual 
changes. 
Research on the board of directors and corporate governance has developed as a 
focus of the Japanese literature since the emergence of the debate in the early 
1990s. Papers either provide general overviews of issues related to the board of 
directors' issues (Demise, 1997; Inabetsu, 2002) or focus on specific issues in 
detail, such as, for example, the composition of the board of directors, which often 
is discussed in relation to the introduction of non-executive directors (Shishido 
2003, Miyauchi, 2003Book). Other related issues are the remuneration system for 
members of the board of directors (Sakai and Yun 2007 , Yamazaki 2003), the role 
of the executive officer (Aoki 2002, Abe 2002, Sawaguchi 1999, Tanaka 2001, 
Niwa 1998, Yamaguchi 1999) and matters related to companies with a committee 
system (Takei, 2002, 2002; Morimoto 2003a, b, c; Yamada 2003). 
Inabetsu (2002) argues that it is assumed that a corporation is supervised by the 
market and the board of directors. He makes the point, however, that the American 
experience during 1980s has shown that the market's role to maintain discipline 
may be questioned. Thus, in a context where market mechanisms cannot be relied 
upon the board of directors is expected to reinforce control. The board of directors 
therefore constitute an internal control mechanism through their monitoring 
function. He illustrates that the history of the reform of corporate governance is the 
history of the reform of strengthening the monitoring function of the board of 
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directors. Inabetsu (2002) points out that the U.S. is perceived as having the most 
advanced monitoring function. Recent corporate scandals have, however, damaged 
its reputation. He reached the conclusion that the independence of the board of 
directors from management was the key to sound corporate governance. Only if the 
board of directors is independent can it perform its monitoring function. In order to 
perform its monitoring function as an agent of the shareholders obstacles have to be 
overcome (Inabetsu, 2002). Inabetsu (2002) identifies several obstacles, such as, 
for example, the dual role of the chief executive officer and board chairman, a gap 
of knowledge and unequal power relations between the CEO and board members, 
and issues related to the board of directors as they decide and approve a company's 
business strategy. In the context of the above issues, institutional investors play an 
important role in enhancing corporate governance. Finally, as many nonexecutive 
directors are other companies' executive managers or CEO, it is important to find 
ways of motivating them. In his study Demise (2002) argues that the reform of the 
board of directors has developed with the trend in Japan being the reduction of the 
number of members of the board of directors and an increase in the number of non-
executive directors. He concludes that the board of directors provides a link 
between the owners of a company and its management and that there is therefore a 
possibility to send related party's representatives to the board of directors to 
balance their stake. Shishido (2003) remarked that historically the government 
aimed to improve corporate governance through amendments of the Commercial 
Code, which reinforced the auditing system. As these attempts had failed to 
establish the credibility of the Japanese corporate governance system, the 
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government thus further amended the Commercial Code in 2003 and gave Japanese 
companies the option either set up the original Japanese board system with its 
board of corporate auditors or the U.S.-style corporate governance system with its 
board of directors and its various sub-committees. He argues that the external board 
of directors has traditionally been expected to exercise a monitoring function. In 
contrast, he views the board of directors as a place for negotiation between 
providers of capital and employees. Miyauchi (2003) in his paper claims that the 
objective of corporate governance is to maXImIse shareholder wealth under 
shareholder capitalism and points to the important function of non-executive 
directors as monitors of management. 
The remuneration model for members of the board of directors has also been the 
subject of study of Japanese researchers. Sakai and Yun (2007), for example, argue 
that the compensation of Japanese companies' executives was monthly pay and 
retirement pay by the 1980s because the main banks had played a monitoring role 
as a creditor and thus had lowered agency costs. Under such circumstances, that is, 
low agency costs, there was less demand to link executive compensation with 
corporate performance. In addition to the monthly compensation the promotion 
system functioned as another kind of reward. The environment for Japanese 
companies, however, changed in the latter half of the 1980s because of 
deregulation and globalisation of the financial system. As a consequence of these 
developments the monitoring function of the banks has become less effective, 
which led to a rise in agency costs (ibid, pp.3-4). Based on their analysis, the 
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authors therefore conclude that, under the new circumstances, executive pay should 
include stock options and plans should be designed based on a medium- and to 
long-term perspective. Peng (2003) argues that the introduction of share price 
interlocking systems such as stock options by Japanese companies has encouraged 
managers to maintain a high share price. He suggests that this could constitute a 
first step of a corporate governance reform. Further, he concludes that it is also 
important to disclose executives' pay schemes so as to improve the corporate 
governance system. 
The introduction of the executive officer has also captured the attention of Japanese 
researchers. Aoki (2002) suggests that the introduction of executive officers may 
offer a solution to the main problems that Japanese companies' board of directors 
have, namely, inefficiency of the board due to its size and unification of the 
execution of duty and monitoring. Further, he suggests that low corporate 
performance, growth and capital efficiency all would trigger the introduction of 
executive officers. Yamaguchi (1999) points out that Japanese companies have 
entered a global era of mega competition. As shareholder wealth maximisation has 
become a primary corporate object, Japanese companies have thus moved away 
from traditional Japanese systems, including the Japanese corporate governance, 
and begun to converge with a global standard model so as to maintain their 
competitive edge. In this context he states that to introduce the corporate officers 
system is inevitable in order to achieve shareholder wealth maximisation. He 
observes, however. that this system has not yet been fully implemented in Japan 
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and suggests that some of these problems might be resolved by enforcing related 
laws. 
In research focusing on corporate governance and accounting, corporate 
governance issues are referred to in the context of issues relating to disclosure 
(Ishii, 2004; Hiramatsu 2001, Furusho, 1999; Matsuo, 2002; Mukoyama, 1999; 
Morita, 2005; Yamazaki, 2003), internal control (Fujikawa, 2003; Kakizaki, 2004; 
Suenaga and Fujikawa, 2004; Nishimura, 2005; Ichiko, 2007; Hatta, 2007; Iyoda, 
2007), accountability of management (Demise, 1997a, b), International Accounting 
Standards (Itoh, 2003), and the reform of the accounting systems (Kakurai, 1999; 
Fujikawa, 2003; Matsumura, 2002). In the debate on accounting disclosure and 
corporate governance, for example, Takao (1999) explores corporate governance 
issues within the accounting framework. He argues that corporate governance can 
be investigated from the point of view of disclosure and reaches the conclusion that 
the accounting system itself takes on an important role as a control mechanism. 
Hiramatsu (2001) also focuses upon disclosure issues in his corporate governance 
research. He acknowledges that tough competition in the global market in 
conjunction with the intensification of globalisation and the long lasting economic 
slump and the successive emergence of corporate scandals, which were followed 
by the bursting of bubble economy, all led to an increasing debate over corporate 
governance in Japan. He explains that the current trend in the corporate governance 
reform is changing the corporate governance systems in line with the U.S. systems. 
The aim of this reform is to strengthen the authority of the auditor. Hiramatsu 
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(2001) also stresses the importance of including disclosure In the corporate 
governance reform. 
Itoh (2003) makes the point that International Accounting Standards, especially fair 
value accounting, relate to corporate governance. He points out that the 
introduction of current value accounting put an end to the Japanese corporate 
governance system because Japanese companies were no longer able to maintain 
their practice of cross-shareholding, which is one of the main characteristics of the 
Japanese corporate system and significantly shapes the corporate governance 
system. He expresses the view that Japanese companies are apparently forced to 
change their traditional systems. This is, however, a problem as, according to Itoh 
(2003), the American system cannot be adopted into Japanese context. Instead it is 
important for Japanese companies to establish a new system, which enhances 
corporate value in such a way that it satisfies all participants of a company. 
The papers that focus on internal control as an important component of the 
corporate governance system explore ways of setting up proper monitoring systems 
in Japanese companies. Ichiko (2007) argues that the New Company Act and the 
Financial Products Exchange Law both are enabling internal control systems. Both 
laws, however, are aimed at different aspects of the internal control system. The 
New Company Act covers the role of the board of directors and of corporate 
executives. A restriction of internal control in the Financial Products Exchange 
Law aims at ensuring reliability of financial reporting. Ichiko (2007) sees a 
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contradiction between these two laws and argues that this might negatively impact 
on a company's objective, as stipulated in the law, of maximising shareholder 
wealth. He therefore suggests that the two laws should be reconsidered and 
adjusted. 
Demise (1997) has argued in the context of writing about corporate governance and 
accountability that the application of authority must be accompanied by 
accountability so as to gain legitimacy. Viewed from this perspective he claims, 
however, that in Japanese companies, the board of directors and executives are not 
clearly separated and some shareholders are therefore calling for more 
accountability. Demise (1997) reached the conclusion that the debate over 
corporate governance in Japan changes the relationship between management and 
shareholders and leads to changes in the corporate structure of Japanese companies. 
There are several papers written by law academics that focus on the 
interrelationship between Japanese legal requirements and corporate governance. 
The main focuses of these papers are changes in and developments of the 
Commercial Code and their impact upon the corporate governance structures of 
Japanese companies (Suzuki 1999; Suenaga 1999; Yoshida 2004; Miyajima 2000). 
Tabata (2005) remarks that recent corporate scandals and an indication of the lack 
of explicit monitoring systems have led Japanese companies to establish 
compliance systems. This phenomenon is the result of attempts to achieve 
efficiency and competitiveness of a company and an increase in the number of 
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foreign shareholders, who have urged management to consider shareholder wealth. 
The author suggests that the OEeD recommendation should be taken into 
consideration in reforming the laws and calls for further debates. Papers on 
corporate governance and the Commercial Code generally refer to the recent 
amendments of the Commercial Code (especially those in 1993, 2002 and 2003) 
(Yoshida, 2004). Papers focus upon the responsibilities of corporate executives and 
the board of directors and consider how the law has imposed higher responsibility 
on them in relation to corporate governance (Yoshida 2004). In his study Miyajima 
(2000) ascribes frequent revisions of the Company Code to the rapidly changing 
business environment especially outside of Japan in the context of globalisation. 
Although, he acknowledges that Japan cannot stand alone and therefore needs to 
adapt to changes in the global environment he at the same time questions if the law 
amendments should only contemplate external factors. Analysis shows that this 
series of law revisions has aimed at restoring and strengthening the right of 
shareholders and the annual meeting. 
There are several papers in the Japanese literature that focus on the relationship 
between management and corporate governance (Demise, 1994; Sakum, 2000; 
Nakamura, 2003; Hirata, 2002b). Hirata (2002b) in his study points to the 
important role of management in the context of the successful operation of a 
company. He argues that the corporate governance system is one of many functions 
that help reduce corporate scandals and enhance corporate competitiveness. He 
holds that too much emphasis is placed on the corporate governance system and 
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other important factors contributing to the avoidance of scandals and the 
enhancement of corporate competitiveness are overlooked. He concludes that even 
if companies have good corporate governance systems their progress still depends 
on whether they are managed properly by management. Hirata (2002b) therefore 
suggests that it is important not only to establish the hardware (that is, the 
corporate governance system) but also the software (that is, management). 
Similarly, Nakamura (2003) argues that the bursting of the bubble economy had 
provided an opportunity for Japanese companies to also re-think their corporate 
management systems. He further pointed out that under the intricate and complex 
socio-economic circumstances, it is not rational to only have shareholder wealth 
maximisation as the purpose of management. It is therefore important to expand the 
objectives that managers have to pursue and include multiple purposes that have to 
be simultaneously pursued. He also stressed that managers' behaviour is dependent 
on their personality, which in turn is based upon their cultural and social values. 
There has also been an interest amongst Japanese academics to focus on 
accountability and ethics in the context of corporate governance. Demise (1998), 
for example, made the point that a key issue in the context of corporate governance 
is accountability because if management is conscious of accountability, this will 
impact positively on their behaviour. Despite the importance of instilling a sense of 
accountability the corporate governance reform in Japan has been advanced 
through revising related laws. Demise (1998) comes to the conclusion that self-
imposed control by industrial organisations and corporate ethics at the level of the 
75 
individual company (such as, for example, the corporate governance codes) in the 
U.K. are an effective monitoring mechanism. Hattori (2002) also investigated the 
growing concern with corporate ethics and argues that the reason for the increased 
interest in business ethics is the high number of corporate scandals. He suggests 
that Japanese companies have to make serious efforts in the following two areas in 
order to survive in the global economy: first, all stakeholders must be taken into 
consideration and corporate governance systems should be built based on the 
Japanese context; and, second, changes in the corporate governance system of 
Japan should reflect the Japanese legal system as well as the internal and external 
environment that affects the economy and management. 
The banking system, one of the key characteristics of the Japanese corporate 
system that has significantly shaped the Japanese corporate governance system, has 
also been the focus of several research studies. In this area, one of the main issues 
is the traditional monitoring role of the banks and whether this role is still effective 
in a context of change. Uchida and Osano (2003) in their study focus upon the role 
of the banks as a monitoring mechanism: They conclude that banks functioned as a 
monitoring mechanism before the bubble economy but have, however, not properly 
fulfilled their monitoring role after the end of the bubble economy. Similarly, 
Hirota and Miyajima (2001) explain that banks had intervened in their clients' 
management when they were in financial difficulties or showed an operating deficit, 
during the 1970s and the 1980s. That function had, however, weakened in the 
1990s. Hirota (2001) explains that companies expect banks to provide information 
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and other non financial services and that they anticipate that banks will help them 
when they go through difficult times. This relationship will, however, change, as 
companies more and more raise funds from sources other than banks. As a result, 
the relationship between banks and companies will be weakened. Research has 
shown that as the relationship between banks and Japanese companies has changed 
and banks had suffered from a serious management crisis, market and institutional 
shareholders have become more and more important for Japanese companies as a 
source of funding. Mizuguchi (1994), for example, argues that the equity market 
plays two roles: first, it acts as a check on companies through day to day changes in 
share prices; and, second, it is a place where the changing composition of 
shareholders impacts upon companies. Cross shareholding practice, according to 
Mizuguchi (1994) adversely affects this checking mechanism of the market 
because management is immune to pressure from shareholders in the context of 
cross shareholdings. Kagono (2000) refers to the responsibility of shareholders 
because large shareholders not only impact upon management policy but also on 
the equity market. He remarks that although large shareholders' activity may 
encourage sound management practices, at the same time they may hinder the 
growth of such practices as some large shareholders might hold shares in order to 
gain from the sale of their shares. Kagono (2000) thus suggests that there is a need 
to consider establishing effective measures so as to prevent negative management 
practices caused by the irresponsibility of large shareholders. 
77 
Further, there are several papers, which put an emphasis on the interrelationship 
between cross shareholding and Japanese corporate governance. The main focuses 
of these papers are historical developments of the cross shareholding practice in 
Japanese companies, how this practice contributed to Japan's economic growth, 
and what kind of adverse affect this practice had on the Japanese corporate 
governance system (Miyajima et aI., 2003, Kitsuki and Nagakubo 1997). Kitsuki 
and Nagakubo (1997) in an historical study on cross shareholding point out that, as 
an outcome of cross shareholding, shareholders could not monitor management 
properly. They argue that this phenomenon has both good and bad aspects: the 
advantage of a lack of monitoring is that managers can manage their companies 
freely and this might have better facilitated their growth; the disadvantage is that 
shareholders cannot monitor their companies due to cross shareholding and thus 
significantly lost control. 
3.2. A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE LITERATURE 
The issues and themes addressed in the English literature more generally reflect the 
Anglo-American model of corporate governance with its focus on shareholder 
wealth maximisation. Key issues addressed are corporate performance and various 
components of the monitoring mechanism of the Anglo-American corporate 
governance system (such as, for example, the board of directors and executive 
compensation). There is also an emphasis on describing and assessing key elements 
of the Japanese corporate system, which are significantly different from the Anglo-
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American corporate system. These include cross shareholdings (especially in the 
context of keiretsu), the role of the main bank and Japanese employment practices 
(such as, for example, lifelong employment, seniority based pay and promotion). 
There seems to be an ethnocentric tendency in some of the literature in such 
elaborations of the Japanese system. The Japanese system is often described as 
being lacking as compared to the Anglo-American. From this perspective Japanese 
corporate governance is 'weak' and components of the Japanese corporate system 
are inadequate and need to be improved through implementing elements of the 
Anglo-American system. In such assessments of the Japanese system, no attempt 
has been made to appreciate the sense in which Japanese corporate governance as 
an embedded practice interrelates with the Japanese corporate system and the wider 
socio-economic and political context. The insistency of the superiority of the 
Anglo-American system also reflects a form of Westerncentrism, in particular an 
emphasis on the superiority of Anglo-American practice. There are several 
references in the literature to the Anglo-American model of corporate governance 
as the 'global standard' (Yamaguchi, 1998, 1999).14 The way in which the 
superiority of the Anglo-American model of corporate governance is taken-for-
granted and remains unchallenged indicates the hegemonic status of the Anglo-
American model. Much of the literature employing an agency theory approach 
reflects the above tendencies. Interestingly, the tendency to take the Anglo-
American model of corporate governance for granted can also be observed in 
literature that recognises and highlights the unique characteristics of the Japanese 
14 Similarly, Gallhofer and Haslam (2007) have argued that IASs!IFRSs have also taken on the role of 
a 'global', albeit mainly influenced by UK and US thought, standard. 
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context (for example in terms of culture). When aspects of corporate governance 
are discussed in such literature, the choice of focus reflects the Anglo-American 
model (for example, the board of directors, see Amadajan and Okumura, 2006). 
There is a lack of literature, which takes as a starting point for analysis the 
Japanese system and provides an appreciation of this system as one embedded and 
thus interrelating with particular Japanese as well as a global context. A noteworthy 
exception in the English literature is Dore (2003) who emphasises in his analyses 
how the Japanese corporate governance system and Japanese corporate system are 
shaped by and in turn shape the specific Japanese context. Dore' s assessment of the 
Japanese system therefore differs in terms of emphasis and appreciation. 
The literature on corporate governance in the Japanese language differs from the 
literature in the English language in several ways. The literature on Japanese 
corporate governance in the Japanese language to a large extent also focuses on 
similar issues as the English literature. Studies have focused on the board of 
directors, considered remuneration systems, elaborated upon the role of the bank as 
important monitors of management and analysed cross shareholdings. There is, 
however, an important difference between the Japanese literature on corporate 
governance and the English literature on corporate governance: the Japanese 
literature in the main is much more cautious about implementing changes to the 
Japanese corporate governance system that reflect elements of the Anglo-American 
corporate governance system. Indeed, research has been critical about especially 
the U. S. corporate governance system. Research has especially cautioned against a 
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wholesale acceptance of the U.S. corporate governance system. Such research has 
pointed to the importance of considering the Japanese cultural and legal traditions. 
Suggestions and proposals made often recommend that the Japanese corporate 
governance system should be improved by finding ways forward for improvements 
within the Japanese corporate governance system. There are papers in the Japanese 
literature that argue that the traditional Japanese corporate governance system has 
been adequate even during the last recession in 1990s, which is evident in the 
steady corporate performance of companies that mainly engage in exporting 
(Egawa 2003, 2005). 
Further and interestingly, there does not appear to be a strong ethnocentric bias in 
assessments of the U. S. corporate governance system. What is found in the 
literature instead is a concern to point to the cultural differences between the U.S. 
and Japan, which have shaped the corporate governance system. 
In summary, there is a large body of literature in the English as well as the 
Japanese language, which focuses upon corporate governance in Japan. It is of 
interest, however, that there is a paucity of studies that adopt an explicitly critical 
theoretical perspective in their analysis. Further, not many studies offer detailed 
analyses of documents issued by the various constituencies during the period from 
1989 to 2007, the issues and trends in the public discourse, and the way the 
Japanese government impacted upon the development of corporate governance in 
Japan. This study here contributes to knowledge in several ways: first, it adopts a 
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critical theoretical perspective to the analysis of corporate governance in Japan, 
second, it offers an analysis of the trends and issues in the public debate on 
corporate governance as evident in newspapers; third, it provides a summary of key 
pronouncement of various constituencies contributing to the debate on corporate 
governance in Japan; fourth, through two case studies it provides insights into how 
the pressure to change the Japanese corporate governance system and to converge 
with the Anglo-American model of corporate governance was perceived and acted 
upon by the Japanese government and the Japan Corporate Governance Forum; 
and, sixth, reflecting a critical theoretical position that study here makes some 
proposals for change. It is of note that this research here through adopting a critical 
theoretical perspective on corporate governance, contrasts with and goes beyond 
research that has either applied an agency theory perspective or a stakeholder 
theory perspective. In contrast, it aims to develop its argumentation about Japanese 
corporate governance and the challenges it faces by appreciating the particularities 
of the Japanese corporate governance system and the Japanese context. Further, the 
analysis of the empirical sites aims to provide insights into how corporate 
governance systems are evolving as part of political struggles in a global context. 
3.3. SUMMARY 
Chapter three has offered a review of the literature. Reflecting the interdisciplinary 
character of this study, the chapter discussed contributions to the literature from a 
variety of disciplines, including, accounting and finance, economics, management, 
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human resource management, law, politics, sociology, international relations and 
Japan Studies. It identified trends, issues and themes in the literatures in the 
English and Japanese language on corporate governance in Japan. The analysis 
indicates that the literature in both languages addresses similar key issues, such as, 
for example, the board of directors, ownership structure, executive compensation, 
the banks as providers of capital and accounting disclosure. There is a difference, 
however, in the assessment of the changes taking place in Japan. The literature in 
Japanese is much more critical in assessing the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model and the suggestion that Japan should converge with this model 
than is the case for the literature in English. The chapter ended by outlining the 
contribution to knowledge of this study. The next chapter, chapter 4, addresses 
issues of methodology from a critical theoretical perspective and outlines the 
methods adopted in this study. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY AND METHOD: A CRITICAL THEORETICAL 
OVERVIEW 
This chapter addresses questions of methodology and method and their 
interrelationship with the theoretical position. It initially elaborates the way in 
which theoretical position, research design and method are interrelated 15. This 
includes a brief elaboration of ontological and epistemological assumptions. The 
chapter then provides a rationale for and an outline of the particular case study 
methodology that is adopted in this study and how this provides insights into the 
research questions that the thesis aims to explore. This is followed by a rationale 
for and a brief description of the type of empirical material analysed, including a 
description of the methods employed in the analysis of the empirical material. The 
chapter ends with an elaboration of the Critical Systems Model that is employed in 
the analysis of the empirics. 
4.1. ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS16 
15 This chapter responds to here is confusion in the literature about the terms theoretical position, 
methodology and methods, using the delineations offered by Crotty (1998, pp. 2-4). A theoretical 
position is an approach to understanding and explaining society and the human world and the 
philosophical stance informing the methodology. A methodology, reflecting this philosophy, may be 
understood in terms of a research design that guides the research in choosing methods and shapes the 
design of the methods chosen. It is the analysis of how the research should or does proceed. Methods 
are the techniques or procedures used to collect and anlyse data related to the research question. 
16 Epistemology here refers to the theory of 'knowing' that is embedded in a theoretical perspective 
and ontology refers to the theory of 'being' embedded in a theoretical position (Crotty, 1998). 
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There is debate in the literature in accounting and finance and the social sciences 
more generally about how theoretical positions, methodology and method are 
interrelated and how this affects the design of a research study. It is possible to 
identify two broad positions in these debates. First, there is the view that there is a 
causal relationship between theoretical perspective, methodology and method. Such 
a view would hold that particular types of methods are linked to particular theories 
and that the epistemological and ontological assumptions underpinning these 
theories determine the types of methods that should be used. In such argumentation 
positivist epistemological and ontological positions are linked to quantitative 
research methods and interpretivist epistemological and ontological positions to 
qualitative research methods. Second, there is the view that the relationship 
between theoretical position, method and methodology is less straightforward. 
Such a view would hold that in certain circumstances or In some sense 
interpretivist theoretical positions can be combined with quantitative research 
methods (Blaikie, p. 1993, 201). A brief elaboration of positivist and interpretivist 
ontological and epistemological assumptions helps to explain these two views on 
the impact of theoretical positions on the choice of methods. 
In positivistic ontological positions, social reality is understood to be an ordered 
universe that consists of observable events. The ability to observe these events 
indicates that they are real. According to such a position, human activity can be 
observed as it takes place in an observable context. Further, social reality consists 
of events that are linked through causal relations. Important in this argumentation is 
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that what causes human behaviour is understood to be external to the individual. 
The above ontological assumptions are reflected in the epistemological 
assumptions of positivistic positions. Knowledge is derived through observation of 
facts by the researcher who is a neutral observer and whose own experiences and 
context do not enter knowledge creation. Knowledge derived in this way is 
understood to be the only legitimate form of knowledge. Positivistic positions are a 
product of the Enlightenment (the Age of Reason) 17 and were initially developed in 
the context of the natural sciences. They soon became, however, applied in the 
social sciences in an attempt to enhance their scientific character. The value of 
positivistic positions was especially appreciated in the social sciences since the 
nineteenth century, when Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) stressed that social facts 
take on the characteristics of things in general and that society should therefore be 
studied by using the methods of natural science, which can be understood as the 
study of things (Jones, 2003, pp. 31-53). Positivistic positions soon gained 
popularity and they now constitute the mainstream approach in social science 
disciplines. This is also the case in finance and accounting. The finance literature, 
which is based on neo-classical economics and the literature in accounting, which 
employs positive accounting theory, are thus underpinned by positivistic 
ontological and epistemological assumptions (Ryan, et aI, 2002). Relatedly, there is 
a mainstream body of literature on corporate governance, which uses quantitative 
research methods in the context of positivistic approaches to research. 
17 Alvesson and Deetz (2000, p. 13) explain that in respect to Western Enlightenment that 'Kant 
described the Enlightenment as the escape from self-inflicted tutelage'. 
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The positivistic approach to research in the social SCIences, however, did not 
remain unchallenged. As early as the eighteenth century, philosophical positions 
had emerged that offered an interpretive alternative to positivistic conceptions of 
the world and knowledge. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was an important 
representative of the interpretive position, which had a conception of the individual 
as belonging to a wider social and cultural entity (Hughes and Sharrock, 1990). This 
argumentation was further enhanced in the nineteenth century by historians who 
addressed the following related questions: first, "Can the study of history be a 
natural science or does it have to develop its own distinctively human inquiry?", 
and, second, "How do we come to terms with the fact that history involves the 
understanding and self-understanding on the part of those human beings under 
study?" It was concluded that the study of history, i.e. the study of human 
behaviour and actions, needed different methods to that of the natural SCIences 
(Hughes and Sharrock, 1990). 
The above elaboration already implicitly points to the different ontological and 
epistemological assumptions that underpin interpretive positions. In these positions 
social reality is understood as a complex set of socially constructed meanings. This 
implies that, in contrast to positivism, that social reality is not an ordered universe 
that consists of observable events. Social reality therefore cannot be understood as 
a thing that may be interpreted in different ways; it is those interpretations (Hughes 
and Sharrock, 1990). Knowledge is therefore understood to be derived from gaining 
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insights into everyday concepts and meanIngs. The social researcher alms to 
understand the socially constructed meanings through entering the social world. 
The above elaborations of the characteristics of positivistic and interpretive 
positions facilitate understanding of the two views (outlined above) on how 
theoretical positions and choice of methods are interrelated. If one is concerned to 
strictly match methods with theoretical positions on the basis of their ontological 
and epistemological positions then it seems reasonable to suggest that positivistic 
theoretical positions should be matched with quantitative methods and interpretive 
theoretical positions with qualitative methods. This position in terms of choice of 
method has, however, been challenged and the view has emerged that the 
interrelationship between theory, methodology and method is not absolutely 
deterministic. Blaikie (1993, p.215) argues in this respect: 
No one approach and strategy, and its accompanying choices on these 
issues, provides a perfect solution for the researcher, there is no one ideal 
way to gain knowledge of the social world. All approaches and strategies 
involve assumptions, judgments and compromises' all are claimed to have 
deficiencies. However, depending on where one stands, it is possible to 
argue their relative merits. 
It can thus be argued that the researchers based on their research interests and the 
theoretical position they employ will tend to have a preference for particular types 
of methodologies and methods. Researchers employing interdisciplinary 
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perspectives, and especially with a critical intent18 (for example, critical theoretical 
perspectives, indigenous perspectives and feminist perspectives), may use 
qualitative as well as quantitative research methods in their research design. Most 
commonly, research employing critical perspectives is still "structured along the 
lines of the powerful examplar rather than a mass of data" (Alvesson and Deetz, 
2000, p.18). The justification for this choice of method is that individual 
experiences can be much better documented through in-depth research methods 
(for example, the various types of interview methods developed by indigenous 
researchers and feminist researchers). There are, however, instances where 
quantitative methodologies and methods are used despite the interpretivist 
ontological and epistemological assumptions that underpin these critical 
perspectives. In such cases, the choice of quantitative methods by critical 
researchers most likely reflects their intention to engage in debate through their 
research insights and the type of research questions they use (Alvesson and Deetz, 
2000). For example, if it is the objective of the researcher to engender change and 
public debate through research insights, quantitative methods might be much more 
effective given the general positive public perception of facts. The power of facts 
and numbers was already recognised by the Frankfurt School (for example, 
Horkheimer and Adorno in their work on the authoritative character type). 
18 Critical intent here refers to the position taken by the researcher to engender emancipatory change 
with the view of facilitating the realisation of the potential of individuals, communities and 
organisations with the overarching goal being global well-being (Gallhofer and Haslam, 2009). 
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Quantitative research methods are now variously employed together with 
interpretive research methods in studies informed by critical theoretical positions. 19 
The next section of the chapter outlines the research design of the thesis; explains 
the way in which the empirical material was chosen and the methods employed in 
the analysis of the empirical material. 
4.2. RESEARCH DESIGN, CRITICAL CASE STUDY AND CRITICAL 
SYSTEMS MODEL (CSM) 
The study employs a critical case study methodology, which like the critical 
theoretical perspective adopted, reflects interpretivist ontological and 
epistemological assumptions. The choice of research design and methods here was 
motivated by the specific research questions, which in turn reflect the critical intent 
to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions and perceptions (that is, of the Japanese 
and Anglo-American corporate governance systems). As it is an objective of the 
research to gain insights into what happens to Japanese corporate governance in the 
context of pressures to change it was decided to choose the case study methodology 
in order to get in depth insights into the issues at stake. The "powerful examplar 
rather than a mass of data" (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000, p.18) facilitates here the 
critical research intent. At the same time there is a need to locate these two case 
studies in the broader public debate, that is, to appreciate how the issues they 
19 An example for such a type of research is the paper by Gallhofer et al. (2000), which uses a web 
survey and interviews to gain insights into enabling dimensions of online reporting. 
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discussed and were concerned about reflected the issues and trends of the public 
discourse of the time. In order to gain insights into the trends and issues of the 
broader public debate a content analysis of a sample of Japanese newspapers was 
conducted. The combination of case study analysis and content analysis facilitates 
the type of social analysis employed in this study (see below). 
The empirical sites for the case studies are: first, bilateral trade negotiations 
between Japan and US, and, second, the development of the Corporate Governance 
Principles of the Japan Corporate Governance Forum. In both cases, corporate 
governance is discussed in the context of change, i.e. a context in which there is 
pressure to change the traditional Japanese corporate governance system. Both 
empirical sites are significant instances of regulatory intervention reflecting the 
Japanese context. The first empirical site, the bilateral trade negotiations, shows 
how the Japanese government, originally the sole and since the introduction of the 
stock exchange after W orId War II a j oint regulator of corporations, acts in the 
context of pressures to change the corporate governance system through 
implementing (or not implementing) required changes into Japanese law. The 
second empirical site, the Japan Corporate Governance Forum, is an instance of an 
attempt at self-regulation, in an area that traditionally was a domain of the law. It is 
of interest to gain insights into the way the Japan Corporate Governance Forum 
responded to the pressures for change in designing their Corporate Governance 
Principles and the contextual constraints that facilitated or hindered this process. 
The insights gained from the detailed analysis of the empirical material shed light 
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on several issues that reflect the concerns of a critical theoretical perspective: for 
example, the unequal power relations (between groups and between states, for 
instance); the tensions between different values, including cultural value, 
underpinning corporate governance systems; the perceived impact of the pressures 
to modify or replace the traditional Japanese corporate governance system on the 
way of life and the well-being of people living in Japan; and the way in which the 
dynamics and tensions constitute threats and opportunities from a critical 
theoretical perspective. 
The research process employed in the two case studies reflects the critical 
theoretical perspective adopted. Alvesson and Deetz (2000, p.17) refer in this 
context to three "overlapping" tasks of research, namely, "insight", "critique" and 
"transformative redefinition". They explain: 
The insights task demonstrates our commitment to the hermeneutic, 
interpretive and ethnographic goals of local understandings closely 
connected to and appreciative of the lives of real people in real situations. 
The critique task demonstrates out commitment to the analytical aspects of 
critical traditions which recognize the possibility of domination in local 
formations and to reconnect local forms and meanings to larger social, 
historical and political processes. The transformative redefinition task 
demonstrates our commitment to the more pragmatic aspects of critical 
thought, recognizing that insight and critique without support for social 
action leaves research detached and sterile (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000, p. 
17). 
Related to this, the research process here follows the Critical Systems 
Model (CSM) as outlined by Gallhofer and Haslam (2008, pp.12-17). 
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The Critical Systems Model offers a way of analysing accounting and social 
phenomena more generally as embedded in context. It reflects the concern of a 
critical theoretical perspective to engender enabling emancipatory change and thus 
emphasises transformation to the better. In the following the Critical Systems 
Model is elaborated with reference to corporate governance. 
Figure one. 
Delineation of a critical approach: A critical systems model of the analysis of accounting in context 
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Figure 1: The Critical Systems Model (Gallhofer and Haslam, 2008, p. 13) 
The left side of the model depicts corporate governance as embedded in its current 
problematic contexts. Through critique, positive and negative attributes of the 
Japanese corporate governance system are identified in relation to the problematic 
context they are embedded in. The right side of the model depicts a better Japanese 
corporate governance system that the researcher initially proposes in order to 
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engender debates. The researcher also aims at suggesting strategies for how the 
move from a current problematic corporate governance system to a better system 
may be achieved. The Critical Systems Model, reflecting the critical theoretical 
perspective employed in this study, emphasises that change towards a better 
corporate governance system (to the extent it occurs) may be understood as along 
continuum. Over time, and through engagement, dimensions of the model change. 
4.3. RESEARCH METHODS 
Following the above research approach, textual analyses of the empirical material 
are carried out so as to gain insights into the issues addressed in the research 
questions outlined in Chapter 1. Consistent with a critical theoretical perspective, 
the study employs methods through a critical and interpretive lens. Critical here 
means that the methods chosen help to develop argumentation in the context of the 
debate over corporate governance in Japan that aims to shed light on possible 
tensions that might arise because of, for example, cultural differences reflected in 
different corporate governance systems and unequal power relations between the 
groups involved in the debate. The critical lens, however, not only impacts upon 
the choice of methods for this study but also on the way in which the methods are 
applied. That is, methods are not followed "like a rule book" but they are variously 
shaped and modified so as to facilitate the development of the argumentation of 
this study. This implies that not all elements and parts that constitute a particular 
method are applied in this study but only those parts of a particular method are 
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chosen that are especially deemed to facilitate the critical social analysis aimed at 
here. The interpretive lens supports and provides further justification for such a use 
of method. Acknowledging that no truth exists that can be uncovered by the 
researcher through the precise application of a particular method the interpretive 
lens supports partial application and modification of methods by the researcher if 
this is to better facilitate his or her task (cf. Gallhofer et al., 200 1 a). 
Based on the above considerations, this study employs two types of textual 
analysis: first, a quantitative content analysis (but informed by and through a 
critical interpretive lens and motivation), and, second, a critical interpretive textual 
analysis. The former is concerned to broadly outline trends in and issues of the 
public debate on corporate governance in Japan as evident in newspapers whereas 
the latter aims to provide insights into how specific participants (the Japanese 
government and the Japan Corporate Governance Forum) in the debate developed 
arguments in relation to corporate governance in Japan, which reflect their 
particular location in the broarder public debate and the Japanese and global 
context more generally. The next section explains how the two methods have been 
employed in this study. 
4.3.1. Content Analysis 
Krippendorf (2004, p. 3) points out that '[a]lthough the term content analysis 
[emphasis m original] did not appear in English until 1941 ... the systematic 
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analysis of texts can be traced back to inquisitorial pursuits by the Church in the 
17th century'. Content analysis, as a distinct research method, was originally 
developed in the context of the study of mass communication, especially 
newspapers. In a general sense it is concerned to code texts by using content 
categories in order to identify the frequency with which these content categories 
appear in the texts analysed (see, for example, George, 2009, p. 145). After the 
Second World War, other social science disciplines began to employ the content 
analysis method (Krippendorff, 2004). Since then, content analysis has been 
significantly developed and today constitutes a key research method for the social 
sciences. As Krippendorff (2004) argues: 
Content analysis is potentially one of the most important research 
techniques in the social sciences. The content analyst views data as 
representations not of physical events but of texts, images, and 
expressions that are created to be seen, read, interpreted, and acted on for 
their meanings, and must therefore be analyzed with such uses in mind. 
Analyzing texts in the context of their uses distinguishes content analysis 
from other methods of inquiry (Krippendorff, 2004, p. xiii). 
This study here applies content analysis in the way it is advocated by Krippendorff 
above. The texts, i.e. the newspapers, are understood to constitute an element of a 
public debate over corporate governance embedded in a particular Japanese context 
as well as a more general global context. And, the newspapers themselves are 
understood to constitute the broader context in which the debates of the two case 
studies (i.e. the bilaterial trade negotiations between Japan and the U.S. and the 
Corporate Governance Principles of the Japan Corporate Governance Forum) are 
embedded. 
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Content analysis has been widely employed by researchers in accounting. It 
especially has gained popularity in the areas of social and environmental 
accounting and corporate social responsibility reporting. In these areas, content 
analysis was employed to gain insights into the extent and characteristics of the 
voluntary disclosure of social and environmental information by corporations 
(Kuasirikun and Sherer, 2004, p. 635). Earlier studies focused on the printed annual 
report or the various forms of stand alone corporate social responsibility reports 
(see, for example, Jaggi, 1980; Guthrie and Parker, 1990; Gray et aI., 1995; Adams 
and Kuasirikun, 2000; Moneva and Llena, 2000; Gallhofer et aI., 2001 b; 
Kuasirikun and Sherer, 2004). More recently, and especially with the advancement 
of the internet as a tool of information disclosure for corporations, studies have 
increasingly begun to focus on corporate web-sites or the internet more generally 
(Gallhofer et aI., 2000). 
Studies in the areas of social and environmental and social responsibility reporting 
aimed at gaining insights into what types of information were voluntarily disclosed 
by companies, where it was disclosed, how it was disclosed and how much was 
disclosed. Longitudinal studies were interested in identifying trends in the 
disclosure of companies over particular periods and comparative studies, most of 
them focusing at short time periods, aimed at identifying differences and 
similarities in the voluntary disclosure of social and environmental information 
across countries (see, for example, JaggL 1980; Guthrie and Parker. 1990; Gray et 
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aI., 1995; Adams and Harte, 1998; Adams and Kuasirikun, 2000; Gallhofer et aI., 
2001 b; Kuasirikun and Sherer, 2004). Although there has been a significant 
increase in studies using content analysis in the area of social and environmental 
reporting, there is a paucity of studies employing content analysis to identify trends 
in the corporate governance reporting of companies. 
Some of the studies in the area of social and environmental or corporate social 
responsibility reporting that utilize content analysis are especially of interest to this 
study here because of their particular application of this research method. Such 
studies have employed content analysis, a quantitative method, in the context of an 
interpretivist theoretical position (Gallhofer et al., 2001 b, Kuasirikun and Sherer, 
2004). Gallhofer et aI. (2001a) employed a critical theoretical framework in their 
analysis of the results of a content analysis of annual reports. They developed a 
critique of the regulatory framework of environmental reporting based on their 
content analysis of annual reports. From a critical theoretical perspective, they 
argued for more legal prescription in the context of environmental reporting. 
Similarly, Kuasirikun and Sherer (2004) in their analysis of corporate social 
accounting disclosure in Thailand also based their critique of the reporting 
practices of Thai companies on a content analysis of annual reports. They explain: 
[The study's] concern is to gain insights into and to critically appraise 
various dimensions of these annual reports, so as to construct a critique of 
corporate social disclosure in Thailand. Pursuing a critical perspective 
sensitive to the context of Thailand, it is concluded that the various 
aspects of the Thai accounting disclosure that are analysed are disabling, 
and more generally that the Thai practices explored fall short of their 
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potential to function as enabling communication (Kuasirikun and Sherer, 
2004, p. 629). 
The particular interpretive and critical theoretical positions adopted by the 
researchers above impacted upon how content analysis was employed in these 
studies. In both studies content analysis was used to show trends in the reporting. 
For example, through content analysis it was highlighted what types of issues were 
disclosed, the volume of disclosure, how the information was disclosed and where 
within the annual report it was disclosed. In addition to the quantitative content 
analysis, interpretive textual analyses of examples of the particular types of 
disclosures that had featured in the content analysis were offered. In the context of 
the particular research design adopted in the studies by Gallhofer et al. (2001 b) and 
Kuasirikun and Sherer (2004), the quantitative content analysis offers a broad 
overview of general trends in the reporting of social and environmental accounting 
information whereas the qualitative textual analysis provides detailed insights into 
the particular ways in which this information is communicated to the readers of 
annual reports. It may be argued that applying both research methods in this way 
provides a more holistic insight into the social and environmental reporting 
practices of companies than simply employing either of the methods. An interplay 
between macro-level and micro-level analyses that achieves a more holistic 
appreciation of the reporting practices. Further, both studies did not carry out 
statistical tests of the data they had obtained from their content analysis. The reason 
for this is that for the purposes of their studies it was sufficient to simply present 
the data either in its raw form or in the form of percentages. 
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The study here also employs content analysis in the way outlined above in order to 
show trends of and issues discussed in the public debate over corporate governance 
in Japan as evident in newspapers. A quantitative content analysis is carried out, 
which, as George (2009, p. 145) has explained, 'is concerned with the frequency of 
occurrence of given content characteristics' 20. More particularly, this study is 
concerned to gain insights into the frequency with which content categories are 
referred to (at least once) in newspaper articles over the period under focus here. 
The next section of the chapter outlines how the sample for the content analysis of 
this study was chosen and how the content categories of the analysis arrived at. 
As mentioned earlier, it was decided to use a content analysis of newspapers to 
gain insights into the issues and trends of the wider public discourse in which the 
debates in the two case studies were embedded. It is reasonable to argue that 
newspapers, being a part of the media, reflect issues and concerns of what can be 
called a public discourse (Krippendorf, 2004). 
4.3.1. 1. Sample 
As the aim of the study is to gain insights into the corporate governance debate 
occurring in Japan, only Japanese newspapers were selected. The concern here is to 
get an appreciation of the broad, i.e. general, public discourse. In order to achieve 
20 This paper by Alexander George included in Krippendorff and Bock (2009), was originally 
published in 1949. 
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this, national newspapers were chosen for the analysis. 21 It was decided to 
differentiate between the types of daily newspapers: first, general newspapers, and, 
second, specialist financial newspapers. This categorisation of newspapers may 
provide insights into whether there are differences between concerns raised and 
issues addressed in the reporting of the national financial daily newspapers and the 
national general daily newspapers. Differences and similarities between these 
categories of newspapers would indicate the extent to which the concerns of the 
financial community have permeated and were shared by the general public 
discourse. Daily circulation rates were taken into account in choosing the sample of 
newspapers for the analysis. Reporting in newspapers with high circulation rates 
was taken as better reflecting concerns in effect emerging in the general public 
Financial Newspapers 
Japanese Name English Name 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun (no English name) 
Nikkei Kinyu Shimbun (Financial Daily) 
Nikkei Sangyou Shimbun (Nikkei Business Daily) 
General Daily Newspapers 
Japanese Name English Name 
Asahi Shim bun (no English name) 
Mainichi Shim bun (no English name) 
Sankei Shim bun (no English name) 
Yomiuri Shimbun (no English name) 
Table 1: Newspapers included in the Sample 
21 An analysis aimed at identifying regional variations within the public discourse would go far 
beyond the scope of this study here and warrant study in its own right. 
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discourse. In choosing the sample of daily national newspapers, the political 
affiliation of the newspapers was also taken into account to ensure that the analysis 
of the trends in reporting would capture the general public discourse. The sample 
selection criteria resulted in a final sample of seven newspapers, as shown in Table 
1. 
The three daily financial newspapers of the sample are all published by Nikkei Inc., 
a publishing company established in 1876, which, according to its president, aims 
to 'contribute to the peaceful and democratic development of the Japanese 
economy - the basis of people's livelihoods - by providing fair and impartial news 
reports' (Nikkei, 2009a). Nihon Keizai Shimbun is the largest of the three daily 
financial newspapers. According to its web-site, it offers 'timely and objective 
coverage of corporate news and macroeconomic trends, from conditions in Japan 
and overseas to investment and management strategies' (Nikkei, 2009c). Nikkei 
Sangyo Shimbun (Business Daily) is a daily specialist newspaper, which provides 
microeconomic information, such as, for example, developments in cutting edge 
technologies and innovative products and services' (ibid.) and is read by 
'professionals in corporate analysis and investment, including securities analysts 
and fund managers' (ibid.). Nikkei Kinyu Shimbun (Financial Daily) is a specialist 
financial newspaper, which was discontinued on 21 January 2008 and replaced by 
the new weekly finance and investment newspaper Nikkei Veritas (Sankei News, 
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2007) 22. The four daily general newspapers are all published by different 
publishing companies, some of which have also been established in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century. The Asahi Shimbun company, for example, published the 
first version of its newspaper Asahi Shimbun in 1879 (The Asahi Shimbun, 2009a). 
Asahi Shimbun, according to its website, is 'the choice of Japan's opinion leaders 
and decision makers in the various business scenes' (ibid). Their readers are highly 
educated and affluent people who take up managerial positions of corporations' 
(ibid.). Yomiuri Shimbun was established in 1874. Since 1977 Yomiuri Shimbun 
have had the highest circulation rate amongst Japanese newspapers. According to 
its website, its readers 'have substantial purchasing power' (Yomiuri Shimbun, 
2009). Mainich Shimbun was established in 1872 and its readers are interested in 
issues that Japan is currently facing, such as the environment, the problems 
associated with an aging society and corporate social responsibility. According to 
the newspaper's website its readers earn a substantial annual income (Mainich 
Shimbun, 2009). Sankei Shimbun was established in 1933. Its readers mainly live 
in big cities and their average age is around forty seven years (Sankei Shimbun, 
2009a, b, c). 
The seven newspapers have a combined daily circulation rate of nearly 38 million 
copies (see Table 2 for daily circulation rates). Nikkei Keizai Shimbun is the largest 
daily economic and business newspaper in Japan as per circulation with a daily 
22 Nikkei Kinyu Shimbun (Financial Daily) was included in the sample as it constituted one of the top 
three Japanese daily newspapers specialising in financial and economic issues during the period 
focused upon in this study. 
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circulation rate of over three million copIes (approaching five million of the 
evening circulation is added). In contrast, the other two daily financial newspapers 
included in the sample have comparatively small daily circulation rates, which is 
partly reflective of the specialist readership they are targeting. 
Financial Newspapers 
Daily Circulation 
Name Morning Evening Total 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun 3,056,038 1,619,360 4,675,39825 
Nikkei Sangyou Shimbun 167 14423 nfa 
Nikkei Kinyu Shimbun 65'00024 nfa , 
General Daily Newspapers 
Daily Circulation 
Name Morning Evening Total 
Yomiuri Shimbun 10,016,894 3,782,579 13,799,47326 
Asahi Shimbun 8,033,400 3,427,061 11,460,461 27 
Mainichi Shimbun 3,880,632 1,323,715 5,204,34728 
Sankei Shimbun 1,921,075 571,710 249278529 , , 
All Newspapers 27,140,183 10,724,425 37,632,464 
Table 2: Daily Circulation Rate 
Yomiuri Shimbun is the largest daily general newspaper measured by daily 
circulation rate. Nearly 14 million copies of this newspaper are sold and distributed 
23 The figure constitutes the average for the period from July to December 2009 (Nikkei, 2009d). 
24 No precise circulation figures were available for this newspaper. The figure in the table constitutes 
the average of a peak circulation of 90,000 (no date available) and a circulation of 40,000 at the end of 
2007. 
25 The figure constitutes the average for the period from July to December 2008 (Y omiuri, 2009). 
26 The figure constitutes the average for the period from July to December 2008 (Y omiuri, 2009). 
27 The figure constitutes the average for the period from July to December 2008 (Y omiuri, 2009). 
28 The figure constitutes the average for the period from January to June 2008 (Mainichi Shimbun 
Advertising Division Cyberspace, 2009). 
29 The figure constitutes the average for the period from July to December 2008 (Sankei Shim bun, 
2009). 
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every day. Yomiuri Shimbun is closely followed by Asahi Shimbun, which reaches 
a distribution rate of around 11 million. Compared with these daily newspapers, the 
other two daily newspapers included in the sample are relatively small. Mainichi 
Shimbun achieves a daily distribution rate of nearly 5 million copies and Sankei 
Shimbum one of nearly 2.5 million copies. Daily circulation rates indicate how 
many copies of a particular newspaper were sold and distributed each day but 
NIwsplpar 1 parlon 2 parsons 3 parsons 4 parsons S or mora o parson unknown TotIl 
perlonl 
Allhl 10.6 44.1 24.1 13.4 5.1 0.1 2.7 2.1 
Mllnlchl 10.1 42.6 24.5 14.9 56 0.0 2.4 2.7 
Yomlurl 9.4 43.8 23.5 15.9 4.9 0.0 2.5 2.6 
Sinkel 13.2 43.3 21.4 14.5 5.5 0.0 2.2 2.6 
Nlhon Kelzal 37.3 44.0 11 .2 5.0 0.6 0.0 2.0 1.9 
Shlmbun 
Table 3: Estimates of Percentage of Different Numbers of Readers per Copy (National, Morning Edition) 
(The Ashahi Shim bun, 2009b) 
do not provide any indication of the number of people who actually read a 
particular copy. A large part of the circulation of daily newspapers normally is to 
households with more than one reader per copy. Table 3 shows that the number of 
readers for all four daily newspapers and the largest specialist financial newspaper 
in the sample is higher than one 30. The daily general newspapers, with the 
exception of Mainichi Shimbun, which has 2.7 readers per copy, all achieve 2.6 
readers per copy. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, the leading daily financial newspaper, 
has 1.9 readers per copy. As Table 4 indicates, the five largest newspapers in Japan, 
30 The data for the number of readers per newspaper is for 2006 (The Asahi Shim bun, 2009b). No later 
data was available. No data was available for Nikkei Sangyou Shimbun and Nikkei Kinyu Shimbun. 
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which are published daily, are read by over 68 million people every day. Given the 
large number of readers of these newspapers it is on the face of it reasonable to 
consider the reporting of corporate governance in these newspapers as having some 
Financial Newspaper 
Morning Edition Readers 
(circulation) 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun 3,056,038 5,806,472 
General Daily Newspapers 
Morning Edition Readers 
(circulation) 
Yomiuri Shimbun 10,016,894 26,043,924 
Asahi Shimbun 8,033,400 20,886,840 
Mainichi Shimbun 3,880,632 10,477,706 
Sankei Shim bun 1,921,075 4,994795 
All Newspapers 26,908,039 68,209,737 
Table 4: Total Number of Readers of the Morning Editions 
resonance with the constitution or construction of concerns and Issues In the 
broader public discourse. 
It is of interest to look at the composition of the readership of the five largest 
newspapers in the sample in more detail. All five daily newspapers (general and 
financial) are read by all age and gender groups (The Asahi Shimbun, 2009b). The 
educational background of the readers of these five newspapers is also high 
reflecting the high educational background of Japan more generally. Table 5 
provides some information on the educational background of the readers of the five 
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largest daily newspapers in Japan. Readers of these five newspapers, according to 
Asahi Shimbun (2009b), include 'powerful decision-makers ' (including, for 
example, managers of Ministries, University Presidents, product mangers of listed 
Dally General and Financial Newspaper 
Educational Background Asahi Shim bun Asahi Shimbun 
Should this be the Mainichi Shimbun 
leading financial Sankei Shimbun Yomiuri Shimbun paper 
Still in School 12.3 9.9 
Junior High School 3.9 8.1 
High School 29.9 41.7 
Junior College 20.0 18.4 
University Graduate School 33.2 21.0 
Unknown 0.7 0.9 
Table 5: The Educational Background of Readers (percentage)31 
companies, CSR department chiefs of listed companies; ibid.), 'prominent business 
people' as well as 'affluent consumers' (ibid.). In short, many influential people are 
understood to read these papers. The composition of the readership further 
evidences the influence and importance of these newspapers in reflecting and 
creating public opinion. An analysis of the issues and concerns addressed in the 
reporting of these newspapers is thus deemed to provide insights into the concerns 
and issues constructed in the broader public discourse in which the two empirical 
sites of the case studies are embedded. 
31 The data is for October 2004 (The Asahi Shimbun, 2009b). Unfortunately no more detailed 
breakdown of the readerships of the five newspapers was available. 
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4.3.1.2. Content Categories 
The choice of content categories has been informed by the theoretical position 
taken in this study and the general aims of the study. The content categories thus 
reflect issues of relevance in a context in which Japanese corporate governance was 
put under pressure to change and to converge with the Anglo-American corporate 
governance system. The design of content categories has also been informed by a 
reading of the literature on the Japanese corporate governance system and the 
Anglo-American corporate governance system. Table 6 lists the content categories 
used in the analysis of the sample newspapers. The five main content categories 
were designed so as to provide insights into trends in the corporate governance 
reporting of the newspapers and the main issues addressed in terms of the 
components of the corporate governance system and the characteristics of the 
corporate system in which the corporate governance system is embedded (main 
content categories 1 - 3). Main content category 4 aims to identify possible impacts 
of developments in the wider context on the corporate governance reporting of the 
Japanese newspapers. And, main content category 5 was designed to gain insights 
into engagements with corporate governance developments taking place outside of 
Japan. Where applicable (i.e. main content categories 2 - 5) sub-categories were 
designed to bring out differentiation within the main content categories. The aim is 
to indicate particular emphases in the newspaper reporting relating to the main 
content categories. 
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Sub-Content Categories 
1. Corporate Governance n/a 
2. Corporate Governance System • board of directors 
Non-executive Director 
Executive remuneration 
• Takeover 
• Transparency 
Accounting Disclosure 
Financial Disclosure 
Financial Reporting 
• Audit 
Internal Audit(or) 
Financial Audit 
• Internal Control 
3. Corporate System • Cross-shareholdings 
• Main Sank 
• Japanese Style Management 
• Shareholders 
Shareholder Interest 
Shareholder Rights 
• Investors 
Institutional Investors 
Foreign Investors 
4. Developments in the Wider • Commercial Code 
Context • Company Act 
• Securities and Exchange Law 
• Corporate Scandal 
• Globalisation 
5. Influence on Corporate • U.S. 
Governance U.S. Style board of directors 
from Outside of Japan U.S. Style Corporate Governance 
• U.K. 
Cadbury (Committee) 
• IASC/IASS 
IASs/IFRSs 
Table 6: Content Categories 
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The sample newspapers were analysed employing the above content categories 
during August 2007. The following online data bases available at Shimbun 
Toshokan (Newspaper Library) in Yokohama were used: Nikkei Terekon21 (for 
Nihon keizai Shimbun, Nikkei Kinyu Shimbun, Nikkei Sangyou Shimbun and 
Mainichi Shimbun) and the individual company data bases for Asahi Shimbun, 
Sankei Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun. Table 7 lists the content categories that 
were searched in the English language and the Japanese language (i.e. the language 
in which the search was carried out). There were several difficulties in carrying out 
this search that arose because of the different languages and the different writing 
systems. In many instances English terms as well as the Japanese translations are 
interchangeably used in Japanese texts. In those cases the search included the 
English term as well as the Japanese translation. Further, the Japanese writing 
system captures the sound of a spoken word. As pronunciations of English terms 
can vary between people, different spellings of terms can occur. In such cases all 
commonly used spellings known to this author have been included in the search. In 
addition, terms can also be written by using one of the three writing systems of the 
Japanese language (Kanji, Hiragana and Katakana characters). If this was the case 
all possible ways of writing the term have been included. For example in the case 
of the term "corporate governance" there are three acceptable ways of writing this 
term: first, the Japanese term "kigyoutouchi" written as {J:: ~ ~ iii; second the 
English term written in Katakana characters written as either ::z ~~ v~ }- jJ/~-r 
/:A or ::z ~~ v~ }- · jJ/~-r /:A. The title of the articles of the newspapers 
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CONTENT CATEGORIES 
ENGLISH JAPANESE 
Accounting Disclosure ~*iffaOO;;r-, ~*iffaO)OO;;r-, ~*7'-{A -7 
0 - :/1' -
Accounting/Financial Audit ~*~1If,M~~1If 
Annual General Meeting ~;t~~ 
Audit(or) ~1If , ~1IfA 
board of directors I&**~~ 
Cadbury Committee =¥- 1' FA:~ -~~~, =¥- 1' F/-\ ~ -~~~ 
Commercial Code it5 i:& 
Company Act ~t±r:& 
Corporate Governance {d~~W:l ' :J-~v- j-jJ/-\-T/'A, :J -~v 
- j- • jJ/-\-T/'A 
Corporate Scandal {t~/Ft!f*, ~*/FtPJ, *5t!ffi 
Cross-Shareholding/Keiretsu ~ J:t~-g. v \, * ~IJ 
Disclosure iffaOO ;;r-, 7'-{A-7 0-:/1' -
Executive Remuneration I&**~fa~ , ~!i~fa~ 
External Audit(or) ~W~1If,~fi~1IfA,~.~fi± , ~1IfA~ 
1If 
Financial Disclosure MRMfaOO;;r-,MRMfa~OO;;r-,M.~-{A-7 
0-:/1'-
Financial Reporting MRfa'5- , ~~tf9'5-
Foreign Investor ~OOA~~* 
Globalisation -7" o-/-\~-e- ~3 /' 
lAS/I FRS OO~~*£~, OO~M~fa'5-£~ 
IASC/IASB OO~~*&~~~~, OO~~*&~~~~ 
Institutional Investor m~~~* 
Internal Audit(or) ~W~1If, ~1If~, ~1If~~1If,~.~1If 
Internal Control ~W~~J 
Investor ~'i(* 
Japanese Style Management a *~ft~, M.~m,~~~~.~,~~~ 
Practices ~M4,~~~~~~,.~~~~A~A 
Main Bank ;. -1 /'/-\/'-7 
Non-Executive Director t±~I&**~, #~ilJI&**~ 
Securities and Exchange Law 6iE~I&5 Ir:& 
Shareholder .f*;t 
Shareholder Interest .f* ;t*IJ~ 
Shareholder Rights .f*:tfl 
Stakeholder *Ij~~f**, AT - -7 *Jv;$"- , AT -7'* 
Jv ~~l -
Takeover ~~, iiHt~Jt~ 
Transparency g~~~~tt,g~~~~~,M.~'5-O)~~ 
tt,M.~'5-~~~~,~*fa'5-O)~~tt,~ 
~t fa '5-0) ~ ~ J3r 
U,K, . ~OO , -1~~A 
U.S. * 00 , 7;'~jJ 
U.S. Style board of directors *OO~I&**~~, 7;'~jJ~I&**~~,~~~ 
~~1I~t±,~~~~1I~t± 
U.S. Style Corporate *OO~{t~~liL *OO~:J ~v j- jJ /-\T /' 
Governance A, *OO~:J -~ v - j- • jj'/-\-T /' A, 7 j. ~ 
jJ~{t~~liL 7;' ~ jJ~:J-~v- 'rjj'/-\-T 
/'A, 7;' ~ jJ~:J-~v- j- ·1j'/ " -T/,A 
Table 7: Content Categories in English and Japanese 
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and their whole content were searched to identify those that referred to the content 
categories listed in table 6. In order to ensure that the articles identified by the 
search all related to corporate governance the individual content categories were 
combined with the term "corporate governance" (for example, "corporate 
governance" and "internal audit"). The results of the content analysis are discussed 
in Chapter 6. 
4.3.2. Critical Interpretive Textual Analysis 
Critical interpretive textual analysis is a popular method for analysing texts in the 
social sciences, including accounting. It is concerned to theorise texts and 
documents contextually and critically, including with reference to various conflicts, 
tensions and potentialities of the context (Fairclough, 1992, 2003; Gallhofer et aI., 
200 1 b). In the late 1980s a particular type of critical interpretive textual analysis, 
namely "critical discourse analysis,,32, emerged (Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000, p. 
447) and became a popular research method especially with researchers who 
assume a critical theoretical position. The reason for this is that, as Blommaert and 
Bulcaen (2000, p. 447) have argued, critical discourse analysis "explicitly intends 
to incorporate social-theoretical insights into discourse analysis and advocates 
social commitment and interventionism in research'. Norman Fairclough, whose 
32 Discourse analysis was originally developed within the discipline of linguistics and later spread to 
other social science disciplines. Discourse analysis has been variously developed within linguistics as 
well as within other social science disciplines (Fairclough, 1992). One such development was critical 
discourse analysis. Accounting researchers have also begun to employ discourse analysis in their 
research studies and a special issue of the Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal on 
"Accounting as Codified Discourse" was published in 2007 (see, for example, Ferguson, 2007; 
Gallhofer et aI., 2007; Spence, 2007). 
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version of critical discourse analysis is most prominent in research studies, has 
stressed that critical discourse analysis is thus a mode of research as well as a 
weapon in social struggle (Fairclough, 1993, p. 134; Gallhofer et aI.,2001, p. 123). 
It is especially this reference to praxis that has attracted critical theoretical 
researchers to critical discourse analysis. Below a brief summary of Fairclough's 
critical discourse analysis is offered and an elaboration of how critical discourse 
analysis has been applied in this study here. 
Critical discourse analysis is a complex method involving various levels of analysis, 
including the linguistic dimensions of a discourse as well as its socio-economic 
dimensions. Fairclough developed a three-dimensional framework for the analysis 
of discourse in which he identified the following levels: level one, discourse as 
text; level two, discourse as discursive practice; and, level three, discourse as social 
practice (Fairclough, 1993; Blommaert and Bulcan, 2000; Gallhofer et aI., 2001). 
Level one focuses on the linguistic features of texts; level two on the processes by 
which texts are produced, distributed and consumed; and, level three understands 
discourse as a social practice and considers how discourse impacts on its context, 
including the well-being of people and how it is shaped by the context (Gallhofer et 
aI., 2001, p. 125). 
It is of interest that although Fairclough developed this very complex model of 
analysis he does not suggest that this model should always be replicated in research 
studies using critical discourse analysis. On the contrary, as Gallhofer et al. (200 I, 
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p. 122) point out, 'Fairclough stresses that the research question and focus 
influence how one does critical discourse analysis in that the researcher emphasises 
differing aspects and dimensions of the analysis' (see also Gallhofer et aI., 2007). 
This study here uses critical discourse analysis as advocated by Fairclough, that is, 
it mainly focuses on level three of the model, that is, discourse as social practice. 
Focusing on this level facilitates analysis of the documents issued during the 
bilateral trade negotiations between Japan and the U.S. and the process of 
developing the Corporate Governance Principles of the Japan Corporate 
Governance Forum as embedded in their socio-economic, political, cultural and 
historical context. Further, analysis at level three draws attention to the way in 
which unequal power relations between participants in debates may affect the 
outcome of debates, and, how these debates and outcomes reflect and impact upon 
particular cultures. And, attention is drawn to the sense in which these debates can 
shape the way of life of people and affect their well-being. These areas that are 
considered at level three of critical discourse analysis are also especially of interest 
to this study here. Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 thus provide an analysis of the 
documents issued during the bilateral trade negotiations between Japan and the U.S. 
and the process of developing the Corporate Governance Principles of the Japan 
Corporate Governance Forum by employing a critical interpretive textual analysis, 
which is informed by level three of Fairclough's critical discourse analysis. 
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4.4. SUMMARY 
Chapter four has provided some methodological considerations and outlined the 
research process applied in this study. It elaborated the way in which theoretical 
position, research design and method are interrelated and offered a brief 
elaboration of ontological and epistemological assumptions. It provided a rationale 
for and outline of the particular case study methodology adopted in this study. The 
chapter also summarised the methods applied in the empirical analysis of the study, 
namely content analysis and critical interpretive textual analysis and provided a 
rationale and brief overview of the sample of newspapers analysed in this study. 
The next chapter, chapter 5, provides a brief history of socio-economic 
developments in the Japanese context from the mid-nineteenth century to the early 
twenty-first century. In the context of this historical overview reference is also 
made to developments in the Japanese corporate system and the Japanese corporate 
governance system. 
115 
CHAPTER 5 
INSIGHTS INTO THE HISTORY OF JAPAN AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
As chapter two has argued, corporate governance systems are embedded in a 
particular socio-economic, political, cultural and legal context and analyses of 
corporate governance practices need to take into account characteristics of this 
context and its interrelationship with the relevant corporate governance system. 
Further, adopting a historical perspective in the analysis of the context and the 
corporate governance system embedded in it facilitates understanding of how 
current features of corporate governance systems have developed and an 
appreciation of the presence of any issues and tensions concerning these corporate 
governance systems today. This means that in order to understand recent and 
current debates about corporate governance in Japan it is important to gain an 
historical appreciation of the Japanese context and the specific Japanese corporate 
governance system. This chapter therefore offers a summary of key developments 
in the history of Japan and the Japanese corporate governance system. The 
emphasis in the chapter is on contextual developments that were especially 
important for the emergence of the specific characteristics of the Japanese 
corporate governance system. The chapter covers the period from 1868 until 2007, 
a period that witnessed Japan's development from a feudal economy to the second 
largest capitalistic economy in the late 1970s, a period of crisis from the 1990s and 
a recovery period beginning in 2005. During this period Japan went through 
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significant changes in its socio-economic, political and cultural spheres and the 
corporate governance system embedded in this context. The discussion of the 
historical context here is selective and highlights significant developments 
especially in the economic and political spheres that had a significant influence on 
the development of the Japanese corporate governance system. In the discussion of 
the historical developments, emphasis is also placed on developments and changes 
in the Japanese corporate system due to the close interrelationship of the corporate 
system and the corporate governance system. The historical period covered here is 
divided into four sub-periods:33 sub-period one covers developments from 1867 to 
1937, the beginning of the Meiji Restoration and a time during which major steps 
towards Westernisation and industrialisation were taking place; the second sub-
period from 1937 to 1945 is characterised by Japan's war efforts; the third period 
from 1945 to 1989 covers the rebuilding of Japan after the end of World War II and 
its economic growth during the 1970s and 1980s, which saw Japan emerge as a 
major economic force globally; and, the fourth sub-period from 1990 to 2007 
outlines how Japan went into crisis after the bursting of its bubble economy and its 
subsequent road to recovery . 
5.1. 1868 TO 1937: JAPAN BECOMES A MODERN CAPITALISTIC STATE 
After 1868 Japan went through a major transformation that replaced a feudal state 
and economy with a modern capitalistic state and industrial capitalistic economy. 
33 This periodisation has been chosen as it emphasises especially economic and political developments 
in the history of Japan. 
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Westney (1987, p. 1) points to the significance of these transformations in the 
socio-economic, political and cultural spheres: 
To many Westerners who came to Asia in the 1860s, arriving in Japan 
seemed to be stepping back centuries in time, into a world of sword-
wielding knights, subservient peasants, tradition-bound merchant guilds, 
and haughty feudal lords. But within a few years of the Meiji Restoration 
of 1868, the Japanese adopted a wide range of new institutions and 
manufacturing and information technologies from the West in a massive 
effort to reshape Japan into a nation that would be equal to the Western 
power. Westerners watched with interest and no little amusements as the 
emulation of Western culture and institutions began to transform the 
society. 
The feudal system that Westney (ibid.) is referring to had already been established 
in 1192 when Minamoto no Y oritomo, the leader of the Bushi warriors, was 
authorised to open the first feudal government (bakufu) in Kamakura, East of Japan. 
Although the emperor still remained as the Head of State in Kyoto, the old capital 
of Japan, Minamoto no Yoritomo (Seii Taish6 gun) was the de facto ruler of Japan. 
Feudal governments changed over the following centuries because of wars between 
various feudal lords. It was one of these wars at the turn of the sixteenth to the 
seventeenth century that significantly impacted upon the power structure of Japan. 
This war ended with the victory of Tokugawa Ieyasu over the Toyotomi family. As 
a consequence of this victory, Tokugawa Ieyasu took over as Shogun in 1603 and 
the Tokugawa family held power in the feudal government until 1868. The 
characteristics of the Tokugawa reign were its seclusion policy, which isolated 
Japan from outside influence, and a related peaceful period of over 210 years, in 
which education and culture were further developed in Japan. 
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Since the 1630s, Japan had operated a closed country policy (sakoku). Cullen (2003, 
p. 48) explains that sakoku (national exclusion) is a modem term that refers to a 
policy applied from the 1630s to the 1850s whereby Japanese ports were closed to 
almost all vessels (exceptions being a limited number of Dutch and Chinese 
vessels) and travel abroad was forbidden. Such a closure to influences from the 
outside world was achieved through the issuance of five principal decrees between 
1633 and 1639. These decrees forbade, as Jansen (2000, pp. 78-79) explains, 
Japanese who had travelled abroad to come back to Japan and ships to be sent to 
destinations outside Japan. It elaborated prohibitions on missionaries and Japanese 
Christians and stipulated that all ships should be sent to one port of entry, Nagasaki. 
Further, Dutch settlers in Japan were forced to move to a small artificial strip of 
land in Nagasaki, located in the West of Japan in 1641. In the literature, common 
reasons given for such an exclusion policy were a fear of Christianity and a concern 
that Japanese dissidents would align themselves with outside forces (see, for 
example, Beasley, 1990, p. 22). Cullen (2003, p. 49) makes the point that 'fear of 
Christianity was a form of shorthand for an omnibus fear about Western intentions'. 
Although there are several explanations provided in the literature on when this 
policy was completed, it is reasonable to conclude that the removal of the Dutch 
settlers completed the seclusion policy (Miyamoto, 1973; Hanawa, 1983). Under 
this policy, only Chinese and Dutch merchants were allowed to come to and trade 
with Japan. This seclusion policy gave rise to events in the 1850s (see below) that 
led to the overthrow of the Tokugawa reign and the end of feudalism in Japan. 
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The other feature of the Tokugawa reIgn that significantly shaped Japan's 
development, was a peaceful period of over two hundred years (Cullen, 2003).As 
Japan enjoyed notable peace and a politically stable period, an important change in 
social roles took place. Bushi warriors34 began to function as policy makers and 
administrative officers rather than warriors. As a consequence of this change in 
their roles they became more concerned about learning and art than warfare and 
increasingly sent their children to school. During the peaceful period many schools 
were thus established. Those established by the Daimyo (feudal lord) were called 
Han-kou and private schools were called Terakoya. In these schools children were 
taught by, for example, Buddhist priests, Shinto priests, medical doctors and 
masterless samurai (Komiyama, 2006). Sons of Bushi warriors were educated in 
Han-kou and children of other classes went to Terakoya. Nish (1968, p. 70) points 
out that in the eighteenth century many Terakoya were established: 'They are 
estimated to have numbered 15,000; and, if this figure is accurate, the rate of 
literacy in Tokugawa Japan was higher than that of Europe at the time.' He further 
points out that '[ t ]he provision of this basic education paved the way for the 
remarkable educational and political achievements of the later nineteenth century' 
(see also Allen, 1981, pp. 2-3). Historians have argued that the rate of education 
facilitated the modernisation and industrialisation of Japan in the Meiji period. As 
Allen (1981, p. 3) observes: 
Japan assimilated new techniques and habits of thought with ease because 
her population was literate and well-trained technically. But it must not be 
34 Bushi were the warrior class, also called samurai, in Japanese society. Since the twelfth century 
they had political power in Japan (Davies and Ikeno, 2002, p. 41). 
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thought that her educational achievements can be attributed solely to her 
success in following Western models. Her leaders brought with them into 
the new era a system of values based on the intellectual and moral 
discipline of the past, and the career of Japan owed much to this 
inheritance ... while the Japanese were able to free their minds from that 
part of their Confucian legacy that was in practice hostile to technological 
change, they carried into the new world traditional codes of conduct and 
habits of mind which served the cause of national power and economic 
progress. These codes and habits affected the relations between superior 
and inferior and the mutual obligations of those in authority and those 
subject to it. They reinforced the sentiments of patriotism and family and 
group loyalty. They encouraged frugality and assiduity. The outstanding 
business leaders, while active in pursuit of their own ambitions, seldom 
lost sight of national purposes. 
In the mid-1850s, however, this peaceful period came to an end. It has been argued 
that the pressure from outside Japan encouraged developments that led to the end 
of the Tokugawa feudal government and the beginning of the Meiji restoration, 
which was 'a concerted modernisation effort by thoroughly reshaping social and 
political structures and giving the people at large a new sense of national self-
identity' (Hirschmeier and Yiu, 1975, p. 70). U.S. warships under the command of 
Admiral Perry came to Japan and delivered a personal letter from their President in 
1853. Japan was asked to abandon its isolation policy because the U.S. at that time 
needed ports to supply fuel and water for their whaling ships. Not having been able 
to achieve this goal on his visit, Perry again went to Japan in the following year and 
this time pressurised Japan to sign the treaty. The feudal government of the time 
yielded to the foreign power in the light of its military power and signed the Treaty 
of Peace and Amity (Nichibei Washin Joyaku) in 1854. The Tokugawa government 
opened two sea ports, Shimoda and Hakodate, by treaty with the U.S. Ironically, 
this event resulted in weakening the power of the Tokugawa government. The 
Tokugawa government and its subordinates who had monopolized power over 
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other feudal lords had made this key policy decision on their own without 
consulting with the other feudal lords and the Emperor. This action was heavily 
criticised. 
The significance of the treaty was that it brought to an end the Tokugawa 
government's policy of isolation and opened the country to foreign trade and 
influence. As a reaction to the treaty, which was seen as a threat to Japan more 
generally, a boycott movement against foreign rice emerged. At the same time, 
influenced by Kokugaku (the study of Japanese literature, thought and culture, 
called 'national learning'; Beasley, 2000, p. 19), which had become strong during 
the Edo era the campaign of Advocacy of the Restoration of the Imperial Rule 
(Sonna Shisou) gained momentum. The slogan, which became popular during this 
period was Sonna-jai Undo ('Revere the Heavenly Sovereign, Expel the 
Barbarians'; McClain, 2002, p. 140) and became closely linked to Sonna Shisou. 
The main players of this movement were discontented lower-level bushi warriors 
who had become administrative officials during the peaceful period but had not had 
any possibility to socially advance because of their fixed hereditary status in the 
feudal social system. This movement put Japan in an unstable political situation 
(McClain, 2002). 
The political situation further worsened when the U.S. minister in Japan, Townsend 
Harris, received orders to enter into a peace and trade treaty with Japan. He tried to 
persuade the Japanese government by pointing to threats to Japan from other 
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European countries. Rojyu (senior councillor) Hotta Masayoshi told Harris to wait 
until imperial sanction was given to complete the treaty. Hotta went to Kyoto, 
where the emperor's palace was, but the emperor sent the petition back to the 
government and ordered that talks were held with other feudal lords on this matter. 
Horta resigned and Ii Naosuke was appointed Tairo (chief councillor), which was a 
temporary position and above Rojyu (senior councillor). Ii concluded Nichibei 
shilkou tsilshou jouyaku (the Japan-US Friendship and Trade Treaty) with the U.S. 
without imperial sanction in 1858. Abiding to the treaty, the government opened 
three further sea ports: Kanagawa (Yokohama), Niigata and Hyougo (Kobe). This 
treaty was much criticised as it was seen as an unequal treaty because Japan did not 
have tariff autonomy, gave America consular jurisdiction rights and treated the U.S. 
as the most favoured nation. Soon after the government had signed the treaty with 
the U.S., treaties of the same kind were signed by Japan with the Dutch, France, 
Russia and the United Kingdom (Beasley, 2000, pp. 31-34). The signing of these 
treaties and their content exasperated those who were opposed to opening the 
country and sought to expel foreigners. In addition, Emperor Koumei also wished 
to close the country. Concerned about the growing movement, Ii brought pressure 
on the opposition, which came to manifest in what was called Ansei no Taigoku 
(the Ansei Purge). Cullen (2003) remarks that in the context of the Ansei Purge 
'seventy-nine persons were detained, seven of whom were executed. More 
important than the numbers was of course the status of some of those punished' 
(p.184). It has been argued that behind this purge there was a conflict between 
those who aimed to advance the union of the Imperial Court and the Shogunate and 
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the cooperation with other daimyo, and those who claimed that the government 
should govern the country as it had done in the past, that is, without cooperation 
and consultation. On 3 March 1868, as a reaction to the oppression, Ii Naosuke was 
assassinated outside of Edo castle by roushi (master-less samurai) who had been 
exasperated by his policy. This incident further damaged the credibility of the 
government (Beasley, 2000). The political instability was further fuelled by events 
that had occurred as a consequence of opening the country in the 1850s and the 
conditions of the subsequent treaties. For example, the opening of Japan to the 
West brought about a rise in prices and intensified the movement against the feudal 
system in Japan. Further, as a consequence of the opening of sea ports, production 
centres and sea ports were now directly connected. This resulted in a change in the 
distribution system thus undermining the conventional system, which was 
monopolized by privileged merchants (Beasley, 2000; McCullen, 2003). 
In addition to the above changes in the socio-economic sphere, significant 
developments also took place in the political sphere. In response to a request from 
emperor Koumei, the government sought to advance the union of the Imperial 
Court and the Shogunate policy and to build a cooperative relationship with other 
daimyo. Some potent daimyo such as, for example, Satsuma, Choshu and Tosa 
were especially enthusiastic about engaging in politics. It has been argued that the 
emperor and other potent daimyo did not intend to defeat the government. Sonno-
joui Undo (the campaign to restore the emperor to power and expel the barbarians) 
in the light of the above developments changed its direction and turned into an anti-
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Shogunate movement. Goto Sh6jirou from Tosa persuaded Tokugawa Yoshinobu, 
the last shogun of the Tokugawa government, to return political power to the 
Imperial Court. Tokugawa Yoshinobu, recognising his unattainable position, 
returned the political power to the Imperial Court on 9 November 1867 (Bailey, 
2000, p. 52). Notwithstanding Tokugawa government's compliant submission, 
some clansmen from Satsuma and Ch6shu who controlled the feudal domains 
succeeded to issue an imperial ordinance to conquer the Tokugawa government. 
Furthermore they ordered Tokugawa Yoshinobu to return his court rank and 
domain. This order infuriated his royal vassals, Aizu and Kuwana. Mobilising the 
former governmental army, Aizu and Kuwana engaged in hostilities with the new 
governmental army. The battle between the former governmental army and the new 
governmental army continued until 1869 (ibid., p. 53). Hereafter Japan entered a 
new phase in her history and her urgent issue was to build a modern and centrally 
administered state. In pursuing its policy of establishing a modem and rich 
Japanese state with a strong army and in an attempt to catch up with developed 
Western countries such as Britain, France and Germany, the government 
centralised the administrative power in Japan. Japan also adopted capitalism and 
democracy, although universal suffrage was only granted in 1945 (Jansen, 2000, p. 
677; Okumura, 2004). In the following, the developments that led to the modern 
centralised state and a form of capitalistic economy in Japan are outlined in more 
detail and reference is also made to developments that were particularly important 
for the emergence of the Japanese corporate governance system. 
125 
It has been argued that the motivation to overthrow the Shogunate was to avoid 
being colonised by Western countries and to restore power to the emperor. In 1868 
the emperor expressed the new governmenfs basic policy, which is known as 
Gokajyo no Goseimon (the Imperial Covenant Consisting of Five Articles). Keene 
(2009) translated this document into English: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Oath in Five Articles 
Deliberate assemblies shall be widely established and all matters 
decided by public discussion. 
All classes, high and low, shall unite in vigorously carrying out the 
administration of affairs of state. 
The common people, no less than the civil and military officials, shall 
each be allowed to pursue his own calling so that there may be no 
discontent. 
Evil customs of the past shall be broken off and everything based on 
the just laws of nature. 
Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen 
the foundations of imperial rule (Keene, 2009). 
Once power had been restored to the emperor, the governing structure was altered. 
At the beginning of this era, the governing structure consisted of a direct 
administration by the emperor and three officials, Sousai (Governor), Gijyo35 and 
Sanyo (Councillor), who supported the emperor (Sakamoto, 1999). Soon after 
proclaiming the Covenant, this structure was replaced when the new government 
issued Seitaisho (the Organic Act of 1868). McClain (2002, pp.157) summarises 
this document as follows: 
35 No translation for this tenn could be found in the literature. 
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· .. the Seitaisho, sometimes referred to as the Constitution of 1868 ... vested 
all authority in the Dajokan, or Grand Council of State. First established as 
part of the reforms of the seventh and early eighth centuries that brought 
the Japanese state into existence, the Dajokan served as the chief policy-
making and administrative organ of Japan's early imperial state before 
waning in significance. As revived in 1868, the Dajokan was headed by a 
grand minister of state, two vice-ministers, and several councillors who 
presided over various bureaus. 
This system was kept until December 1885 when the Grand Council of State 
(Daj6kan) was replaced by a European type cabinet (Naikaku) (Beasley 2000, p. 
68). 
A significant challenge for the new government after 1868 was the need to replace 
the old feudal structures with a new administrative system that would take power 
away from the still existing feudal lords. This was especially important as the 
government needed to raise taxes and aimed to build up a national army in the light 
of perceived threats from outside as well as inside. Between 1868 and 1871 various 
attempts were made to initially restrict the power of the domains before finally 
dismantling them. The domain structure ended on 29 August 1871 when it was 
replaced by a new administrative structure. Under this structure the country was 
divided into administrative districts called 'prefectures'. These prefectures were the 
first step towards a centralised state (Beasley 2000, pp. 60-1). 
Having replaced the old feudal structures, the new government turned towards 
revising the unequal treaty, which the Tokugawa government had concluded with 
the foreign countries in the closing days of the Tokugawa era (Kimura 1981) and to 
127 
further push forward the industrialisation of Japan. To achieve both objectives the 
new government thought it important to modernize the country and to set up 
various social infrastructures, such as, for example, a Western legal system, a 
national railway system, a national postal system and a national army. The 
government therefore pushed ahead with Fukoku Kyohei (wealth and military 
strength) and Shokusan Kougyo (the promotion of industry) (Nakamura, 2003). 
Japan adopted the idea or pursuit of capitalism and democracy and Western 
technology. Developments until around the turn of the century were State led, with 
the government exercising leadership in the political and economic development of 
Japan. The main objective was to modernise, which meant to Westernise, the 
political and economic structures of the country. In order to achieve Westernisation, 
delegations were dispatched to the U. S. and European countries to learn from these 
countries and to observe their practices. Within a short period, significant changes 
had taken place in Japan. The political system, which had been modelled on the 
Chinese system, was replaced by a system modelled on European sources. A 
modern constitution was promulgated in 1889, the Diet was established in 1892 
and the Code of Civil Procedures and the Commercial Code were introduced in 
1890 and 1899 respectively (McKinnon, 1986, pp. 123-128). The introduction ofa 
modern legal structure was important for two reasons: first, it constituted a legal 
framework, which was acceptable to Western countries and was thus necessary in 
the context of Japan's attempts to achieve a revision of the unequal treaties 
(McKinnon, 1986, p. 125); and, second, it provided the legal framework for a 
speedy and initially state-led industrialisation. The government was successful in 
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implementing a modem and Western legal system into Japan. Having introduced a 
constitution and five major codes by the end of the century it achieved the revision 
of the unequal treaties as the Western nations accepted its new legal system 
(McKinnon, 1986, p. 128). In the context of its modernisation project the 
government also modernised the army, which was modelled on Germany and 
France and introduced a national postal system (Beasley, 2000). 
As stated above, the government's political and economic policy was Shokusan 
Kougyo (the promotion of industry). This policy was advanced by Okubo 
To shimichi , who was an attendant of the Iwakura Mission, which visited the U.S. 
and other European countries with the purpose of studying Western systems. 
Okubo created the Ministry of Home Affairs (Naimushou) and took office as the 
Minister of the newly created Ministry because of the experiences he had gained 
from his visit to European countries. He also pushed forward Shokusan Kougyo. 
Sakamoto (1999) argues that Okubo put forward this policy under government 
initiative. In order to facilitate Shokusan Kougyo, Okubo set up Koubushou (a 
Ministry charged with the managing of the process of achieving this policy) in 
1870. This Ministry was subsequently replaced by Naimushou (the Ministry of 
Home Affairs), which was established in 1873. The Meiji government preceded 
with industrialisation by first setting up government enterprises in areas such as, for 
example, creation of a railway network, iron industry, shipbuilding and silk reeling. 
The government selected a small number of business people who were called 
seisho (businessman who had connections with the government) who received 
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certain privileges. For example, Seisho were able to rent ships from the government 
free of charge for their trading ventures. When the government sold off part of the 
state-owned companies, Seish6 were offered these companies for purchase (see 
below) (Sakamoto, ibid). 
One aim of the state-led growth during the early Meiji period (up to 1900) had been 
to strengthen Japan's military power and the other to promote new industries 
(Teranashi, 2000, pp. 43-44).36 In both cases the government had been successful. 
When Japan engaged in war with China (First Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895) and 
a decade later with Russia (Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905), the enemy was 
defeated in both cases (Perez, 1998, pp. 117-124). In terms of economic 
development the government's attempt to industrialise Japan had also been 
successful. 
It is of note that World War I had a different impact on Japan and its people than it 
had on the European states and their people. Of significance for Japan was the 
creation of a large European market for war exports that Japan was able to take 
advantage of. This in turn further facilitated Japan's industrialisation (Totman, 
2000, p. 361). 37 Thus, during the 1920s the Japanese economy experienced 
36 There are different interpretations in tenns of the role that the Japanese state played in leading the 
development of Japan. Interpretations vary between the state 'as a dominant and enlightened force in 
promoting Japan's modernization and the population as a pliant yet capable mass. a~le to be guided 
toward modern ways' and an emphasis on the 'state's repression of the popular WIll m the course of 
enacting its social revolution from above' (Jones and Ericson, 2007, p. 173). 
37 Totman (2000, p. 361) points out that a significant impact of World War I on Japan was that it 
changed the geopolitical context of the region: 'By crippling the European capa.c~ty to shape affairs in 
East and Southeast Asia, it created new geopolitical uncertainties and opportumtles .. .In short, the war 
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significant economic growth and an expansIOn of national and international 
markets (Perez, 1998, p. 137). Economic growth was also further facilitated 
through the enhancement of the transportation and communication system and free 
trade policies. Teranishi (2000, p. 45) refers to key characteristics of the economic 
system during the Taisho era, which had facilitated economic growth, for example, 
the free competition principle, private sector-led economy and an emphasis on the 
regional economy. This period has been referred to as the 'era of Taisho 
Democracy' but Perez (1998, p. 137) argues that 'this era can also be characterized 
as the period when Japan moved away from democracy toward military 
adventurism' because of the less influential role of government during this period. 
Totman (2000, p. 362) comments on the changed role of the government from the 
end of the Meiji era (1912) up to the end of the 1930s: 
... for most of the post-1914 period, one is struck by the modesty of 
governmental effectiveness in domestic affairs, in contrast to early Meij i, 
when government initiative was central to so much socioeconomic 
change ... [1]n post-Meiji Japan government played an increasingly 
marginal and erratic role in shaping social, economic and cultural 
developments ... Even in foreign affairs its role was inconsistent and 
indecisive ... 
Towards the end of the period the military became more powerful in the context of 
a perceived threat from Russia (Perez, 1998, pp. 138-9). The influence of the 
military led to Japan embarking on another war with China in 1937. Having 
outlined key developments in the socioeconomic, political and cultural context of 
Japan during the period from 1868 to 1937 the next section provides a summary of 
ended the era of a relatively stable East Asian context, ushered in one of much greater instability, and 
deepened Japanese involvement in that new era'. 
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key developments in the corporate sector of Japan during this period, which were 
of significance for the development of the Japanese corporate governance system. 
During the period from 1868 to 1937 several developments took place in the 
political, economic and legal spheres that had a significant impact on the 
organizational, ownership and financing structures of business organisations and 
management practices and that were significant for the development of the 
Japanese corporate governance system. We thus now tum to a discussion of 
developments during this process of modernisation and Westernisation that are of 
particular relevance for an understanding of how the Japanese corporate 
governance system developed: the introduction of the Commercial Code, the 
growth of the zaibatsu and the Japanese style joint stock company, Japanese 
employment practices and the development of the Japanese banking system. 
5.1.1. The Introduction of the Commercial Code 
As referred to above, in its attempt to Westemise and industrialise, Japan's 
government introduced a modern legal framework, which was modelled on 
Western practices. For corporate governance and businesses more generally key 
developments took place in the 1890s. A Company Law was introduced in 1893 
that provided for the setting up of three types of companies: the joint stock 
company (kabushiki kaisha), the limited partnership (goshi kaisha) and the 
unlimited partnership (gomei kaisha) (Hirschmeier and Yui, 1975, p. 187). The 
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development and introduction of the Commercial Code in Japan in the 1890s, as 
McKinnon (1986, p. 126) has pointed out, was bound up with a dispute between 
English and French-trained Japanese jurists. The Commercial Code as well as the 
Civil Code were originally drafted by French-trained jurists. The English-trained 
lawyers held up the introduction of the Codes as they were concerned about an 
overemphasis of French law in the drafts. In contrast, the French-trained lawyers 
held that their drafts were based on principles 'universally applicable to mankind' 
(Takayanagi, 1963, pp. 30-32, cited in McKinnon, 1986, p. 126). In the early 1890s 
advances were made when the government commissioned Herman Roesler, a 
German lawyer, to draft a Commercial Code for Japan. Roesler's draft was based 
on the then draft German Commercial Code. When Japanese jurists raised 
objections against the draft Commercial Code the government asked them to re-
work the Code. McKinnon (1986, p. 119) explains that the re-worked version of the 
Commercial Code, however, 'differed very little in substance from Roesler's 
original draft' as the Japanese lawyers in the process of re-working the draft Code 
had begun to appreciate German law. McKinnon (1986, p. 120) has summarised 
the significance of the introduction of the Commercial Code as follows: 'With the 
Introduction of the Code, the Japanese system of regulation assumed its initial 
structural form, comprising a single authority, the Ministry of Justice, utilizing a 
single mechanism of regulation, the Commercial Code.' The Commercial Code was 
the basis for the corporate form of business organisation and the regulation of its 
financial disclosure. 
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The Commercial Code introduced in 1899 consisted of five books: General 
Provisions (Book I), Companies and Partnerships (Book II), Commercial Acts 
(Book III), Bills (IV), and Maritime Commerce (V). Legal requirements for the 
formation and liquidation of joint stock companies, the rights and duties of the 
directors, shareholder and the annual general meeting and disclosure requirements 
(McKinnon, 1986, p. 123) were contained in Book II. Over the years the Japanese 
Commercial Code went through several revisions with the latest and most 
significant one being completed in 2006: through the last revision, Book II of the 
Commercial Code was integrated into Company Law. The Japanese Corporate 
Code still exists but it has ceased to cover joint stock companies. 
5.1.2. The Development of the Zaibatzu and Japanese Style Joint Stock 
Companies 
From the beginning of the Meiji Restoration, two different kinds of joint-stock 
company took prominence in Japan: the type of joint-stock company known in the 
West and the zaibatsu, a form of joint-stock company peculiar to Japan. A 
significant number of zaibatsu had emerged in a context where the government 
began to sell off some of the companies that it had initially established in order to 
push forward industrialisation in Japan. Through the sale of such companies, the 
government aimed to raise some capital. State-owned companies were sold in many 
cases to those businessmen who had good connections to the government or 
government agencies (seish6, see above). Through acquiring these companies some 
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businessmen were able to form zaibatsu. Many zaibatsu maintained close links 
with the government (Bailey, 2000, p. 117). 
Zaibatsu were 'large, diversified conglomerates' (Yafeh, 2000, p. 75) owned by the 
founders and their families. Yamamura (1964, pp. 539-540) summarises the key 
characteristics of a zaibatsu as follows: 
(a) Semi-feudal characteristics, in that centralized power rests in a Zaibatsu family, 
which extends its power through strategically arranged marriages and other 
personal knight-vassal dedication relationships. 
(b) Well-knit, tightly controlled relationships among the affiliated firms by means 
of holding companies, interlocking directorships, and mutual stockholdings. 
(c) Extremely large financial power in the form of commercial credit which is 
used as the central leverage to extend control in all industries. 
Especially after the issuance of the Company Law of 1893, zaibatsu controlled 
their affiliated enterprises through holding companies, which were non public 
enterprises and controlled by their founders and their respective families (Tanaka, 
1998). The structure of a zaibatsu was a corporate pyramid with the holding 
company at the top of the structure and a series of joint stock companies attached to 
them and controlled by the former (Hirschmeier and Yui, 1975, p. 187). Despite 
their size there was considerable concentration of ownership in zaibatsu. The 
reason for this was the method of internal financing through the establishment of 
their own financial institutions (ibid., pp. 186-187).38 With the expansion of the 
zaibatsu and the introduction of graduates as professional managers, these 
38 This is in contrast to development in the US 'where owner-management gave way to the 
corporation with diffused ownership and management by career executives' (Hirschmeier and Yui, 
1975, p. 186). 
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" 39 
organlsatlOns, according to Hirschmeier and Yui (1975, p. 187), faced the 
following problem: 
The most urgent task of the zaibatsu leaders was then, after 1900, to create 
new structures of control which would give maximum flexibility while 
maintaining firm central control and undivided ownership. 
Based on the Company Law many important zaibatsu re-organised their company 
structure with 'holding companies in the centre and a string of joint stock 
companies controlled by the former' (Hirschmeier and Yui 1975, p. 187). 
According to Cooke and Sawa (1998, p. 218), ten main zaibatsu had become 
prominent during 1867 to 1937. Out of the ten zaibatsu two had been founded 
during the period of the last feudal government and the others between 1867 and 
1912. Their economic power had been further enhanced through investments in 
banking, mining and foreign trade. In the period before the Second World War, 
these zaibatsu controlled a significant part of the commercial and industrial 
activities of Japan (Teranishi, 2000, p. 46; Yafeh, 2000, p. 75). According to 
Beasley (2000, pp.116-117), the 'Big Five (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Yasuda, Sumitomo, 
and Daiichi), together capitalized at fifty million yen in 1914 and 280 million in 
1927, controlled 19 per cent of private banking by the end of the period.' 
Mitsubishi's formation during this period is typical of a zaibatsu. Mitsubishi was 
formed during the Meij i era. The founder of Mitsubishi, Iwasaki Yataro, originated 
39 Allinson (1999, p. 42) explains: 'As rationally managed business organizations, the zaibatsu set the 
standard for other firms to follow. They were among the first Japanese firms to ire college-educated, 
professional managers to oversee individual firms and eventually to take leadership positions of 
their holding companies.' 
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from a low grade bushi warrior. He had worked for a trading firm run by the feudal 
domain West of Japan, which had played an important part in overthrowing the 
Tokugawa government. When the new government banned the practice of 
companies being run by feudal domains, Iwasaki Yataro took over the trading firm. 
Iwasaki, who was engaged in maritime transport, was able to extend his business 
through cooperating with the government in its battle with rebellions supporting the 
old order. After the death of Iwasaki Yataro his brother Iwasaki Yanosuke 
succeeded in the business (Abe, 1995, pp.l0l-l03). Subsequently Mitsubishi 
diversified into other sectors, such as, for example, shipbuilding, mining, heavy 
industry and foreign trade. They also established a bank in 1880 (Beasley, 2000, p. 
117; see also Hirschmeier and Yui, 1975, pp. 138-142). 
In contrast to the zaibatsu, ordinary joint-stock companies were listed and owned 
by general shareholders. The Japanese joint stock companies differed in terms of 
ownership and control from Western companies as the separation of ownership and 
control was not carried out to the same extent. In terms of the development of 
corporate governance, it is of interest that, as Teranishi (2000, p. 45) has pointed 
out, from 1900 to 1920 'the separation of ownership and control was still in its 
initial step, and firms were controlled by large stockholders' According to 
Hirschmeier and Yui (1975, pp. 188-189), 'the structure of the executive officers 
developed in Japanese companies somewhat along different lines from those 
common in the West. .. the most important difference ... probably [being] the 
combination or fusion between the actual managing positions and those of control'. 
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In practice this meant that the main shareholder, or a representative of them, would 
hold the position of president40 as well as being the chairman of the board of 
directors and the shareholders' assembly. In the context of low numbers of 
shareholders this was not necessarily a problem for other shareholders as the 
president was also able to represent their interests. As career executives became 
more involved in management, however, this situation changed. Executive 
directors took on the roles of decision-maker and key administrator, reducing the 
role of the shareholder president to one of figure-head who would represent the 
company to the outside world. It is of note that since the early twentieth century the 
executive director usually had joined the company as a university graduate and had 
risen within the company to this position (Hirschmeier and Yui, 1975, pp. 188-189). 
Of significance here is that very soon these newly established executive directors 
had become major shareholders themselves through investing their high salaries in 
their own companies (ibid., p. 196; Miyamoto, 2005).41 Non-executive members of 
the board of directors were elected shareholder representatives. 
5.1.3. The Development of the Japanese Employment System 
Factories during the early industrialisation stage in Japan found it difficult to 
employ and retain skilled workers. In addition to the low wages paid, Hirschmeier 
and Yui (1975, p.117) point out that another important reason for this was the 
40 This was also the case for zaibatsu (supra). 
41 Further, shareholders who had an interest in a particular company would buy shares from other 
shareholders in order to take over the company, a phenomenon particularly common in the spinning 
industry (Miyamoto, 2005). 
138 
'popular belief that factory work was an evil to which they preferred much lower 
paid home employment.' Hayashi (1979) explains that in this context employers 
mobilized their personal relationships in the places they came from to hire skilled 
crafts-men or employed members of their kinship groups (p.21). The low wage rate 
of these workers was supplemented by the wages of the wives and children who 
were also employed by the factories or companies. Such a system is referred to in 
the literature as 'total employment system or whole-family employment system' 
(ibid). In the context of such employment practices a unique relationship between 
employer and employee developed in companies in Japan, namely the 'the quasi-
family-type or affectionate relationship' (ibid). Despite the quasi-family-type 
relationship there was, however, a high turnover rate in the factories. The main 
reason for this was that the crafts-men tried to improve their skills by obtaining 
training in different factories (Hayashi, 1979, p.22). 
It is of interest that in the case of unskilled workers the relationship between 
employers and employees was different from that of crafts-men. As Hayashi (1979, 
p.22) explains: 
... in this case [the relationship] was rather that of patron and clients, with 
the employer providing not only foods, clothes, and shelter but also 
necessary expenditures in connection with social functions in addition to 
bonus payment twice a year. 
Hayashi (1979, p. 22) maintains that some of the characteristics of the particular 
employer - employee relationships that developed in Japan during the l880s and 
1890s are still evident in Japanese employment relationships today. 
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Another practice aimed at attracting workers during this period was to send 
recruitment agents to other companies and to poach their employees. In the context 
of the recruitment and retention problem that companies experienced two key 
positions emerged in relation to how these issues could be resolved: There was the 
view that competitive and stable wages should be introduced. This argument was 
made by employers who believed in the market principle. The majority of the 
employers, however, did not want to change the traditional relationship between 
employer and employee. Hirschmeier and Yui (1975, p. 119) hold that "most 
employers emphatically rejected this kind of reasoning, declaring that employer-
labourer relationships ought to be guided by the time-honoured father-son 
principles, and that monetary motives, and the ideas of rights legally defined, 
should not be permitted to spoil this relationship." The crisis in employment and 
management that arose towards the end of the nineteenth century was successfully 
overcome during the 1920s and 1930s when permanent employment and seniority 
based pay, two characteristics of what is known today as the Japanese employment 
system or Japanese labour relations, were introduced (Hirschmeier and Yui, 1975, 
p.119; Hayashi, 1979, p. 23; Beasley, 2000, p. 119). It should be pointed out, 
however, these employment practices only benefited part of the Japanese labour 
force. As Beasley (2000, p. 119) explains: 
It applied to the major high-technology industries, spreading outwards, it 
would seem, from shipbuilding and the engineering trades, though even in 
those fields it benefited only part of the labour force. Unskilled and semi-
skilled workers, who had no scarcity value, lacked the bargaining power to 
insist on comparable advantages, no matter who employed them. In other 
140 
words, what was emerging was an elite among workers, similar to the one 
which the zaibatsu and a few other concerns comprised in the business 
world at large. 
5.1.4. The Development of the Japanese Main Bank System 
Further, this period saw the emergence of the Japanese banking system. The 
developments during this period were also significant for the emergence of the 
Japanese main bank system, which is a key component of the Japanese corporate 
sytem. Main banks are not only the providers of finance for Japanese companies 
but also have an important monitoring role in the Japanese corporate governance 
system. Hidaka and Kikkawa (2004) outline the key features of a main bank as 
follows: 
'Main bank' is originally a term used by practitioners in Japanese financial 
institutions and industrial firms. They call a particular bank the main bank 
when the firm obtains its largest share of borrowings from that institution. 
It also holds a certain amount of equity in the firm (Hidaka and Kikkawa, 
2004). 
From the 1870s to the 1910s a modern financial system was created in Japan. In 
this context the banking system evolved out of a process whereby elements from 
various foreign banking systems were combined and adapted so as to form the 
Japanese banking system. According to Aoki (1994), the following banking 
systems had an impact on the Japanese banking system: 
The Japanese system combined elements of the Anglo-American 
commercial banking system, composed of national banks (kokuritsu 
ginko) authorized to issue bank notes with national bonds as 
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collateral, and later ordinary banks (jutsu ginko) funded by private 
capital, with the continental European model of long-term credit 
banks for industry and agriculture ... as well as local savings banks 
and postal savings. Japan established a central bank in 1882 based 
on the Belgian example ... (Aoki, 1994, p. 43). 
Banks became the major provider of external finance for companies during this 
period. A decentralised banking system with two types of banks had emerged by 
the 1920s: first, five large zaibatsu banks, and, second, a large number of medium 
and small banks. Aoki (1994) describes these banks as follows: 
[They] were closely connected to a particular group of industrial firms by 
credit relations and (cross) ownership. Some of the small banks were 
family owned ... and often closely tied to their own firms. In providing 
long-long term investment funds, those banks took a different 
development route from the British commercial banks (Aoki, 1994, p. 43). 
Of interest here is the development of the Kikan-ginko system, whereby 
industrialists established banks in order to finance their activities. These banks 
were closely linked to their affiliated firms through close cross-directorships 
(Teranashi, 2000, p. 45). After a banking crisis in 1927 the number of banks was 
significantly reduced through mergers and acquisitions. Aoki (1994, p. 44) 
identifies to key developments in the period from the 1930s to the end of the 
Second World War, which have been particularly important for the development of 
the main bank system: first, promotion of bank consortia for long-term investment 
loans, and, second, the introduction of the designated banking system (ibid.).42 The 
following quote from Aoki (1994) indicates the significant impact of the designated 
42 Although the designated banking system was introduced in 1944, that is, outside the period under 
consideration here, it is briefly referred to in this section as this facilitates better appreciation of the 
development of the main bank system. 
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banking system, which was introduced by the Ministry of Munitions, on the 
development of the main bank system. 
For each firm receiving military procurement orders, a single bank was 
designated and funds were supplied to the firm through that bank. The 
firm held its deposit and loan accounts with its designated bank, which 
may be considered as a prototype of the payment settlements account 
aspect of the main bank relationship (Aoki, 1994, p. 44) 
It is the above structures, which constitute the foundations of the Japanese main 
bank system. 
In summary, modernisation and Westernisation characterised Japan during the 
period from 1868 to 1937. Beasely (2000, pp. 114-5) claims that the modernisation 
of Japan was not completed until 1920 and develops the following argument 
regarding Japan's modernisation and Westernisation: 
Japan retained enough financial independence to resist the pressures 
making for conformity. Farming and commerce in the Tokugawa period 
had led to an accumulation of capital in private hands which proved 
sufficient to fund the first stages of growth, once government had 
provided an infrastructure and established the machinery by which to 
channel investment in appropriate directions. As a result, Japan did not 
require heavy capital inputs from abroad and had no considerable foreign 
debt before the Russo-Japanese War. The West provided technology, plus 
a knowledge of methods of business organization, introduced into Japan 
by foreign experts and advisers, but it had no great part in ownership or 
management. That increased the scope for modification of the Western 
model' (Beasely, 2000, pp.l14-115). 
In terms of the development of Japanese style corporate governance, several 
developments in the corporate and legal context were of significance during the 
period from 1867 to 1937. First, this period saw a concentration of ownership, 
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which consequently reduced the conflict between owners and managers to a 
considerable extent. This particular kind of share ownership pattern in Japan has 
led to the development of a corporate governance system in which management is 
effectively controlled by the major shareholders of the company. Second, this 
period witnessed the emergence of some of the characteristics of the Japanese 
employment system (seniority based pay, life-long employment, loyalty as the 
basis for the employer - employee relationship and internal promotion), which 
have helped shape the Japanese corporate governance system. Third, another 
important development during this period was the introduction of the Commercial 
Code, which provided the legal framework for the development of corporate 
governance practices. 43 Further, and fourth, the development of the main bank 
system during 1868 and 1937 laid the foundation for the emphasis on debt finance 
in the context of the Japanese corporation and the subsequent reliance on banks as 
playing an important monitoring role in the context of the Japanese corporate 
governance system (Aoki, 1994). 
5.2.1937 -1945: JAPAN AT WAR 
The period from 1937 to 1945 was characterised by Japan preparIng for and 
participating in War. As Nakamura (1995, p. 3) has argued: 'From the outbreak of 
the war with China in July 1937 until the defeat in August 1945, Japan poured all 
its strength into the war and, in doing so, was destroyed.' With the outbreak of the 
43 Another important development during this period was further democratisation with the male vote 
being given in 1925 (Teranishi, 2000, p. 46). 
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war with China the Japanese government began to exercise stricter control over the 
economy, which was continuously strengthened until the defeat in 1945 
(Hirschmeier and Yui, 1975; Beasley, 1990; Nakamura, 1995). Major concerns in 
this context were the allocation of funds to the war effort and the reorganisation of 
the industrial sector for war production. Several laws were introduced during this 
period in an attempt to exercise control over capital and foreign trade so as to 
prioritise military needs (Beasley, 1990, p. 190). The Provisional Financial 
Adjustment Law was promulgated in 1937 and was concerned to prioritise the 
allocation of domestic funds to the armament industry (Sakuradani, 2007). Through 
the issuance of the Temporary Capital Adjustment Law and the Temporary Export 
and Import Commodities Measures direct government control over the economy 
were set in place. Nakamura (1995) summarises the impact of the two laws on the 
economy and businesses: 
The former law imposed controls on the establishment of companies, 
capital increases, payments, bond floatations, and the borrowing of long-
term funds in an effort to channel long-term funds on a priority basis into 
the military industries. The latter gave the government the authority to 
control the production, processing, trading, holding, and consumption of 
commodities and raw materials related to exports and imports. (Nakamura, 
1995, p. 7) 
The Key Industries Control Law and the Export Union Law (Hirschmeier and Yui, 
1975, p. 150) were also further attempts by the government to expand its control 
over the Japanese economy. Of interest is also the National General Mobilisation 
Law from 1938 because of its impact on companies. As Bearsley (1990, p. 190) has 
argued, this law further facilitated government control through providing a wider 
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framework of emergency powers, such as, 'the direction of labour and materials, 
the regulation of wages and prices, government operation of key industries, if 
required, and even a compulsory savings scheme' (see also Sakuradani, 2007, p. 4). 
Nakamura (1995, p. 8) explained that this law enabled the government to exercise 
'broad controls in such broad areas as the behavior of firms, their disposal of 
profits, and financial institutions' uses of funds'. Miyamoto (2005) points out that 
as a result of the above legal amendments the government also interfered III 
companies' dividend policy and directors' bonuses. Further, the proportion of 
external directors and executives who were large shareholders of the company was 
decreased and internally promoted executives became prominent. With the 
outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939, material shortages in Japan became a 
pressing problem. In order to alleviate this problem, the government set prices and 
introduced rationing systems for certain goods (for example, cotton and steel). As a 
consequence of such government measures there was a growth in the black market, 
which the government tried to control though the introduction of an economic 
police force (Nakamura, 1995, pp. 8-10). Further, through the issuance of the 
September 18 Stop Order in 1939 a ceiling was placed on prices and wages 
'thereby bringing them under government control' (ibid., p. 10). In 1939 as a 
consequence of a drought, which had negatively impacted upon the rice crop and 
hydroelectric power, controls and rationing systems were also introduced into 
many aspects of national life. For Nakamura (1995, p. 10), 'the Japanese economy 
by 1940 was in effect a centrally planned command economy much like that of the 
former Soviet Union'. Of interest in the context of this strong State dominance 
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were proposals, which were made as part of a debate over the New Economic Order. 
These proposals 'called for separating the owners of capital from those responsible 
for management in order to convert businesses from private profit-seeking 
undertakings into "public" enterprises where production would be paramount' 
(ibid.). Financial circles were strongly against these proposals. In 1941 and with 
Japan engaged in the Pacific War, Control Associations (Tosei Kai)44 were formed 
in key industries so as to further enhance the growth of the war economy. This was 
a further strengthening of state control as Nakamura explains: 
Although the ordinance establishing a controlling cartel in each major 
industry theoretically conferred great powers on association members and 
called for autonomous regulation in the hands of private individuals, in 
actuality the government took on broad supervisory powers and made the 
associations function as lower-echelon mechanisms of government control. 
(Nakamura, 1995, p. 14). 
As this system, however, was not deemed to be very successful, the Munitions 
Company Law of 1943 was promulgated, which obliged companies to appoint a 
person responsible for production, which the government could choose and who 
had the right of representing the company (Tanaka, 1998; Nakamura, 1995, p. 14; 
Miyamoto, 2005). This 'public official' had to increase production in such way as 
to reflect national (i.e. set by the government) directives (Nakamura, 1995, p. 14). 
A further and significant development towards the end of the War, was the 
establishment in 1944 of the System of Financial Institutions Authorized to Finance 
Munitions Companies. These financial institutions according to the arrangements 
44 These associations reflected aspects of the debate over the New Economic Order (Nakamura, 1995, 
p.14). 
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were backed by the Japanese government, the Bank of Japan and other financial 
institutions so that providing funds to munitions companies would never be a 
problem (Nakamura, 1995, p. 18). 
Although in history writing more generally the view is often expressed that the end 
of World War II constituted an absolute discontinuity in structures and systems this 
is, however, a myth. For the case of Japan, Nakamura (1995, p. 3) has pointed to 
the relevance of developments during the war period for post-war developments: 
... the war years cannot be ignored in a consideration of the postwar period. 
To a great extent, the system created was inherited as the postwar 
economic system. The industries developed during the war became the 
major postwar industries; wartime technology was reborn in the postwar 
export industries; and the postwar national lifestyle, too, originated in 
changes that began during the period of conflict. 
There are several developments during the war period that were of significance for 
the development of the Japanese corporate governance system. First, the Commerce 
and Industry Ministry's and the Munitions Ministry's control over the economy and 
industry during the war is to some extent reflected in the administrative leadership 
in the business area of two post-war Japanese Ministries: the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Transport. According 
to Nakamura (1995, p. 19) 'it was during the course of wartime controls that the 
"guidance" relationship was established between firms and the bureaucracy, and 
between private banks and the bank of Japan'. Second, relationships set up in the 
context of the System of Financial institutions Authorized to Finance Munitions 
Companies became important in the context of keiretsu (i.e. here the powerful 
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financial groupings of major banks such as, for example, the Industrial Bank of 
Japan, Sanwa and Dai-ichi Kangy6; Nakamura, 1995, p. 18). Third, the seniority 
wage system and the lifetime employment system, both developed after World War 
I, became a prominent feature of the Japanese employment system.45 As a result of 
seniority based promotion, a system had emerged by the end of the Second World 
War whereby the board of directors was composed of executive directors and non-
executive directors who were subordinates of the former. Consequently, 
shareholder interests had 'become subordinated to the general interests of growth in 
the company' (Hirschmeier and Yui, 1975, p. 191). And, fourth, post-war labour-
management relations also reflect developments during the war period when labour 
unions were replaced by Patriotic Industrial Associations (Sangyo Hokoku Kai) 
based on firms rather than sectors (Nakamura, 1995, p. 19).46 
45 These systems were initially developed for the chemical and heavy industry sectors but then 
expanded into a nation-wide system as part of the government imposed wage controls from 1940-
1941 (Nakamura, 1995, p. 19). 
46 Having elaborated the development of characteristics of the Japanese corporate governance system 
from 1868 to 1945 it is of interest to consider two questions, which have been addressed in the 
literature: First, was the Anglo-Saxon style corporate governance widely practiced in pre-war Japan? 
And, second, in what sense might one argue that the Japanese corporate governance model evolve 
before 19377 Watanabe (2000) holds that before World War II the Japanese model of corporate 
governance was quite similar to the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance. It prioritised 
shareholder property interest. He also maintains that large shareholders although they had been 
replaced as directors by university graduates, still had an important influence as members of the board 
of directors. In contrast, based on their own empirical work, Miyamoto and Abe (2004, p. 30) argue 
that the Japanese corporate governance structure had already begun to evolve and develop before 
1937: 'It is true that the large stockholders had effective power at the early stage of these companies' 
[Le. the companies they studied] history. In this sense, the corporate governance of early modem 
Japan was similar to that of the Anglo-Saxon model. But the governance of large stockholders had 
ended by the late 19th or early 20th century, and the governance of salaried managers was established 
by the First World War.' They thus conclude that the Japanese corporate governance system has a 
much longer history and pre-dates the pre-war period and, relatedly, 'Anglo-Saxon structures did not 
necessarily prevail within pre-war big businesses (Miyamoto and Abe, 2004, p. 30). The literature is 
inconclusive on that matter. For the purpose here, it is, however not important to precisely identify 
when the Japanese corporate governance model came into being. What is important in the context of 
this study is to gain an appreciation of how the characteristics of the Japanese corporate context and 
what is called the Japanese corporate governance model had developed within the context they were 
and are embedded in. 
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5.3. 1945 - 1989: THE EMERGENCE OF JAPAN AS A MAJOR 
ECONOMIC POWER 
During the period from 1945 to 1989 Japan emerged from a nation, which had lost 
the war and whose economy had been destroyed, to become a nation with a 
developed economy threatening the global economic supremacy of the U.S. In the 
following a brief summary of the economic development of Japan after W orId War 
II and some key political developments is offered. Then three developments in the 
Japanese corporate context, which had a significant impact on the Japanese 
corporate governance system, namely cross-shareholdings, the role of the banks 
and Japanese style management, are discussed. 
After World War II, Japan was occupied by the allied forces with the U.S. being 
the dominant force in the occupation army. The occupation authorities had a 
significant impact on Japan in terms of shaping her legal and administrative 
framework. For example, the constitution of Japan implemented during the 
occupation period reflected the U.S. notion of democracy as well as U.S. values. It 
is also of note that during the occupation period a close relationship between Japan 
and the U.S. developed, which also remained after Japan gained independence on 
8th September 1951 by concluding a treaty of peace, named the San Francisco 
Peace Treaty, with forty eight countries (Perez, 1998, p. 159). The Japan - U.S. 
relationship was motivated by a mutual interest of both governments. The U.S., 
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concerned about security in the light of a recovering USSR, was keen to have 
military bases on Japanese territory. Japan in tum, having been isolated from its 
neighbours because of the position taken during W orId War II, was keen to secure 
the help of the U.S. in the event of an invasion. Subsequently, Japan and the U.S. 
signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which gave the U.S. a 
special position amongst the other treaty partners of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty: Japan allowed the U.S. to set up military bases in Japan and in return got 
assurance that the U.S. would help defend Japan in the case of an invasion by 
(an)other country(ies) (Vogel 2002, p.1). The U.S. helped integrate Japan into the 
Western bloc, which was acting as a force against communist countries. Japan thus 
emerged after 1945 as a member of a group of so-called democratic and capitalistic 
countries in the context of the Cold War. Japan's position in the global political 
order became an important factor that helped facilitate the economic success of the 
country (Vogel, 2002). 
The war had destroyed Japan's economy and had left 13.1 million people 
unemployed. After Japan's defeat, the allied forces held the view that they were not 
responsible for the reconstruction of her economy. This view manifested for Japan 
in high reparation payments and the cancellation of the indemnity payments to 
businesses. These payments had been promised by the wartime government to 
companies in case they should incur losses as a result of their war efforts 
(Nakamura, 1995, p. 33). The stance of the U.S. towards Japan, however, already 
changed as early as autumn 1946 when Japan was seen as an important ally in the 
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Cold War (ibid., p. 37).47 According to Vogel (2002, p. 1), this meant that 'the 
United States ... supported Japan's economic recovery by allowing Japan to limit the 
reparations paid to war victims, by creating a liberal international trade regime, and 
by maintaining open markets at home while tolerating Japanese trade protection 
and an undervalued yen'. Of significance here was that private foreign trade was 
reopened in 1947, which allowed citizens of the Allied countries to carry out 
business in Japan (Nakamura, 1995, p. 38). With the support from the U.S., Japan 
made a remarkable economic recovery after World War II (Grimes, 2002). 
Nakamura (1995, p. xvii) comments upon Japan's economic growth after 1945: 
Of unquestionably great significance, the reforms implemented 
following the war may without exaggeration be termed 
revolutionary. With new reforms carried out atop a foundation of 
institutions and technology handed down from prewar days, and in 
an environment conducive to world-wide economic growth and 
technological progress, the postwar Japanese economy was able to 
pursue its course of rapid growth in long, swift strides. 
During the occupation period the allied administration carried out three key 
reforms: the break-up of the zaibatsu48 , a land reform and a labour democratisation 
(Nakamura, 1995, p. 25). 
After Japan had gained independence in 1951 the country experienced increased 
economic growth from the 1950s through to the early 1970s. This growth occurred 
47 U.S. policy further changed significantly in October 1948 in the cont~xt of a co~cern over 
developments in China. Steps were now taken to work towards the reconstructIon o~ Japan s economy 
by 'removing many restrictions that had been previously imposed and decreemg that Japanese 
economic recovery would be expedited' (Nakamura, 1995, p. 40). 
48 The impact that the dismantling of the zaibatsu had on the corporate context of Japan is discussed in 
more detail later in the chapter. 
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in the context of a worldwide economic growth and was, according to Nakamura 
(1995, p. 53) neither the result of 'special government policies nor of a few heroic 
achievements, but was produced by the 'cumulative efforts of the people' and 
'showed virtually a straight line of economic growth (an average economic growth 
rate of 10 percent)'. During this period' Japan succeeded in reducing the proportion 
of imports used for the processing trade and expanded the scale of imports for 
domestic consumption, thus lowering the ratio of imports to GNP' (Nakamura, 
1995, p. 65). The growth of Japan's economy was further facilitated through the 
availability of sufficient and cheap raw materials and energy, which was needed in 
the development of the heavy and chemical industries. The Korean War (1950-
1953) also had a positive impact on the Japanese economy as the boom that it 
created contributed to the re-building of Japanese companies after the end of the 
Second World War (ibid). 49 The period of economic growth after the war also 
showed a significant technological progress in Japan (Nakamura, 1995, p. 68). 
The Japanese government had played an important role in facilitating the economic 
growth through various policies, which were intended to protect industry. Since 
1955 the government had also set economic plans, which set out the direction of 
social and economic developments and the strategies and policies the government 
should adopt to achieve these goals and an indication of 'behavior guidelines for 
49 Several developments had taken place prior and after the Second World War that had constituted 
challenges to Japanese companies. These included the move away from o~er-m~agers to 
professional and hired managers (i.e. a separation of ownership and control), the dlsmant~mg of the 
zaibatsu that had led to increased competition and the democratisation oflabour (e.g. establIshment of 
finn based labour unions) (Nakamura, 1995, p. 68). 
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the people and for business' (Nakamura, 1995, p. 91). During this period the 
government also developed a special relationship with industry in providing it with 
administrative guidance (gyosei shido) (Nakamura, 1995, p. 89). Nakamura refers 
in the context of this state guidance to the perception that has emerged in the U.S. 
of Japan, Inc. (a phrase coming from the U.S. State Department) and in the U.K of 
the Japanese economy being the '''most intelligently dirigiste system in the world" 
(emphasis in the original)'. 50 In response to these perceptions, Nakamura points 
out that administrative guidance in Japan has a long history: 
... it simply comes down to this: the attitude on the part of both 
government and business that such guidance and protection is not strange 
but quite natural had been taking shape for a considerable period of time, 
ever since the days of wartime controls. (Nakamura, 1995, p. 91) 
The 1960s and the early 1970s witnessed an increased standard of living in 
conventional terms and a 'Westernization of the national lifestyle' (Nakamura, 
1995, p. 100). 
In the 1970s the Japanese economy had to overcome significant challenges: the 
Nixon shock and two oil crises (1973 and 1979; Nakamura, 1995, p. 237). The 
Nixon shock here refers to policies introduced by U.S. President Nixon in the 
context of his New Economic Programme, one of which was the' suspension of the 
convertibility of the US dollar into gold' (Nakakita, 1993, p. 356). As a 
consequence of the new policies, managed floating exchange rates were introduced. 
Nakakita (1993, p. 356) comments on the effect of this on the Japanese business 
50 This was the view expressed by Norman Macrae from the Economist (Nakamura, 1995, p. 90). 
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community: 'Nixon's announcement came as a shock to the Japanese business 
community, which had been prepared to defend to the death the Yen3 60 rate.' 51 
The two oil CrIses of the 1970s also had a significant impact on Japan, which 
heavily relied on crude oil as primary energy in the light of lacking domestic 
energy resources (Nakakita, 1993). The increase in oil price in 1973 led to an 
increase of prices within Japan and to panic buying in a context where suppliers 
withheld goods as they were anticipating higher prices. The government stepped in 
and tried to control inflation. As a consequence of government policy the rapid 
economic growth came to a halt and Japan entered a recession (Nakamura, 1995, 
pp. 213-218). The oil crises forced businesses to refocus, to reduce costs and 
introduce methods to conserve energy, which led to a reduction in crude oil 
consumption. Consequently production and investment in plant and equipment 
declined (Nakakita, 1993, pp. 356-7; Nakamura, 1995, pp. 213-218). Nakakita 
(1993, p. 357) summarises the effects that these changes had on the Japanese 
economy: 
Accordingly, the Japanese economy began to rely more on higher value-
added industries, particularly automobiles, electronics, machine tools and 
other processing and assembling industries. This was due largely to a 
technological advancement taking place on the shop-floor, including total 
quality control (TQC), automation, and electronic manufacturing 
techniques. In the meantime, heavy industrial sectors, including 
aluminium, cement, and paper and pulp, lost their competitive edge with 
the ascendancy of the Asian Newly Industrializing Economies (ANIEs). 
51 This exchange rate, US1$ = Yen 360, had been in place for 22 years (Nakakita, 1993, p. 338). 
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The measures put into place were successful and in the 1980s the Japanese 
economy had recovered and its position internationally had been further 
strengthened. Nakakita (1993, p. 357) comments: 
With the exception of the period during the two oil crises, Japan's balance 
of payments continued to shop an enormous surplus, and its share of world 
GNP increased from 6 per cent in 1970 to 11.8 per cent in 1986. 
The period from the 1950 to the 1970s was not only of significance in terms of 
Japan's economic success but also in terms of the development of some key 
economic and political institutions, which had reached maturity in the late 1970s. 
These economic and political institutions were perceived as having facilitated 
Japan's extraordinary economic success by the beginning of the 1980s. Key 
economic institutions in this context include, for example, the Japanese financial 
system, corporate system and corporate governance system as well as labour 
market institutions (such as, for example, life-long employment) and wage 
coordination and restraint. Key political institutions include the dominance of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the bureaucracy and the iron triangle (Cargill and 
Sakamoto, 2008, pp. 31-32). The iron triangle was the close relationship between 
the LDP, the bureaucracy and client industries, firms and sectors. Cargill and 
Sakamoto (2008) explain how the iron triangle operated in practice: 
The iron triangle was in large part a feature of the political regime in 
pretransition Japan. 52 The client industries and firms provided electoral 
support to the LDP, which in tum delegated policy-making power ~o the 
bureaucracy, which in tum provided regulation and favorable polIcy to 
protect the client industries and firms. The client industries and firms 
52 Cargill and Sakamoto (2008) refer to pretransition Japan as the Japan before the introduction of 
liberal reforms in the latter half of the 1980s. 
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delegated control to bureaucrats and provided postretirement employment 
opportunities for bureaucrats via amkudari53 , the bureaucracy mobilized 
the support of industry and firm for the LDP, and the LDP in tum 
provided public resources and favourable policies to the client industries 
(Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008, p. 54). 
It is of note that the above economic and political institutions of Japan showed 
characteristics that were perceived by commentators inside as well as outside of 
Japan as different from the characteristics of Western institutions. The reason for 
the observed differences, it was argued, was the particular culture of Japan that was 
reflected in these institutions. This point was prominently made by Ronald Dore 
(see, for example, Dore, 2003). It is of interest that even those commentators who 
wish to downplay the particular impact of Japanese culture on these institutions, 
recognise that Japanese institutions before the market reforms were different. An 
example for such a position are Cargill and Sakamoto (2008) who have argued 
that:-
Japan's economic and political institutions appear to be more sensitive to 
risk-aversion and accepting of collectivism. Its risk-aversion and 
collectivism in tum render Japanese economic and political institutions 
resistant to change, and when change does occur, it is usually in response 
to a change in the external environment. Every society incorporates these 
attitudes in varying degrees, but in Japan's case these attitudes playa 
larger role in shaping economic and political institutions. Japan perceives 
itself as having fewer degrees of freedom than other countries in making 
economic and political decisions because of a limited resource base, 
limited land areas that can be utilized for production and living, and 
Japan's susceptibility to natural disasters such as earthquakes and violent 
weather. This in tum has provided incentives to develop institutions based 
S3 The tenn amakudari means "descent from heaven" and was used for retired ministry officials who 
were dispatched by the government to lucrative positions in private corporations. 
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on mutual support, insularity, and aversion to risk and change (Cargill and 
Sakamoto, 2008, p. 30).54 
It should be noted that the particular characteristics of the Japanese institutions that 
Cargill and Sakamoto are referring to above have not only contributed to the 
economic success of Japan but most importantly have also facilitated the 
emergence of a more egalitarian society with a life-style that was more secure and 
certain for its citizens. Commentators have thus pointed to the Japanese variety of 
capitalism as an example of a type of capitalism where the state was concerned to 
facilitate the well-being of its citizens through interventionist policies (Dore, 1998, 
2000).55 
In terms of Japan's international political position during the period from 1945 to 
1989 we can observe a significant transformation: from a position of having been 
defeated in the war and being occupied by allied forces, Japan had moved to 
becoming a member of international organisations such as the IMF (1953), GATT 
(1955) and the OECD (1964). The change in the political position of Japan and its 
membership of international organisations was accompanied by a change in trade 
policy: protectionist measures (see the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade 
Control Law, 1949) introduced in the early post-war period were consequently 
replaced by attempts towards trade and capital liberalisation from the 1960s 
(Nakakita, 1993, pp. 361-2). Of note here is the role of the state in fostering 
54 It is of note that Cargill and Sakamoto (2008) carefully omit any reference to Japan's particular 
culture, which has also shaped the institutions they are referring to here. Chapter 6 explains in more 
detail the interrelationship between Japanese institutions and systems and culture. 
55 Chapter 6 provides a summary discussion of the characteristics of the Japanese type of capitalism. 
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economic development during the period from 1945 to 1989. It was state policy 
that had managed and facilitated the economic growth during the period. For Lee 
(2008), Japan is thus an example for state-led economic development and directly 
challenges the neo-liberalist model of development promoted by the U.S. and 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Banle Lee (2008, p. 1) explains the two 
positions regarding development: 
[The end of the Cold War] has strengthened to a significant degree the 
political triumph of the "New Right" in the United States and Britain and 
seemingly confirmed a long-held conviction among neoliberals that the 
free play of market forces and a minimal role for the state in economic 
affairs would ensure efficiency and productivity of the economy ... The 
critics argue that all modern economically developed states employed the 
practice of state-led economic development in one way or another when 
they began to industrialize. Opposed to this is the position that all modern 
economically developed states have succeeded in their development by 
relying predominantly on self-regulating market forces. 
According to Lee (2008), Japan thus constitutes a challenge to the U.S. and the 
neoliberal world order. It is important to consider this clash of positions later in the 
analysis of the empirics (subter). 
The period from 1945 to 1989 also witnessed important developments in the 
corporate context of Japan, which were of significance for the Japanese corporate 
governance system. These were an increase in cross-shareholdings, which had 
emanated from the dismantling of the zaibatsu, the development of the banking 
system and the establishment of a set of distinct employment practices for Japanese 
firms. These developments are discussed below. 
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The break-up of the zaibatsu under the Allied administration had significant 
consequences for the Japanese corporate system. The occupying forces had been 
particUlarly concerned about the zaibatsu, which they believed had played a 
significant role in supporting the State during the pre-War and War period. In 
addition, as Beasley (1990, p. 216) has pointed out, zaibatsu were seen as 'barriers 
to domestic competition' and hence to 'economic democracy'. Indeed, the zaibatsu 
still had substantial assets and power even after the war had ended. The plan of the 
occupying forces was therefore to dismantle the zaibatsu so as to decentralise their 
power and wealth. In accordance with this policy, shares of the holding company 
were sold through the Holding Companies Liquidation Commission (Yafeh, 2000) 
and, as a result of this, shareholdings of individual investors had increased 
significantly by 1949. According to Kitsuki and N agakuba (1997, p. 4), 
shareholdings of individual investors had reached 68.4% in 1949. In addition, in 
April 1947 an Anti-monopoly Law was introduced to ensure that no successors of 
the zaibatsu could emerge (Beasley, 1990, p. 216). This development reversed soon 
after, however, when many individual shareholders began to sell their shares after 
the re-opening of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 1949 (Kitsuki and Nagakubo, 
1997). As a result of this change in share ownership, cross-shareholdings among 
Japanese companies emerged. Kitsuki and Nagakubo (1997) and Tanaka (1998) 
identify three transition periods that advanced cross-shareholding: first, during the 
1950s; second, between the middle of the 1960s and the beginning of 1970s, and 
third, during the 1980s. As a result of the amendments to the Anti-monopoly Law 
in 1949 and 1953 further cross-shareholdings were encouraged. The amended law 
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allowed companies to purchase other companies' shares and financial institutions 
to hold at most 10% of a company's outstanding shares, which encouraged 
companies to hold each other's shares. During the 1960s and 1970s another 
impetus that encouraged cross-shareholdings came with Japan's new membership 
of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the 
liberalisation of capital markets in 1964. As the liberalisation of capital markets 
allowed anybody to invest in Japanese companies, cross-shareholdings increased as 
Japanese managers were worried about a takeover by foreign investors. In the 
1980s, cross-shareholdings received further impetus as companies preferred equity 
finance to indirect financing (i.e. issue of shares at market value and convertible 
debentures). The newly issued shares at market value further encouraged cross-
shareholdings (Kitsuki and Nagakubo, 1997; Tanaka, 1998). As will be shown later 
in the analysis of the empirics cross-shareholdings have impacted significantly on 
the Japanese corporate governance system (subter). 
After the Second World War, banks played a vital role in the rebuilding of the 
Japanese economy. The government kept strict control over financial markets in 
order to facilitate Japan's attempt to catch up with other developed countries. 
Banks were thus able to raise funds at low interest rates from the central bank. 
Watanabe and Yamamoto (1993, p. 214) note: '[B]anks enjoyed a powerful 
position in their capacity as lenders, and carefully examined the business plans and 
financial condition of borrowing companies. Companies did not refuse to disclose 
detailed information about their operations to the banks, as the banks were an 
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essential source of funds.' As long as companies performed well, banks did not 
interfere with management. Once company performance was poor, however, banks 
stepped in and interfered with management. Cargill and Sakamoto (2008) explain 
how the Japanese financial system facilitated the particular type of Japanese 
corporate governance system: 
The Japanese financial system ... was rigidly regulated, administratively 
controlled, internationally isolated, and relied on the transfer of funds 
through private and public bank channels, as opposed to relying on money 
and capital markets. In fact, corporate governance was intimately tied to 
the financial system relying on a set of company groups or keiretsu 
[emphasis in original], centered on a large financial institution, usually 
one of the large city banks. This system also was known as the main bank 
system (Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008, p. 12). 
Further, administrative guidance (especially through government departments) and 
insider information played an important advisory role in terms of risk assessment in 
the financial system. Cargill and Sakamoto (2008, p. 86) point out that in the 
context of the strongly regulated and internationally isolated financial system this 
was an adequate mechanism. 
In addition to cross-shareholdings and the role of the banks as major lenders, a 
third characteristic of the Japanese business context that impacted on the 
development of the particular kind of Japanese corporate governance was Japanese-
style employment practices. Japanese-style employment practices include 'life-long 
employment, seniority-based pay and promotion and company affiliated trade 
unions' (Seki, 2005, p. 378). After World War II these employment practices 
became standard for all employees in companies and not just skilled workers. 
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These employment practices encourage management to develop the skills of their 
employees and to enhance their sense of belonging to the company and thus raise 
their morale. A result of such 'nurturing' of employees is that most corporate 
executives were internally promoted and the corporate executive therefore came to 
be seen as a kind of workers' representative (Egawa, 2003). 
By the end of the period from 1945 to the late 1980s the Japanese economy had 
been booming and had reached its height by the end of 1989. Japan had 
outperformed many other industrialised countries and its development was seen as 
a model for other countries (Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008, p. 83). During this era of 
economIc growth in the 1980s Japan had increasingly come under pressure, 
especially from outside of Japan, to carry out some structural reforms. The 
Japanese government eventually embarked on a liberalisation programme in the 
second half of the 1980s. These deregulation attempts have to be understood in the 
context of neo-liberal policies becoming prominent initially in the U.K. under 
Margaret Thatcher and the U.S. under Ronald Reagan from the late 1970s (Cargill 
and Sakamoto, 2008) and early 1980s but soon spreading to other capitalistic 
d . 56 develope Western economIes. 
56 This liberalisation programme is referred to and further elaborated upon later in this chapter. 
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5.4.1990 - 2007: CRISIS AND RECOVERY 
The period from 1990 to 2008 witnessed a major shift in the socio-economic and 
political spheres of Japan. According to Cargill and Sakamoto (2008, p. 3), this 
period saw 'wide swings in economic and political performance'. They argue that 
this period is part of a wider transition towards a market economy as well as a 
transition in the political regime. How significant the changes during this period 
were is evident from their comment on the differences between the 1980s and the 
1990s: 
In the 1980s, Japan seemed invincible in terms of economic, financial, and 
political stability, whereas in the 1990s and the beginning of the new 
century, Japan seemed unable to do anything right. The distress by the late 
1990s illustrated to all but a few that the "old" Japan was no longer viable. 
Japan needed to adapt its economic and political institutions to a new 
environment and, in the process, the old social contract between the 
government and the population began to unravel (Cargill and Sakamoto, 
2008, p. 3). 
For Cargill and Sakamoto (ibid.) this transition period is the most significant period 
in Japan's post-war history as it 'represents a dramatic shift in how Japan operates'. 
This period is also of great significance for the development of the Japanese 
corporate governance system. With the crisis occurring in Japan's socio-economic 
and political spheres, the Japanese corporate governance system, which is 
embedded in this crisis laden context, also came under criticism and pressure to 
change. In particular, the Japanese government was put under international pressure 
to change the Japanese corporate governance system and converge it with the 
Anglo-American corporate governance system. The debates over corporate 
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governance that this study focuses upon are embedded in this crisis ridden context. 
An appreciation of the developments during the 1990s up to 2008 thus facilitates 
the analysis of these documents. Below developments during the 1990s and the 
early twenty-first century in the socio-political and economic sphere are 
summarised. The emphasis in this summary is on developments that especially 
impacted upon corporate governance in Japan. 57 Where appropriate, reference is 
made in the summary to the interrelationship between developments in the socio-
economic and political spheres and the Japanese corporate governance system. 
The 1990s in Japan began with the bursting of the bubble economy. This event 
significantly shaped the next two decades and had a far reaching impact on the 
socio-economic and political spheres of Japan as well as on people's well-being 
more generally. The latter half of the 1980s had witnessed an increase in real estate 
prices because liberalisation policies had made it possible for foreign institutions to 
enter Japan. The demand for real estate in the context of a limited supply 
(especially in Tokyo) coupled with a monetary policy of the Bank of Japan, which 
led to an increased supply in money and credit available, had fuelled an increase in 
real estate prices, which was significantly above the historical level (Cargill and 
Sakamoto, 2008, pp. 93-94). Cargill and Sakamoto (2008, p. 97) explain that 
towards the end of the 1980s market participants had 'lost perspective' and price 
57 The summary of the developments during the 19905 and the early twenty-first century has to be 
highly selective here. The emphasis is on those developments that .help .facilit~te t.he analysis of the 
empirics of Chapters 6,.7 and 8: The di.scuss~on of de.velopments ~n thIS sectIOn IS, however, more 
detailed then in the prevIOus sectIOn as thIS penod constitutes the mam focus of the study here. 
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expectations were 'no longer reasonably connected to economIC fundamentals'. 
They comment: 
The irrational exuberance was not only embraced by the public as they 
were willing to pay higher and higher prices for equities and real estate. It 
also embraced the financial system. Supported by accommodative 
monetary policy, banks and other financial institutions commenced a rapid 
credit expansion that further supported asset inflation in the context of a 
flawed and incomplete liberalization process (Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008, 
p.97). 
Several reasons were gIven for the emergence of the bubble economy and its 
subsequent bursting. One key reason referred to in the literature for the emergence 
of the bubble economy was the way in which the liberalisation programme of the 
late 1980s was carried out and the consequences emanating from this. Cargill and 
Sakamoto (2008), for example, argue that the Ministry of Finance reacted to 
pressures from the banks, securities companies and corporations who lobbied for 
liberalisation in areas they would especially benefit from. In addition to this 
pressure, there was international pressure to liberalise the economy. The particular 
stance of the Ministry of Finance impacted upon the way reforms were carried out. 
As a consequence, Cargill and Sakamoto (2008, p. 84) argue, "[t]here was never an 
economy-wide perspective and philosophy of markets over a state-directed 
economy and, as a result, liberalization was unbalanced and incomplete'. A 
particular issue in this respect was that key elements of the financial system had 
stayed in place, for example, the close relationship between financial institutions 
and the Ministry of Finance and the relationship between corporations and financial 
institutions, which was especially facilitated through the keiretsu system. These 
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monitoring mechanisms were, however, not sufficient in a context in which 
financial institutions could engage in new and riskier forms of lending because of 
the liberalisation programme. Further, transparency had not been enhanced in the 
new context and insider information and ministerial guidance had still been heavily 
relied upon In addition, the main bank system, which had an important monitoring 
role, began 'to unravel in the context of liberalization' (Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008, 
p. 98). In this context it was easy for financial institutions to engage in risky 
investing and lending that 'made it relatively easy for asset prices to increase at 
rates that could not be justified by economic fundamentals' (ibid., p. 100). In 
addition, Kikuzawa (2002) points out, Japanese companies began to move away 
from raising money from the banks, which as a consequence further weakened the 
monitoring role of the banks (see also Miyajima and Arikawa, 1999). Watanabe 
and Yamamoto (1993) writing in the early 1990s also point to the lack of 
monitoring and argue that the Japanese corporate governance system had not 
adequately adjusted to contextual changes of the 1980s (ibid., p. 208). This 
shortfall in corporate governance is also seen as one of the contributing factors to 
the subsequent economic crisis of the 1990s. 
At the beginning of the 1990s the bubble economy burst and Japan entered a 
recession. The bursting of the bubble economy and the collapse of the asset prices 
was, according to Cargill and Sakamoto (2008), a direct result of a policy decision 
of the Bank of Japan: 
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By 1989, the BOJ became concerned about real estate and equity prices, 
and the rate of inflation was beginning to increase. The BOJ began to 
consider an increase in the discount rate despite opposition of the MOF 
[Ministry of Finance]. On May 1989, despite the MOF's objections, the 
BOJ commenced raising the discount rate from the postwar historical low 
of 2.5 percent to 3.25 and eventually to 6 percent in August 1990 (Cargill 
and Sakamoto, 2008, p. 98). 
The implications of this move were significant. Asset prices that had been at a high 
in January 1990 dramatically declined58 and Japan entered an economic recession 
with deflation59 and a crisis that would last for over one decade. This period in 
Japan's history is commonly referred to as the "lost decade" because of the lost 
financial and economic development. 60 Below some of the key developments 
during this period are referred to. 
It is of interest that the bubble economy and the bursting of the bubble economy 
was officially for the first time confirmed in 1993 in Heisei Go nen Nenji Keizai 
Houkoku, Keizai Hakusho, (Economic White Paper) of the Keizai Kikaku-Cho (The 
Economic Planning Agency) (Keizai Kikaku-Cho, 1993). Until then the official line 
was that the economy was still significantly growing. In contrast, Hoshi and 
Kashyap (2001) point out that the '1990s began with a sharp deceleration in 
growth: between 1990 and 1994 the average annual growth rate of real GDP was 
58 Equity prices declined first and were followed by real estate prices in 1991. According to Cargill 
and Sakamoto (2008, p. 99): 'As of August 2007, equity prices recovered to only about 45 per4cent of 
their high at the start of 1990. Real estate prices continu~d to i~crease. un~il late 1991 but then 
commenced declining and only as of late 2006 have shown sIgns of Increasmg. 
59 Deflation had started in 1995 and according to Cargill and Sakamoto (2008, p. 16) prices fell to at 
least 2007. 
60 Cargill and Sakamoto (2008, p. 101) refer to a lost decade and a half as they hold that the economic 
and financial crisis continued until 2005. Nakamura (2008, p. 113) also argues that the crisis 'lasted 
well into the early 2000s, and both Japanese firms and households suffered from the lack of economic 
growth for many years' . 
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1.5%, compared to 5.5% for the previous four years' (p.267). According to their 
statistics the Japanese economy had taken a sudden tum from the 1990s and Japan 
had to struggle with stagnation throughout this period. 
The decline in asset prices in 1990 led to a financial crisis from 1990 to 1994. 
During this period the balance sheets of corporations and banks deteriorated and a 
large non-performing loan problem emerged. Both of these developments were the 
result of declining asset prices (Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008). A significant problem 
in this context related to jilsen. This crisis, which came to light first in 1991, was 
the financial crisis of the housing loan companies (i.e. jilsen). Hoshi and Kashyap 
(2001, p. 269) explain that these housing loan companies were founded in the early 
1970s by city banks and other financial institutions such as trust banks and 
securities firms. These loan companies quickly grew specialising in home mortgage. 
Hoshi and Kashyap state that 'as of 1980, 95% of their loans were to individuals' 
(ibid.). The fate of the jusen changed, however, when they found themselves in 
competition with their parent banks in the early 1980s after a revision of the 
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law. The competition had emerged 
because the revised law now allowed companies to raise funds from foreign 
markets. It is been argued that this deregulation signalled that Japanese companies 
were now less dependent on bank loans in financing. Japanese banks therefore 
found it necessary to find new costumers. Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) refer to this, 
stating that as the Japanese banks lost their traditional customers, they moved into 
the home mortgage business. When their parent banks moved into the housing 
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mortgage business, Jusen had to find other business opportunities and thus moved 
into the real estates market. Although the Jusen were able to satisfactorily expand 
and grow their business during the bubble boom, nonperforming loan problems 
became an issue after the bursting of the bubble economy in 1990 (ibid.). It is of 
note that the bursting of the bubble economy did not only adversely affect the Jusen 
but also the banks. As a consequence the monitoring strength of the banks was 
severely damaged. The banks and large corporations were saved through the 
intervention of the Ministry of Finance and the convoy system, a system of mutual 
support, whereby troubled banks and corporations were rescued by better 
performing banks and corporations (Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008, pp. 86, 103). 
There was a brief recovery of the economy from 1995 to 1996. Keizai Kikaku-Cho 
(The Economic Planning Agency) had already reported in its Heisei roku non NenJi 
Keizai Houkoku, Keizai Hakusho, (Economic White Paper) in 1994 that the 
adjustment phase of the share prices and real estate prices had been completed as a 
result of the Bank of Japan's (BOJ) policy to lower its discount rate seven times 
between 1991 and 1993 from 6% to 1. 75%. Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) comment: 
'In the fiscal 1994 budget, the government resumed issuing deficit bonds. The 
economy began to recover. With the growth rate improving to 5.1 % by 1996, 
recovery appeared to be on the track'. Encouraged by this growth, the Japanese 
government under Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto embarked on a major 
redesign of the Japanese financial system, called the Big Bang (Gibson, M. S., 
1998; HalL 1998, pp. 139-158). The objective of this reform programme was to 
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make the Japanese financial system a key component of the international financial 
system. The motto to support this deregulation attempt was 'Free, Fair and Global' 
(Vogel, 2006, p.89; Okamoto, 2005, p.69). According to Cargill and Sakamoto 
(2008) these reforms were based on the following principles: 
(1) To establish free, open and competitive markets; (2) to ensure fair 
financial practices through transparent and enforced regulation and 
supervision; and (3) to initiate accounting, legal, and regulatory 
institutional reforms to make Japan's financial system internationally 
compatible (Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008, p. 110). 
The Big Bang resulted in legislation that led to further deregulation and liberalisation. 
An important change was the transfer of financial regulatory and supervisory 
authority in Japan from the Ministry of Finance to the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA). This move ended the regulatory domination of the Ministry of Finance in the 
financial system, which had been established in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century (Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008, p. Ill). Other changes in policy encompassed 
the termination of income tax cuts that had commenced in 1994, the increase in the 
self-pay ratio in National Health Insurance and the increase in consumption tax 
from 30/0 to 50/0. The announcement of the change in consumption tax contributed 
to a last-minute rise in demand before the increase took effect. Deregulation 
involved the revision of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, 
which came into force in April 1998 and the Financial System Reform Law, which 
came into force in December 1998 (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001, p.275). This 
deregulation attempt of the late 1990s is of interest in relation to the Japanese 
corporate governance system. The point has been made that on the face of it in 
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order to accomplish deregulation, the government tried to reform the market 
through some legal and accounting changes, the latter ostensibly bringing Japanese 
accounting nearer to 'global' standards (Vogel, 2006, p. 89). This focus on 
disclosure may of course be considered a corporate governance issue as corporate 
transparency is a dimension potentially contributing to corporate governance. 
Despite the initial up-turn in the economy mentioned above, Japan was hit by another 
financial crisis. 1995 saw the liquidation of the second-largest regional bank in 
Japan, Hyogo Bank (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001, p.268). The Ministry of Finance 
stepped in and helped save Hyogo Bank because of its important role in the Kobe 
region. Through the convoy system large Japanese city banks were required to help 
to rescue Hyogo Bank. The failure of Hyogo Bank negatively impacted on how 
Japanese banks were perceived by foreign markets. To make matters worse, foreign 
markets not only began to cast doubt on the soundness of Japanese banks they also 
became concerned that healthy banks would be required in future to participate in 
attempts to rescue other Japanese banks who experienced financial difficulties. 
This resulted in Japanese banks being charged an additional rate when they raised 
funds through inter-bank loans. This was called the Japan premium and it 
significantly eroded the profitability of the Japanese banks (Hoshi and Kashyap, 
2001, pp.268-271). The financial crisis deepened in 1997 with Sanyo Securities 
Company, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (a major city bank) and Yamaichi Securities 
Company (one of the Big Four securities firms) all failing (Hoshi and Kashyap, 
2001; Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008, p. 112). During this period several corporate 
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scandals came to light. Daiwa Bank's New York branch showed a significant loss 
in 1995 after a dealer had successfully concealed trading losses for several years. 
As a result, Daiwa Bank withdrew from the U.S. market. In 1996 Sumitomo 
Corporation reported huge losses because of an illegal transaction In copper 
trading. Again, an employee of the company had carried out this illegal transaction. 
Nomura Securities' illegal payment to a corporate extortionist came to light in 1997 
(Cooke and Sawa, 1997). The new crisis soon intensified and led to the near 
collapse of the Japanese economy in 1998 (Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008, p. 15). 
Further, there were several corruption scandals, which involved the Bank of Japan 
and the Ministry of Finance. These developments led to a loss of confidence from 
the public in the bureaucracy. The scandals and corporate failures had a significant 
impact on how corporate governance was perceived. In this context, Cooke and 
Sawa (1998, p. 217) argue that the 'corporate governance issue was vigorously 
debated with a sense of urgency after a series of corporate failures in the financial 
services sector and scandals involving some large listed companies in Japan'. The 
system, which had been praised as having been a major contributor to facilitating 
the growth of the Japanese economy, now came to be seen as a contributory factor 
to the crisis of the early 1990s and the difficulties succeeding it (Cooke and Sawa, 
1998). The corporate governance debate was especially concerned to investigate 
why corporate scandals had not been prevented and what was wrong with Japanese 
companies' management structures and practices, which had once been praised and 
seen as an advantage of Japanese companies over Western companies. 
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Significant during this period of crisis were some changes in the political sphere, 
which commentators have argued also contributed to the prolonged crisis. The most 
significant development was that the ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP), lost control of government in the elections in 1993. For the first time in its 
history the LDP had lost the majority of seats in the lower house. 61 The new 
government was a coalition government consisting of eight parties and excluding 
the LDP (Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008, p. 16). During this period, it has been 
argued, politicians did not focus sufficiently on economic matters. Although the 
LDP regained votes in the 1994 elections it did not reach the majority and a 
coalition government was again formed. Further, this period saw an electoral 
reform as well as a reform of the bureaucracy. Of significance in terms of further 
pushing forward liberalisation was the election by the LDP of lunichiro Koizumi as 
the new Prime Minister in 2001. 
Koizumi had popular support which allowed him to make significant economic and 
political changes during his term of office from 2001 to 2006. Aiming to solve 
Japan's economic and financial problems he further pursued liberalisation policies. 
As Cargill and Sakamoto (2008) comment: 
... under the slogan of "There will be no economic recovery without 
structural reform" and "Structural Reform without sanctuary", Koizumi 
advocated more aggressive reforms to solve the economic and financial 
distress than did his predecessors. Koizumi wanted a faster resolution of 
the huge non-performing loan problem in the banking system, more 
61 A contributory factor to this defeat was that two groups of LOP politicians had formed their own 
conservative party just before the 1993 elections. 
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drastic restructuring of "zombie" 62 corporations and banks, and more 
deregulation and privatization to increase the efficiency and 
competiveness of the Japanese economy (Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008, p. 
18). 
In advocating his policies Koizumi moved away from the gradual reform approach 
adopted by previous LDP administrations. Key measures taken under Koizumi 
were the privatisation of the Postal Savings System (PSS) and the restructuring of 
the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FlLP) budget, through which the 
Ministry of Finance had allocated funds to targeted sectors of the economy. Postal 
savings, which came to 35 percent of the total savings in Japan, were the main 
source of funding for the FILP budget, which in turn constituted 10 percent of GDP 
in 2001 (Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008, p. 18). These reforms thus reduced the 
traditionally strong role of the government in resource allocation. During his term 
Prime Minister Koizumi also reduced the power of the bureaucracy through 
exercising strong prime ministerial leadership and consequently reduced the 
traditionally strong link between LDP, bureaucracy and their client industries 
(ibid.). A reform taking place during Prime Minister Koizumi' s term of office, 
which had a significant impact on the Japanese corporate governance system, was 
the amendment of the Commercial Code in 2003. The amended Commercial Code 
allowed companies to choose either the traditional Japanese corporate governance 
system or the Anglo-American corporate governance system. 
62 Cargill and Sakamoto (2008, p. 1 03, ~~~e 2) provide the fol1~wing .explanation for th~ t~rm 
"zombie" corporations: 'The phrase "zombIe w~s used to charactenze sa~mgs and loan asso~IatlOns 
'n the United States during the 1980s that were msolvent, but kept operatmg because of forgIveness 
1 d forbearance policies of the regulatory agencies and politicians. The phrase ... became part of the 
:mmon language of describing the outcome of forgiveness and forbearance policies in both Japan 
and the United States.' 
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During Prime Minister Koizumi' s term of office the economy started to recover. 
This recovery, however, only affected certain sectors and left out others (for 
example, small and medium businesses and traditional sectors). Similarly, 
corporate profits have increased whereas wages have not. Cargill and Sakamoto 
(2008) point to a shift in public opinion that subsequently led to a devastating 
defeat of the LDP in the 2007 upper house elections: 
... the public and policy makers supported deregulation and liberalization 
during the Koizumi administration, partly because of the obvious failure 
of the old regime in the 1990s. However, interest in further significant 
reform is waning. In Japan, a view has emerged among the public, media, 
and politicians that liberal market reform has gone too far and has caused 
negative economic consequences, including economic disparities among 
different economic sectors and segments of the population (Cargill and 
Sakamoto, 2008, p. 22). 
Cargill and Sakamoto's (2008, p. 22) observation is of interest here: 'Politicians -
whether LDP or otherwise - are likely to find it difficult to resist pressures to slow 
down the pace of reform and pressures to increase spending to deal with the 
growing social problems that have emerged as Japan moves toward a freer and 
more competitive structure.' 
The 1990s and the early twenty-first century have witnessed a global critique of the 
Japanese corporate governance system and significant pressure to change it and to 
converge with the Anglo-American corporate governance system. The way in 
which the government dealt with the pressure to change the Japanese corporate 
governance system reflects the context of the 1990s and the early twenty-first 
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century. Similarly, the public debate over corporate governance, which emerged in 
the early 1990s and the debate of the various constituencies involved in the debate 
have also been shaped by this context. In other words, the proposals for change to 
the Japanese corporate governance system and the changes implemented to that 
system have to be understood as embedded in the various concerns and processes to 
deregulate and to liberalise the Japanese economy and its financial institutions as 
well as the economic, financial and political crises during this period. Further, the 
changes to the Japanese corporate governance system during the 1990s and 2000s 
have to also be understood in the context of changes to the Japanese corporate 
system. Of special significance here was the unravelling of the main bank system 
and the reduction of ministerial control over the financial system through the 
various deregulation and liberalisation policies. These changes weakened the 
traditional Japanese monitoring system, which had heavily relied on the monitoring 
function of the main banks and ministerial guidance in the context of risk 
assessment. Further, in the context of Japanese companies searching for ways out 
of their financial difficulties, proposals were made that threatened Japanese 
management practices and especially their emphasis on employees. Nihon Keieisha 
Dantai Renmei (Nikkeiren), the Japan Federation of Employers' Associations, 
published a book entitled 'Shinjidai no Nihontekikeiei' In 1995 with 
recommendations of how to overcome the crisis companies were facing. The book 
advocated employment flexibility to reduce the high labour costs, which were 
understood to be the key component of the high cost structures of Japanese 
companies. It recommended that the companies should shift to replacing permanent 
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employees with part time employees, contracted employees and temporary workers 
from a temporary staff service agency so as to cut costs. Such practices potentially 
threaten life-long employment and engender a move away from the focus on 
employees, which was the traditional focus of the Japanese corporate governance 
system. A maj or step in the move away from the Japanese corporate governance 
system was the revision of the Commercial Code of 2003 to allow companies to 
choose either the Japanese corporate governance system or the Anglo-American 
corporate governance system. 
5.5. SUMMARY 
Chapter five has provided a brief overview of Japan's emergence from a feudal 
economy in the latter half of the nineteenth century to a fully developed market 
economy in the 1970s, the country's experience of an economic and political crisis 
in the 1990s and the beginning of recovery after 2005. A particular emphasis was 
also placed in this historical overview on a summary of developments in the 
corporate system of Japan and its impact on the Japanese corporate governance 
system. The developments outlined in chapter five provide insights into the context 
in which the public corporate governance debate in Japan and the corporate 
governance debates of the various Japanese constituencies were embedded from 
1989 to 2008. Having provided insights into the historical context in which 
corporate governance in Japan is embedded in, the next chapter, chapter 6, offers a 
brief comparison of the characteristics of the Japanese and Anglo-American 
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corporate governance system and corporate system and an analysis of the key 
issues and concerns of the public debate over corporate governance as evident in 
Japanese newspapers and a summary of key issues and concerns addressed III 
public pronouncements on corporate governance of key Japanese constituencies. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEBATE IN JAPAN (1989 - 2007): 
SOME KEY INSIGHTS 
In the debate over the Japanese corporate governance system an emphasis has been 
placed on the differences between the Japanese corporate governance system and 
the Anglo-American corporate governance system. Critics of the Japanese 
corporate governance system put particular emphasis on the following 
characteristics of the Japanese business system and the Japanese corporate 
governance system, which for them impacted negatively on the effectiveness of the 
corporate governance system: the powerful role of and influence upon management 
by the banks as the major providers of capital, the cross-shareholdings, and, the 
system of corporate and external auditors as specified by the Commercial Code 
(Cooke and Sawa, 1998). Comparing the Japanese system of corporate governance 
with what was perceived to be a more effective and thus better UKJUS modelled to 
an increase in argumentation that Japanese companies should be required to adopt 
the US model of corporate governance (Yoshikawa and Phan, 2003; Egawa, 2005). 
In a context of highlighting the identified differences between the two corporate 
governance systems, Japan was put under pressure to change its corporate 
governance system and to converge with the Anglo-American corporate 
governance system during the period this study focuses upon (1989-2007). The 
way in which corporate governance was debated in Japan and the way the pressure 
to change the Japanese corporate governance system was either perceived as a 
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threat or an opportunity reflects specific characteristics of the Japanese context, 
including Japanese cultural values and its unique type of capitalism. 
An understanding of the Japanese corporate system and Japanese capitalism and 
how they reflect Japanese culture is thus crucial for the analysis of the two 
empirical sites of this study, i.e. the bilateral trade negotiations between Japan and 
the U.S. and the development of the Corporate Governance Principles of the Japan 
Corporate Governance Forum. Further, there is also a need to gain an 
understanding of the key Japanese constituencies that were participating in the 
corporate governance debate. Such an understanding facilitates an appreciation of 
the location of the two key constituencies focused upon here, namely the Japanese 
government and the Japan Corporate Governance Forum. And, as the empirical 
material analysed here is part of a broader public discourse on corporate 
governance in Japan, there is a need to gain an appreciation of the trends in and 
key issues of this debate. Chapter six aims to provide insights into the above key 
areas. The structure of the chapter is as follows: first, a brief elaboration of the key 
components of the Anglo-American and Japanese corporate governance system, the 
Japanese corporate system and Japanese type capitalism~ second, brief insights into 
the key Japanese constituencies involved in the corporate governance debate and 
their views on corporate governance; and, third, a discussion of the trends in and 
key issues of the public debate on corporate governance as evident in the main 
daily general and financial newspapers in Japan. 
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6.1. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM, CORPORATE SYTEM AND 
TYPE OF CAPITALISM 
This section of the chapter initially briefly summanses important differences 
between the Japanese and Anglo-American model of corporate governance. It then 
outlines key elements of the Japanese corporate system and the Japanese type of 
capitalism. 
6.1.1. Characteristics of the u.s. and Japanese Corporate Governance Systems 
Much has been written on the difference between the U.S. (Anglo-American) and 
Japanese corporate governance systems.63 Drawing from the literature and adopting 
a critical and contextual perspective, a brief summary and comparison of the 
characteristics of the two national corporate governance systems is provided. 
The Anglo-American corporate governance system is commonly referred to as an 
outsider system, that is, a market-based system whereby shareholders from the 
outside exercise control over and through management. The source of control lies 
with the owners of the company, i.e. the shareholders. The goal of the firm under 
the Anglo-American model is thus defined with reference to its owners, that is, in 
conventional terms, profit-maximisation or, in Modern Finance Theory, the 
maximisation of shareholders' wealth (Schulz, 2004). In contrast, the Japanese 
63 The corporate governance system is understood to encompass corporate accounting. 
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model of corporate governance is an insider system whereby stable insider 
relationships are the basis of control over and through management. This model 
reflects the Japanese notion of the community firm with its emphasis on 
stakeholders rather than shareholders as the primary beneficiaries of corporate 
activity. Stakeholders and especially employees are thus the source of control in the 
Japanese corporate governance model. The goal of the firm, to increase long-term 
market share, reflects the emphasis on employees (Schulz, 2004; see also Dore, 
1973). 
The monitoring mechanisms of the Anglo-American and Japanese corporate 
governance models differ significantly and reflect the emphasis on either outsiders 
or insiders. In the context of the Anglo-American model these monitoring 
mechanisms include institutional shareholders, the board of directors, the stock 
market, (disciplinary) takeover, bankruptcy or receivership/liquidation procedures 
and transparency/accounting disclosure. In the case of the Japanese model, the 
monitoring mechanisms include government ministries, the "Old Boys,,64 network 
and the President's Council (Dore, 2003; Schaede, 1995). 
In the debates over corporate governance more generally, the board of directors and 
the number of non-executive directors on the board have been highlighted as key 
features of an effective corporate governance system. It is thus of interest to 
64 Rixtel and Hassink (2002, p. 1) explain that in Japan there is 'a movement of retired top staff 
members (so-called "old" boys or the mechanism of "descending from heaven" [amakudari]) from the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Bank of Japan ~BoJ) into the boards Japanese private 
banks'. This practice also applies to other large private companies. 
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elaborate the key differences between the traditional Japanese board of directors 
and that of the Anglo-American board of directors. The structure of the Japanese 
board of directors also significantly differs from the Anglo-American model. 
Characteristics of the Anglo-American board include its committee structure and 
the role of independent non-executive directors as an important monitoring 
mechanism (Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 2007; Monks and Minow, 2008). In contrast 
to this set up, the Japanese board of directors does not have a committee structure 
and mainly consists of corporate insiders, that is, salaried managers promoted from 
within the company. Board membership also overlaps with membership of the top 
management team. Further, in contrast to Anglo-American companies, Japanese 
companies have a two tier board system, which consists of the board of directors 
and the board of auditors. The board of auditors have the role to monitor the board 
of directors (Ahmadjian, 2003, p.229; see also Bonn et al., 2004). 
Further, the Anglo-American and Japanese corporate governance models differ in 
terms of the worldviews they reflect. The Anglo-American model is underpinned 
by neo-liberalism, a characteristic of which is the assumption and legitimisation of 
(narrowly) self-interested owners and managers and other actors. It is these 
assumptions and presumptions about human nature that are reflected in the system 
of punishments and rewards, which are an essential part of the Anglo-American 
corporate governance model. According to Dore (2003, p. 135): 
The Anglo-Saxon system of external controls works to keep managers 
honest and efficient by threatening punishment - punishment through 
take-over as a result of the impersonal workings of the stock market or 
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punishment through dismissal by a board of directors, dominated by 
External Directors whose job is explicitly defined as representing the 
interests of capital-providing owners. 
The Japanese model is based on a worldview derived from Mencian and Sung 
Confucianism, characteristic of which is an 'ethical tradition of dutifulness' and an 
'ethical vocabulary of responsibility, guilt and shame' (Dore, 2003, p. 136; see also 
Dore, 1987). This ethical tradition is reflected in the internal controls of conscience 
and peer pressure that are part of the Japanese corporate governance system. As 
Dore (2003, p. 135) explains: 
The Japanese system of internal controls works - through face-to-face, not 
impersonal, arm's length relationships - by exerting moral pressure on 
managers' conscience. 
These specific characteristics of Japanese culture have also impacted upon and are 
reflected in the Japanese Corporate System and the Japanese type of capitalism. 
6.1.2. Characteristics of the Japanese Corporate System 
The Japanese corporate governance system as an embedded system reflects the 
particular characteristics of the Japanese corporate system: cross-shareholdings, 
main bank system, specific employment practices and the Japanese type firm. It is 
these corporate characteristics that render the Japanese corporate governance 
system different from corporate governance systems of other countries, including 
that of the U.S. Through cross-shareholdings, strong and interlocking relationships 
have been established, which also create a sense of shared interest between the 
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members of groups (e.g. in a keiretsu). Further, the concept of the Japanese type 
firm significantly shapes the Japanese corporate governance system. For example, 
banks, and in particular the main bank, are the main suppliers of funds to the 
companies. The main bank thus has a monitoring and disciplining role but only 
actively gets involved in managing the firm in crisis situations when it dispatches 
representatives to the respective company. The monitoring of top management by 
the main bank according to Miyajima (1998, p. 35) is a disciplinary mechanism 
that is a form of 'contingent governance'. Miyajima (1998, p. 35) explains that 
banks in carrying out their monitoring and disciplinary role 'rely on passive stable 
shareholders who do not interfere in firm management to mitigate agency problems 
that might occur as a consequence of the dispersed ownership of the corporation'. 
It is of note that managers of Japanese-type firms are not under the same kind of 
pressure from stock markets as are Anglo-American firms to achieve short-term 
results. This is because of the stable cross-shareholdings amongst the members of 
corporate groups, a set-up that has encouraged growth-oriented behaviour and a 
long-term horizon (Miyajima, 1998, p. 35). Another characteristic of the Japanese-
type firm is its emphasis on employees, which is reflected in employment practices 
such as life-long employment (according to Dore, 2003, p. 136 'career employment' 
in contrast to the 'job employment' of the Anglo-American firm), seniority-based 
pay and promotion. The emphasis on employees also impacts on executive 
decisions, which on the face of it are guided more by a stronger sense of 
responsibility to fellow employees than is the case in Anglo-American firms 
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focused upon shareholder interests (Dore, 1998). Because of its emphasis on 
employees, the Japanese-type firm is also called a community-like corporation 
(lnagami and Whittaker, 2005). Our brief description of the Japanese corporate 
system has highlighted the major differences in terms of monitoring and 
disciplinary mechanisms between the Japanese-type firm and the Anglo-American 
type firm. In summary, in contrast to the Anglo-American context with its reliance 
on external monitoring and disciplinary mechanisms, the Japanese-type company 
relies on internal mechanisms. For Dore (e.g. 2003, p. 133), both mechanisms, 
which reflect the particular context in which they are embedded, may be equally 
effective: 'effective mechanisms which impose discipline on those who manage 
corporations can be not external at all, but internal' (emphasis in the original). 
6.1.3. Key Characteristics of Japanese Capitalism 
The literature has pointed to significant differences between the types of 
capitalisms evident in capitalistic countries globally and thus Japan and the U.S and 
U.K. (Albert, 1993; Berger and Dore, 1996; Dore, 2000; Yamamure and Streeck, 
2003). The corporate governance systems of the U.S. and U.K and Japan as 
embedded systems reflect as well as shape the types of capitalism of the context 
they are embedded in. In the literature these types of capitalism have been referred 
to as the Anglo-American model of capitalism (in the U.S. and the U.K.) and 
Rhineland capitalism (in Germany and Japan) (Albert, 1993). Dore, in his seminal 
work on the Japanese type of capitalism (1998, 2000) has identified five areas in 
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his discussion of the characteristics of Japanese capitalism, which also highlight 
how Japanese capitalism differs from other forms of capitalism. These areas are: 
structure of the corporation,65 competition, role of government, macroeconomic 
management and income distribution. In the Japanese context, Dore has pointed out 
that there is a general preference for long-standing relational contracting (for 
example, within keiretsu firms) and even competition between market rivals may 
be moderated by sectoral industry organisations. In such a case, a sectoral industry 
organisation would take on the role of a quasi-community. 66 The role of the 
government in the Japanese context is also different because there is less reliance 
on market mechanisms. The Japanese government used to have a significant role in 
indicative planning and the allocation of investment resources and still has an 
'important role as umpire between competing private interests' (ibid., p. 776). In 
terms of macroeconomic management there is 'greater room for manoeuvre [in 
Japan] than in most advanced capitalist countries (e.g. a brake on wage inflation 
through the "spring struggle system")' (ibid., p.p. 776-7). And, in terms of income 
distribution, wages and salaries are less dispersed in Japan. Dore also points here to 
the 'solidaristic egalitarian features' of the Japanese capitalistic systems, such as, 
for example, progressive income tax, high inheritance tax, a well-funded and a 
fairly generous level of pensions (ibid., p. 777). 
65 See our discussion above. 
66 Dore (1998, p. 776) here refers to an example of th~ steel industry in Japan whereby the orders of 
teet company, which had been badly damaged durmg an earthquake, were taken on by other steel 
one s ·1 0 i· I· 
companies while the damaged steel company was ~ebUl t. nce t e stee company was operatlona , Its 
customers were returned by the other steel compames. 
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It is of note that the various elements of the Japanese corporate governance system, 
the Japanese corporate system and the Japanese type of capitalism have not been 
static but in flux during the period from 1989 to 2007, the focus of our analysis 
here. These changes have occurred because of a complex set of pressures, reflected 
in and partly constituted by the bilateral trade negotiations. Because of the way the 
various areas of the Japanese system interrelate, a change in one area may 
significantly impact on other areas and thus the system as a whole. In other words, 
changing the corporate governance system may engender change in the corporate 
system and in the Japanese type of capitalism and in the general socio-economic 
context. Interesting in this respect is consideration of what Dore (1998, p. 777) 
terms 'psychological consonance', which constitutes a key form of systemic 
cohesion (the other being 'institutional interlock') 67 in the Japanese system. 
Psychological consonance means that various parts of the system require people to 
behave in similar ways, that is, calls on similar behavioural disposition, 
consistently emphasising certain values. What Dore (ibid.) refers to here are 
characteristics of Japanese culture that shape people's behaviour especially: 
1. a willingness to enter binding long-term commitments (i.e. very moderate degree 
of liquidity preference) 
2. a greater concern for long-term rewards than for short-tenn gains 
3. a concern for the emotional and moral quality of the social relationships involved 
in economic transactions, the friendships and the mutual obligations they generate, 
as well as their mutual profitability (friendships include firm-to-finn relations) 
67 This form of systemic cohesion is based on, for example, preconditions such as cross-shareholdings, 
I ck of hostile takeovers and diminished shareholder pressure leading to a commitment not to layoff 
a rkers in times of recession or the ability to 'bear extra short-term costs to maintain relations with 
::~pliers in order to maintain a reputation for fair dealing and the advantages of the supplier's future 
co-operation (Dore, 1998, p. 777). 
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4. a tendency to view group solidarity as an important ingredient of that emotional 
and moral quality (the group can be one's firm, one's nation) 
5. t~e egalitarian perception that group solidarity becomes impossible if inequalities, 
elther of matenal reward or respect, become too wide 
An interesting question here, which we address in our analysis below, is whether 
and how changes in the Japanese corporate governance system also constitute 
threats to the Japanese way of life and ethical values. 
6.2. KEY JAPANESE CONSTITUENCIES OF THE DEBATE ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN 
There are some key Japanese constituencies 68 in the debate over corporate 
governance in Japan whose views have variously influenced the public debate. 
Here the following key constituencies, which were influential because of their 
specific location within the Japanese socio-economicand political context, and 
their key contributions to the debate over corporate governance in Japan are briefly 
discussed: Tokyo Shouken Torihikijyo (Tokyo Stock Exchange), Nippon Keidanren 
(Japanese Business Federation), Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate 
Executives), Kigyo Nenkin Kikin Rengoukai (Pension Fund Association), Nihon 
Kounin Kaikeishi Kyoukai (The Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants), 
Nihon Kansayaku Kyoukai (Japan Corporate Auditors Association), Shakai Keizai 
68 "Constituency" here refers to an organisation or interest group. 
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Seisansei Honbu (Japan Productivity Centre for Socio-Economic Development) 
and Nihon Koporaito Gabanansu Foram (Japan Corporate Governance Forum) 69. 
The above constituencies contributed to the debate on corporate governance in a 
context whereby corporate governance and accounting are regulated by the state. 
The emphasis in Japan on the state as a regulator may be explained with reference 
to historical developments in the latter half of the nineteenth century. As Oguri and 
Hara (1990, p. 40) summarise: 
In the Japanese context, the pre-eminence of public or state regulation is 
not unique to accounting but rather a pervasive feature of the social fabric 
of the nation. It is ascribable primarily to the nation's late entry into the 
global race for capitalist modernisation in the nineteenth century and to 
the leading role played by the bureaucracy in that drive for modernisation. 
The legal framework, regulating corporations in Japan, has a dual structure, which 
was substantively a result of developments in the nineteenth century and after the 
Second World War. Japan developed its Commercial Code based on German law in 
the late nineteenth century and its Securities and Exchange Law based on U.S. law 
after 1945 (see below). This dual structure of the law was in existence at the 
beginning of the period that is the focus of this study here (i.e. 1989 - 2007). The 
emphasis on the law in regulating corporations is of relevance as any changes to 
corporate governance and accounting will have to be administered by the relevant 
69 The discussion of the key constituencies and their contributions to the debate focuses on issue, that 
are deemed important in the context of the two case studies here. The objective of this section of the 
chapter is therefore not to provide a detailed analysis of the various constituencies and their 
contributions. Such analyses would be major studies in themselves and would go far beyond this study 
here. 
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ministries and implemented through the law. 7o Within this framework of state 
regulation the various constituencies express their opinions and variously aim to 
influence and shape the law under revision. Constituencies, for example, are 
consulted and invited to comment on draft proposals of the law by the relevant 
ministry.71 In addition, the various constituencies issue public statements in which 
they express their opinions in terms of, for example, corporate governance.72 Below 
a brief description of nine Japanese constituencies and their public statements on 
corporate governance during 1989 and 2007 is offered. 
6.2.1. Tokyo Shouken Torihikijyo (Tokyo Stock Exchange) 
The Tokyo Stock Exchange is the largest and most significant of the five Japanese 
stock exchanges.73 The Tokyo Stock Exchange was founded on 15 May 1878 and 
started trading on 1 June 1878. Later, in order to facilitate the war economy all 
eleven stock exchanges that were then operating in Japan were unified during the 
Second World War (1943) to form the Japan Securities Exchange, which was 
subsequently dissolved under allied occupation in 1947. On 16 May 1949 the 
70 The Japanese system of state regulation is modelled on the German system of state regulation of the 
nineteenth century (Ogura and Hara, 1990). 
71 The opinions expressed and comments made on revisions of the Commercial Code and the 
Securities Exchange Law by the individual constituencies are not publicly available for the period 
under focus here. Information on submissions is only released in highly aggregate form by the 
ministries, for example, in terms of the number of submissions received from organisations and 
individuals. 
72 Most of the statements are available in the Japanese language on the Japanese web-sites of the 
bodies constituting the constituencies. Some constituencies, such as, for example, Keidandren, have 
English web sites (http://www.keidandren.or.jp/english) with translations of these documents. The 
English websites, however, are in many cases not as comprehensive as the Japanese web-sites. 
73 The five stock exchanges of Japan are currently in Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Fukuoka and Sapporo 
(Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2001a). 
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Tokyo Stock Exchange in its present form was founded. In the process of 
deregulation attempts the Tokyo Stock Exchange was demutualised and became 
Tokyo Stock Exchange Inc. in 2001 (Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2001b). Today Tokyo 
Stock Exchange (TSE) is one of the five largest stock exchanges globally. 
The Tokyo Stock Exchange became actively involved in the corporate governance 
debate in the late 1990s. It conducted questionnaire surveys in 1998, 2000, 2003 
and 2005 to ascertain information about the corporate governance practices of its 
listed companies (Tokyo Shokentorihikijyo, 2005). In 2004 it issued its Principles 
of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies, which reflected recommendations 
made by the Committee on Listed Company Corporate Governance. This 
committee had been set up by the President of the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 2002 to 
enhance corporate governance in Japan and to attract Japanese as well as foreign 
investors (Tokyo Shokentorihikijyo, 2004). The members of the committee 
included representatives from the business world, academia, pension funds, think 
tanks and the media. The Tokyo Stock Exchange defines the purpose of the 
Principles of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies as follows: 
Enhancing corporate governance should be accomplished though [!] the 
voluntary efforts of listed companies combining with the appraisal of such 
by the shareholders and investors participating in the .market, and the 
purpose of these Principles is to offer the foundatIOn of common 
understanding necessary for doing so (Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2009a). 
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In 2007 the Tokyo Stock Exchange issued a White Paper on Corporate Governance 
for TSE listed companies. The motivation for this was a perceived need for better 
practices in corporate governance: 
... stock exchanges have the obligation to call for improvements based on 
their conclusions and to develop an environment for facilitating for 
improvements by providing standards for necessary issues. The 
widespread application of better practices for listed companies is required 
more than ever in corporate governance (Tokyo Stock Exchange, 2007a). 
A further White Paper on Corporate Governance was issued in January 200974 
outlining corporate governance practices with a view to improving current 
corporate governance practices and thus to attracting foreign investors (Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, 2009b). 
6.2.2. Nippon Keidanren (Japanese Business Federation) 
Nippon Keidanren, the Japanese Business Federation, is an organisation comprising 
of companies, industrial associations and regional economic organisations. It is an 
amalgamation of Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations) and 
Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employers' Associations), which took effect from 
2002. Nippon Keidanren currently has a membership of 1609, including amongst 
others 1,295 companies, 129 industrial associations and 47 regional economic 
organisations (Nippon Keidanren, 2009)75. It has a broad remit: 
74 This White Paper is outside the period focused upon in this study, that is, 1989-2007. 
75 The membership data is for March 2009 (Nippon Keidanren, 2009). 
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Nippon Keidanren, for this purpose, shall establish timely consensus and 
work towards resolution of a variety of issues concerning Japanese business 
community, including economic, industrial, social, and labor. Meanwhile, it 
will communicate with its stakeholders including political leaders, 
administrators, labor unions, and citizens at large. It will urge its members 
to adhere to Charter of Corporate Behavior and Global Environment Charter, 
in order to recover public confidence in businesses. It will also attempt to 
resolve international problems and to deepen economic relations with other 
countries through policy dialogue with governments, business groups and 
concerned international organizations (Nippon Keidanren, 2009). 
Nippon Keidanren has published various statements on corporate governance since 
the latter half of the 1990s. In 1997 it published its "Urgent Recommendation 
Concerning Corporate Governance" (Nippon Keidanren, 1997). The 
Recommendations were developed to respond to a widespread interest in and 
discussion of corporate governance in Japan. Nippon Keidanren stress in their 
recommendations that 'in order to maintain and strengthen their international 
competiveness into the twenty-first century in the context of an age of mega 
competition, Japanese businesses must realize a form of corporate governance that 
meets global standards' (ibid). Nippon Keidanren were motivated to engage in the 
corporate governance debate because of a series of corporate scandals: 
At Keidanren, however, we are deeply disturbed by the recent string of 
corporate scandals, and we therefore wish to recommend a strengthening of 
the function of corporate auditors and a review of the system of shareholder 
derivative lawsuits as measures to be implemented soon to deal with the 
issue of corporate governance (Nippon Keidanren, 1997). 
Nippon Keidanren thus call for a reVISIOn of the law in order to strengthen the 
corporate auditor's function and a review of the derivative lawsuit system. At the 
same time they stress the need for companies to take their own initiatives and 
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'formulate their own guidelines for corporate behavior and strive to full compliance 
with them' (ibid.). 
In 2000 Nippon Keidanren published its Recommendations Concerning Commercial 
Law Reform (Nippon Keidanren, 2000a). It stresses the urgency of a law reform in a 
context where 'Japan's economic environment is being transformed by a range of 
factors, including economic globalization, the information technology revolution, 
changes in the industrial structure, and the expansion of capital markets' (ibid.). A 
revision of the Commercial Law should thus ensure the enhancement of Japan's 
competiveness globally. Of particular interest in terms of the corporate governance 
debate is that Nippon Keidanren supports the changes proposed in the draft 
legislation for strengthening the auditor system and to amend the shareholders' 
derivative suit system and that Nippon Keidanren makes proposals for an 
improvement of the Stock option system with a view of further facilitating its use 
(ibid. ). 
In 2000 Nippon Keidanren issued another document especially concerned with 
corporate governance, Points of Discussion Relating to Corporate Governance in 
Japanese Public Companies (Interim Report) (Nippon Keidanren, 2000b). The 
Points of Discussion are prefaced by the following statement, which highlights the 
increasing importance of shareholder interests: 
It will be necessary for companies to build corporate governance that places 
even more importance on shareholder value. For this purpose, it will be 
important to (I) improve the speed and strategy of management: (2) ensure 
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the transparency of corporate behavior; and (3) enhance disclosure and 
accountability (Nippon Keidanren, 2000b). 
The corporate governance components that Nippon Keidanren addresses in its 
statement are shareholder meetings and board of directors and board of corporate 
auditors. Interestingly, Nippon Keidanren call again for less regulation and argue that 
'corporate organization should be left to the independent judgment and discretion of 
each company'. In terms of disclosure they argue that 'evaluation should be left to 
the market' (Nippon Keidanren, 2000b). Overall, for large-scale public companies, 
Nippon Keidanren hold that deregulation of the Commercial Code would be 
desirable (ibid). 
Another key contribution to the debate on corporate governance was made by 
Nippon Keidanren in 2003 in its Proposal for Revision of the Corporations Law 
(Nippon Keidanren, 2003). Nippon Keidanren refers in the introduction to its 
Proposal to 'requests advanced by the business community regarding greater 
flexibility in the range of options available for group organization, streamlining 
corporate governance requirements, and a wider range of methods for financing and 
returning profits to shareholders'. In the context of such developments, Nippon 
Keidanren presents its key positions in the Proposal. 
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6.2.3. Nihon Seisansei Honbu (The Japan Productivity Center) 
Shakai Keizai Seisansei Honbu (Japan Productivity Center for Socio-economic 
Development, JPC-SED) 76 was established in 1994 through a merger of Shakai 
Keizai Kokumin Kaigi (Social Economic Congress of Japan, SECJ) with Nihon 
Seisansei Honbu (The Japan Productivity Center, JPC). The origin of this 
organisation can be traced back to March 1955 when Nihon Seisansei Honbu (The 
Japan Productivity Center) had been established through cabinet approval to consider 
"measures for productivity improvement" (Japan Productivity Center, 2009). Shakai 
Keizai Seisansei Honbu (Japan Productivity Center for Socio-economic 
Development) was later renamed Nihon Seisansei Honbu (The Japan Productivity 
Center) in April 2009 (Japan Productivity Center, 2009). The JPC-SED is an 
independent organisation consisting of business people, academic experts and labour 
representatives. It subscribes to the following three principles: "expansion of 
employment; cooperation between labor and management; and fair distribution of the 
fruits of productivity among labor, management, and consumers" (ibid.) 
The JPC-SED began to engage in the corporate governance debate in 1998 when it 
conducted a questionnaire survey on corporate governance of the executives of 5000 
listed companies' executives. According to the questionnaire survey, over 60% of 
those surveyed anticipated that in the future the Japanese corporate governance 
system would still value both employees and shareholders, that is, Japanese 
76 Shakaikeizaiseisanseihonbu is referred to in this study as .JPC-SED as all the documents discussed 
here have been published before the JPC-SED was renamed In 2009. 
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companies would not simply follow the Anglo-American corporate governance 
system, which only pursued shareholders' wealth. Further, around 70% of the 
respondents expected the board of directors to be the key monitor of business 
activities. At the same time, however, 80% of the respondents expressed the view 
that the board of directors had lost substance. In order to resolve this problem and to 
strengthen the board of directors they suggested a separation of the decision-making 
function and the execution or executive function of the board of directors which is , 
common in Anglo-American corporations, and a reduction in the number of 
members of the board of directors. Other suggestions were the introduction of the 
fixed terms and retirement age system for corporate executives in order to replace the 
old executives with younger executives and to thus bring new energy to the board of 
directors. 
Further, the corporate executives in their responses to the questionnaire recognised 
the importance of a monitoring system for managerial actions. They expected the 
board of directors, corporate auditors, labour unions, middle management and in-
house legal departments to constitute the internal monitoring system, and 
shareholders, institutional investors, customers and business partners to constitute the 
external monitoring system. The respondents also strongly stressed the need to 
enhance disclosure. In order to achieve better disclosure, the executives suggested 
the introduction of non-executive directors and regular meetings between 
management and large shareholders. The respondents also suggested that companies 
should increase their contacts with institutional investors and the mass media for 
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disclosure purposes. Overall respondents to the survey held the view that although it 
was necessary to make legislative prescriptions for corporate governance, it was, 
however, more important for each company to take substantial measures themselves 
and establish an open company through disclosure (Shakai Keizai Seisansei Honbu 
1998a, b). 
The JPC-SED also conducted a survey of statements on company ethos in 1998. 
They reported that Japanese companies were customer oriented and thought highly of 
their employees. Companies also aspired to harmoniously co-exist with society. In 
contrast to employees, shareholders were not frequently referred to in statements on 
company ethos. Indeed, only 21 % of the respondents mentioned shareholders in their 
statements on company ethos (Shakai Keizai Seisansei Honbu 1998c). 
The JPC-SED, reflecting its status as an independent organisation consisting of 
business people, academic experts and labour representatives, is especially interested 
in the Japanese management system. The JPC-SED has thus frequently conducted 
surveys on Japanese-style human resource management since 1997. In 1999, a 
survey revealed that 67.5% of the companies surveyed planned to reduce the number 
of their permanent employees. At the same time, however, Japanese companies still 
wanted to maintain the life-long employment system, which was a key characteristic 
of the Japanese corporate system. The survey indicated that 54.8% of the companies 
surveyed intended to maintain this practice. Moreover, over half of the companies 
that had responded to the survey indicated that the business performance of their 
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companies had been poor were still keen to maintain the practice of life-long 
employment. Interestingly and somewhat contradictory, the companies keen to 
maintain life-long employment at the same time planned to reduce the number of 
their permanent employees and to increase outsourcing. In order to maintain life-long 
employment the companies surveyed thought it was important to reduce the ratio of 
seniority based payment and introduce performance related pay schemes for their 
employees who were at management level instead. In fact, 39.4% of the companies 
surveyed reported that they were moving from seniority based payment to 
performance related pay schemes for their management level employees (Shakai 
Keizai Seisansei Honbu, 1999). 
The 2000 survey indicates that companies were still considering a change of their 
employment practices. 54.2% of the companies surveyed responded that they 
planned to reduce the number of their permanent employees and gradually increase 
mid-career employment. The responses of the companies indicated that the ratio of 
permanent employees would decline from an average of 84.7% to an average of 
74.2%, while the ratio of contract employees with highly specialist capabilities and 
contract employees and part-time employees would increased from 1.6% to 5.9% and 
from 13.7% to 19.5% respectively (Shakai Keizai Seisansei Honbu, 2000). 
In 2005, a further survey revealed that 43.9% of the companIes surveyed had 
employed non-executive directors (64.9% of the companies that had over 5000 
employees), and 44.7% of them had introduced an operating officer system (67.60/0 
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of the companies that had over 5000 employees). Further, 44.7% of them had 
established internal reporting systems (78.4% of the companies that had over 5000 
employees), which had gained much attention as a means of preventing corporate 
misconduct. The survey showed that although performance related pay systems for 
management level employees had been advanced, only 15.0% of the companies had 
an employee remuneration committee (Shakai Keizai Seisansei Honbu, 2005). 
In summary, the JPC-SED surveys indicated that during the period from 1998 to 
2005 company practices in relation to corporate governance had begun to change. 
There was a move to incorporate aspects of the Anglo-American corporate 
governance system and thus respond to the critique of the Japanese corporate 
governance system. It is of note that despite this move companies still had expressed 
a concern to maintain life-long employment. 
In 2001 a special committee of labour-management relations Roushi Kankei 
Tokubetsu Iinkai (Labour-Management Relations Special Committee) of the JPC-
SED launched a series of research studies aimed at investigating Japanese style 
management. It published an interim report on 14 December 2001 and interim 
recommendations on 12 December 2002 and announced its final recommendations 
on 31 July 2003. The aim of the research was to gain insights into the influences on 
the employer-employee relationship and the new issues for the employer-employee 
relationship arising from changing business management practices and a changing 
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corporate governance system (Shakai Keizai Seisansei Honbu, 2002a,b; Japan 
Productivity Center, 2003). 
The 2001 interim report showed that both the employer side as well as the employee 
side were of the opinion that special attention was now being paid to shareholders 
and that shareholders were considered in the process of making business decisions 
(Shakai Keizai Seisansei Honbu, 2001). This focus on shareholders indicated a shift 
away from a focus on employees as had been the case in the context of Japanese 
management practices. The interim report also revealed that the labour side felt that 
management had adopted short-termism (45.2%) whereas a smaller proportion on the 
management side (that is, managers of corporate planning departments and managers 
of personnel and labour affairs departments) agreed with this observation (24.7% and 
25.9% respectively). Both sides agreed, however, that the management of Japanese 
companies had made progress in implementing achievement oriented and operating 
performance systems. Further, the view was expressed that the remuneration for 
executives had not significantly been changed (for example, stock options had not 
been introduced frequently). In relation to the life-long employment system, both 
sides recognised that it would become difficult to maintain this practice (i.e. 50.6% 
of managers of corporate planning departments, 49.6% of managers of personnel and 
labour affairs departments and 43.0/0 of labour representatives) (Shakai Keizai 
Seisansei Honbu, 2001). 
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Based on the questionnaire survey on corporate governance conducted in 2001 
Roushi Kankei Tokubetsu linkai (Labour-Management Relations Special Committee) 
published its interim recommendations on 12 December 2002. The interim 
recommendations referred to the U.S. corporate governance system as an external 
governance system, which was characterised by aiming at shareholder-oriented 
management and appointing non-executive directors, whereas they referred to the 
Japanese corporate governance system as an internal governance system, which was 
characterised by an emphasis on employee-oriented management. The interim report 
argued that the Japanese system had come under pressure to change in the context of 
globalisation. The interim recommendations also suggested that the Japanese 
corporate governance system should have aimed at harmonising both systems, the 
Japanese as well as the Anglo-American system, so as to correspond with the 
interests of both stakeholders and shareholders. The recommendation pointed out that 
the traditional Japanese internal governance system had been weakened recently, and 
suggested that it was therefore important to revitalise the Japanese style internal 
governance system in order to achieve a balanced governance system, which would 
constitute a synthesis of the U.S. system and the Japanese system. 
The recommendation claimed that labour-management cooperation and active 
participation of employees were vital for a process aimed at revitalising the Japanese 
style internal governance system. It was recommended that, through a strengthening 
of labour-management consultations labour-management relationships should be 
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established. And, there should be a striving for the sound development of companies 
in the long term (Shakai Keizai Seisansei Honbu, 2002a). 
The final recommendations, published on 31 July 2003, argued that the Japanese 
corporate governance system had moved towards the u.s. style corporate 
governance system with its attention to shareholder wealth maximisation. Like the 
interim recommendations, which had been published in the previous year, the final 
recommendations advocated that companies should think highly of their employees 
and that it was important to achieve a balance between shareholder value and 
employee interests in the case of the Japanese corporate governance system. They 
further recommended restructuring of the labour-management relationship and the 
utilisation of the labour-management consultation system in all instances, as this was 
important for the Japanese corporate governance system (Japan Productivity Center, 
2003). The final recommendations concluded: 
"Employees are the very source and important stakeholders of corporate 
activities. Allowing them to participate in corporate management and 
raising their willingness to work are keys to improving productivity. This is 
another reason why the function of collective labor-management relations 
must be reorganized and strengthened so that it can more readily adapt to 
changes in corporate management and new issues in. labor-m~~agement 
relations accompanying those changes. In any age, lssues ansmg from 
changes in corporate management require effort~ ?f both labor and 
management. The importance of settling problems wlthm the framework of 
collective labor-management relations remains unchanged (Japan 
Productivity Center, 2003). 
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6.2.4. Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association o/Corporate Executives) 
Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives) was established in 1946, 
one year after the end of the Second World War, by eighty three individuals from 
medium-sized enterprises. The aim of setting up the Association was to contribute to 
the rebuilding of the Japanese economy and its sound development. Keizai Doyukai 
is 'a nonprofit, private, nonpartisan organization'. The members of the Association 
participate in the Association as private persons, and not as managers of their 
respective companies. It is the objective of the Association to discuss and exchange 
opinions on broad economic issues happening at home and overseas. Keizai Doyukai 
has conducted studies on various issues and holds that its opinions impact upon 
Japanese society as a whole. The organisation ostensibly maintains its independence 
and discusses with political parties, authorities, and labour unions without being 
constrained (Keizai Doyukai, 2009). 
Keizai Doyukai has published Kigyo Hakusho (White Paper on Business) at random 
times. In a White Paper on Business in 1996, it stated that Japan had been faced by a 
period of reforms that were equivalent to the revolution of the latter half of the 
nineteenth century that Japan had experienced in its history. Keizai Doyukai, 
reflecting its status as an association of corporate presidents, made various proposals 
from the viewpoint of management. They discussed corporate governance in their 
White Paper, stating that Japanese companies should recognise that a company can 
only survive with the support of its various stakeholders. They suggested that 
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companies therefore needed to change their corporate governance systems, which 
were characterised by a significant concern for their employees. They also 
highlighted the importance of disclosure in order to enhance transparency and fair 
business practices in compliance with market principles. In relation to disclosure 
they expected that external stakeholders could be actively involved in the external 
monitoring system through the sharing of information through timely and continuing 
disclosure. 
Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives) recognised the need to 
reform the board of directors, the board of corporate auditors and the role of the 
corporate auditor. In their White Paper they listed the following problems in relation 
to the board of directors that needed attention: first, large board size; second, lack of 
independence from senior management because most of the members of the board of 
directors were internally promoted; third, as important decisions were made in the 
council of general executives, the board of directors had lost in significance; fourth, 
insufficient recognition by the board members that they had been chosen to represent 
the shareholders of the company. The White Paper suggested that companies should 
introduce remuneration plans such as stock options in order to align corporate 
executives' interests with shareholder interests. Further, the White Paper also 
recommended a reduction in the number of members of the board of directors and an 
introduction of non-executive directors who would offer experience and ideas 
different from those of the internally promoted members of the board of directors, 
which in tum would enhance the self-check system. Proposals were also made for the 
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refonn of the board of corporate auditors and the role of the corporate auditor. The 
White Paper expected corporate auditors to take on an important monitoring function 
and thus recommended the development of an environment that would facilitate the 
activities of corporate auditors. Proposals here included, for example, enhancing the 
number of staff who support corporate auditors, giving corporate auditors the right to 
attend important meetings and to have one-on-one meetings with the top 
management. It was also recommended to appoint not only accountants and lawyers 
but also experienced business persons who held leadership positions in other 
companies as external auditors (Keizai Doyukai, 1996). 
In 1998, Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives), published the 
13th Kigyo Hakusho (White Paper on Business), which acknowledged that the world 
had become a global economy. In light of this development it was thus vital for 
Japan to move towards a market oriented economy and for Japanese companies to 
adopt capital efficiency management. The White Paper recommended that companies 
should appoint two non-executive directors, to review and strengthen the board of 
corporate auditors and the role of the corporate auditor, to establish unique 
customised corporate governance systems and to enhance transparency in 
management, which had already been stated in a previous White Paper on Business. 
Keizai Doyukai argued that the corporate governance system was influenced by 
culture, the size and business category of the corporation and that it was therefore 
desirable that laws and regulations would remain minimal and that companies should 
be entrusted with self-regulation. The White paper also called for further disclosure. 
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In addition it was pointed out that shareholders should assume a responsible role (for 
example, shareholders should hold shares for a long time). In terms of employment 
practices, it was argued that the environment in which Japanese businesses operated 
had changed and as a result of these changes it was necessary for Japanese 
companies to introduce more flexible employment practices so as to be able to 
compete globally (Keizai Doyukai, 1998). 
In 2002, Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives) made a 
proposal for the corporate governance system of Japanese companies. This proposal 
was an extension of the previous two Kigyo Hakusho (White Paper on Business) 
published in 1996 and 1998 respectively (see above). 
Kigyo Hakusho (White Paper on Business) published in 2003 focused upon corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). The main concern had now shifted to corporate 
governance in line with corporate social responsibility. The White Paper stated that 
the purpose of the corporate governance system was to ensure that companies could 
develop themselves firmly and sustainably. It was argued that in order to achieve 
such an objective it was vital for companies to fulfil their social responsibility. In 
other words, fulfilling their corporate social responsibilities would enable companies 
to sustainably grow, which would be in line with the purpose of establishing 
corporate governance (Keizai Doyukai 'Kigyo Keiei Iinkai', 2003). 
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The White Paper emphasised the role of top management in providing strong 
leadership in the context of change and in providing clear guidance to the employees 
of the company. Further, the White Paper recommended that the board of directors 
should separate out the function of execution of duty from the monitoring function. 
That would remedy the current practice of concentrating power at the level of top 
management, which makes it difficult for members of the board of directors to act as 
agents for shareholders in preventing misconduct by top management. This 
recommendation reflected Keizai Doyukai's concerns (Japan Association of 
Corporate Executives) about recurring corporate scandals in Japan, which had 
lowered confidence in and the competitiveness of Japanese companies. It therefore 
recommended that companies maintain their soundness and compliance with related 
laws. Like previously published recommendations by Keizai Doyukai (Japan 
Association of Corporate Executives), the 2003 White Paper also stressed the 
importance of disclosure and communication with stakeholders. It was further argued 
that companies should take stakeholders into consideration so as to achieve an 
increase in shareholders' wealth in the long term and not only pursue short term 
profit (Keizai Doyukai 'Kigy6 Keiei Iinkai', 2003). 
In 2004, Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives), conducted a 
questionnaire survey on corporate governance. The results of this survey show that 
about 94% of the respondents recognised corporate governance as an "important 
business challenge" (Keizai Doyukai, 2004). The survey also revealed that only 7% 
of companies had adopted the U.S. style corporate governance system with 
210 
subcommittees consisting mainly of non-executive directors, whereas 93% of the 
respondents still reported the adoption of the traditional Japanese corporate 
governance system. The survey showed that companies that had chosen the 
traditional Japanese corporate governance system had introduced non-executive 
directors and the corporate officer system. Interestingly, only 3% of the companies 
that followed the Japanese corporate governance system intended to change over to 
the U.S. (or Anglo-American) corporate governance system. Around 44% of the 
other companies did not plan to move towards the U.S. board of directors system or 
were thinking which system to chose or adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Those, who 
had switched to the U.S. system, saw the change as positive, whereas 47% of the 
respondents surveyed reserved their judgment. 56% of the respondents were positive 
about serving as a non-executive director, although 44% of the respondents had a 
negative attitude about this matter (ibid.). 
After the series of these recommendations published between 1996 and 2004 (see 
above), Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives) published its 
proposals on the new Japanese style management in 2008. These proposals reflected 
previous proposals in that they advocated advancing communication with 
stakeholders and the utilisation of non-executive directors. These proposals again 
reflect the tendency evident in previous proposals to recommend changes to the 
Japanese corporate governance system, which were in line with the Anglo-American 
corporate governance system. The 2008 proposal are, however, of particular interest 
as they discuss some aspects of traditional Japanese management practices in a way 
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that begins to question the appropriateness of applying the Anglo-American model of 
governance to the Japanese context. Life-long employment, a management practice 
that sustained the Japanese corporate governance system, was seen in the proposals 
as being an advantage in enhancing the long-term growth of a company. Further, it 
was also acknowledged that to a certain extent seniority based employment practices 
also can serve corporate success. And, the proposal highlighted the role of labour 
unions as a partner of management (Keizai Doyukai, 2008). The 2008 proposal had 
thus begun to move away from the view that Japanese companies should follow the 
U.S. style corporate governance system if they wanted to increase their 
competitiveness in the global market. This change in view is part of a general trend 
in Japan since the end of Prime Minister Koizumi's term in office when politicians as 
well as the public had begun to critically reflect upon the liberalisation attempts from 
the late 1990s to 2005 and the view had emerged that liberalisation had gone too far . 
6.2.5. Kigyo Nenkin Rengokai (Pension Fund Association) 
Kigyo Nenkin Rengokai (Pension Fund Association) was originally established in 
1967 as 'a federation of employees' pension fund, based on the Employee Pension 
Insurance Act and the Pension Fund Association in its present form was established 
under the revision of the Act in 2004' (Kigyo Nenkin Rengokai, 2009; Pension Fund 
Association, 2009a). Kigyo Nenkin Rengokai (Pension Fund Association) manages 
effectively its assets for those 'who seceded from employees' pension funds after a 
short period (usually less than 10 years) of membership (midway seceders) in an 
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integrated manner, and undertakes the aggregation of different corporate pension 
plans, including employees' pension funds, defined benefit corporate plans and 
defined contribution plans' (Pension Fund Association, 2009a). 
Kigyo Nenkin Rengokai (Pension Fund Association) has published several Corporate 
Governance Principles, namely, in 2003, 2006 (revised version) and 2007. There 
were some additional issues addressed in the Corporate Governance Principles of 
2007 the basic stance on corporate governance, however, was the same in 2007 as 
before. In the Practical Guideline on the Exercise of Shareholder Voting Rights 
published in 2003 and the Corporate Governance Principles published in 2007, 
Kigyo Nenkin Rengokai (Pension Fund Association) commented on corporate 
governance, stating that: ' ... what is of utmost importance is to forge a system within 
the company to monitor company management from the standpoint of shareholder 
value' (Pension Fund Association, 2009b). Based on this perspective, Kigyo Nenkin 
Rengokai (Pension Fund Association) referred to the board of directors, the board of 
corporate auditors, disclosure and accountability, executive remuneration, dividend 
policy, changes in management strategy, corporate social responsibility and the 
responsibility of Kigyo Nenkin Rengokai (Pension Fund Association) as a 
shareholder. 
In the Corporate Governance Principles (2003), the Association required companies 
to separate the execution function and the monitoring function of the board of 
directors and to monitor the Chief Executive Officer on behalf of the shareholders. 
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They further remarked that the board of directors should be of an appropriate size. It 
was recommended that at least one third of the members of the board of directors 
should be non-executive directors. Further it was stated that it was desirable for the 
CEO not to have a dual role, which means not to take on the chairpersonship of the 
board of directors. Kigyo Nenkin Rengokai (Pension Fund Association) supported the 
U.S. style corporate governance system with sub-committees consisting of mainly 
non-executive directors (Kigyo Nenkin Rengokai, 2003). In the case of corporate 
auditors, the association emphasised that corporate auditors should remain 
independent from the company for which they work. The association also expected 
corporate auditors not only to conduct 'the legality of but also, on a deeper level, the 
propriety of the decisions rendered and business executed by company management' 
(Pension Fund Association, 2009b; Kigyo Nenkin Rengokai, 2009b). 
The Association encouraged CEOs to disclose information on business activities so 
as to fulfil their duty of accountability to shareholders and other stakeholders and 
urged CEOs to supply the board of directors and the audit committee with 
information, which is sufficient for them to judge the adequacy of the CEO's 
business judgment. 
The association recommended that companIes introduce monetary incentive 
packages for their executives, which were linked to long term shareholder value. 
Companies were also urged to disclose individual executive remuneration 
arrangements. The association advised companies to balance executive remuneration 
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with company earnings and dividends paid to its shareholders. In terms of dividend 
policy it was recommended that companies should decide the dividend policy from a 
medium- to long-term perspective. Companies that did not have adequate future 
business plans and had reserved residual profit more than was deemed necessary 
were urged to ensure an appropriate dividend level (Pension Fund Association, 
2009b; Kigyo Nenkin Rengokai, 2009b). 
The association also required management to gIVe adequate information to 
shareholders in a context where the company was changing its business strategy so as 
to enable shareholders to make correct decisions. Further, it was argued that 
management should get the approval of shareholders before making important 
decisions In terms of changes to their business strategy. The association also 
expected companIes to be good corporate citizens and to establish a good 
relationship with its stakeholders such as, for example, employees, business partners 
and the community where the company was located. Further, the association urged 
companies to ensure compliance with the law and with business and corporate ethics. 
Finally, the association announced that it was prepared to positively engage in 
dialogue with companies it had invested in as a stable and long-term shareholder 
(Pension Fund Association, 2009b; Kigy6 Nenkin Rengokai, 2009b). 
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In the revised version of the Principles, which was published in 2006, several issues 
were added. First, a section on accounting auditors 77 was added, which stressed that 
accounting auditors must be independent from the client company and be able to 
prove it. The company should also respect the opinions of the Audit Committee 
when the accounting auditors are chosen. Second a new issue which is related to the , , 
business plan, was that the association recommended that companies should be 
aware of the cost of shareholders' equity. It was thus recommended that the return on 
equity (ROE) should ideally be over 10%. Third, the association also added an item, 
which related to the role of the association as a shareholder and declared that '[i]n 
particular, the PFA will engage in dialogue with companies whose earnings and/or 
shareholder value have been underperforming over a long term and which are 
deemed to be lacking in proper corporate governance' (Pension Fund Association, 
2009b). 
Kigyo Nenkin Rengokai (Pension Fund Association) set up the Employees' Pension 
Fund Corporate Governance Forum in order to ensure that the corporate governance 
system of Japanese companies focuses on shareholder value and published a 
recommendation on Kigyo nenkin to Koporeito Gabanansu -Kabunushi Kachi no 
Saidaika ni Mukete- (Corporate Pension and Corporate Governance) in 2004 as a 
result of a series of research studies by the association. The recommendation stated 
that the corporate purpose was to maximize shareholders' wealth in the long-term. It 
emphasised, however, that this purpose did not conflict with a consideration of other 
77 In Japan accounting auditors are those auditors who carry out the external audit. Internal audits are 
carried out by corporate auditors. 
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stakeholders as it was impossible for companies to be successful in the long-term 
without having a good relationship with various stakeholders. Further, the 
recommendation supported the exercising of voting rights as a duty of shareholders 
and required companies to establish corporate governance systems, which separated 
the execution function from the monitoring function of the board of directors, 
appointed non-executive directors, implemented disclosure requirements and 
encouraged management engagement, which all would ensure the maximisation of 
shareholders' wealth in the long-run (Kigyo Nenkin Rengokai, 2004). 
6.2.6. Nihon Kansayaku Kyokai (Japan Corporate Auditors Association) 
Nihon Kansayaku Kyokai (Japan Corporate Auditors Association, JCAA) was 
founded in 1974 as a result of the amendment of the Commercial Code to 'strengthen 
the authority and independence of Corporate Auditors' (Japan Corporate Auditors 
Association, 2001a). Since its establishment, JCAA has been active in research and 
studies so as to 'develop and promote the Corporate Auditors system' (ibid.). JCAA 
currently has 'about 4,000 corporate members and about 6,000 registered Corporate 
Auditor's (ibid.). Corporate auditors are called "Kansayaku" in Japanese and they are 
peculiar to Japan. According to JCAA, "Kansayaku" (corporate auditors) is defined 
as 'different from internal compliance or accounting/audit managers, who are 
ordinary employees of the company with less authority, and reporting to the 
Shareholders' (Japan Corporate Auditors Association, 2001 b). Kansayaku (corporate 
auditors) are appointed by the company's shareholders at the Annual General 
217 
Meeting (AGM) and they playa role in the 'Horizontal Two-Board' (ibid.) structure 
of Japanese companies. 
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Figure 2: The Role of the Board of Corporate Auditors in the Japanese Two Board System78 
The function of Kansayaku (corporate auditors) is broadly equivalent to the audit 
committee, which is applied in the Anglo-American style of corporate governance 
system. There are, however, some important differences, such as, for example, that 
corporate auditors conduct a "'business audit' and a 'financial audit" ', 79 and they are 
78 Figure 2 is from the Association's web-site (http://www.kansa.or.jp/english/about_sub-w.html). 
79 JCAA explains 'business audit' and financial audit' as follows: 'A business audit is an assessment 
of whether or not the directors are correctly observing applicable laws and the company's charter 
provisions while managing the company, and is commonly referred to as a 'compliance audit' . A 
financial audit is conducted before the financial statements are submitted to a shareholders' annual 
meeting. The audit report, which contains the results of both the financial and business audits, must 
accompany the notice of the shareholders' meeting. Consolidated financial statements are also 
subject to auditing by kansayaku, and the results of the audit must be reported at the annual 
shareholders' meeting' (Japan Corporate Auditors Association, 2001d). 
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a body separate from the board of directors. JCAA holds that Kansayaku (corporate 
auditors) are an '[e]ssential functioning part of Japan's Corporate Governance 
framework' (Japan Corporate Auditors Association, 2001b). 
Setting up a Kansayakukai (board of corporate auditors) in large companies 80, 
extending the term of office of corporate auditors from two years to three years, 
increasing the number of corporate auditors from more than one to at least three and 
introducing Shagaikansayaku (the Outside Auditor) became mandatory when the 
amended Commercial Code came into effect in 1993 (Ikejima, 1994). Through this 
amendment of the law, large companies must form a Kansayakukai (board of 
auditors), which consists of at least three full-time corporate auditors and more than 
one outside auditor, who has not served as a member of the board of directors of this 
company or one of its subsidiaries (ibid. , p.82). 
JCAA published their first pronouncements on corporate governance in 1996. 
Reflecting the nature of the association, their area of discussion of corporate 
governance was auditing and the auditor within the framework of the corporate 
governance debate. In their pronouncements, JCAA presented issues, which they felt 
could be improved, that is, the composition of the board of corporate auditors, the 
appointment of outside corporate auditors and communication issues between 
corporate auditors and top management. 
80 The definition of a large company according to the Commercial Code is: ' ... the statute as a joint-
stock company having legal capital of 500 million yen or more or total balance-sheet liabilities of 20 
billion yen or more' (Japan Corporate Auditors Association, 2001 d). 
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JCAA made several suggestions concerning improvements of the board of corporate 
auditors. It stressed the central role of full-time external auditors on the board of 
corporate auditors and recommended improved communication and sharing of 
information with outside corporate auditors in order to facilitate the role of the 
outside corporate auditors. JCAA, however, did not recommend that outside 
corporate auditors would hold positions with other companies even if he or she was 
only appointed in a part-time role because of the significant responsibility attributed 
to outside corporate auditors. JCAA advised that corporate auditors should have 
better communication with top management and the executives of the company. It 
also recommended that corporate auditors should be able to attend the executive 
board as it was the de facto decision-making body of the company. And, it was 
suggested that companies should supply their corporate auditors with a sufficient 
number of support staff (Kansa Seido Iinkai, 1996). 
JCAA has published various research studies since 1996. In 2000 the association 
released an Interim Report on future perspectives on laws, especially the Commercial 
Code and corporate governance issues. The report made ten recommendations. It is 
of interest that the report defined the objective of a company as making benefits from 
business activities in order to meet the requirements of its various stakeholders with 
its basic principles being sound management and effectiveness. In order to achieve 
these principles, it was argued that it was crucial for companies to reconsider their 
organisational structures and clarify the powers and responsibilities of the members 
220 
of the board of directors and the corporate auditors. Further, it was suggested that it 
was important to have flexible laws governing the activities of companies so that 
they would be able to appropriately deal with the changing business environment. 
Thus, for the case of the corporate auditors, the JCAA recommended that it was 
preferable to flexibly manage the corporate auditor system within the existing legal 
system rather than implementing further regulations such as, for example, effectively 
augmenting the personnel of outside auditors. The JCAA also recommended that the 
law should allow companies to either adopt the traditional Japanese corporate 
governance system with its board of corporate auditors or the Anglo-American style 
of corporate governance system with the monitoring function being with the non-
executive directors. It further advised to reconsider corporate governance systems in 
the context of managing a corporate group, for example, in the context of the 
management of subsidiary companies. JCAA also advocated that companies should 
improve the quality of auditing and enhance disclosure especially of human resource 
management issues in relation to members of the board of directors. It was also 
suggested that the remuneration systems of executives and the class law suit system 
should be reconsidered and the Annual General Meeting (AGM) be revitalised. 
Finally, JCAA recommended that companies should take into account the different 
interests of their shareholders, for example, shareholders who hold shares in order to 
make profit in the short-term and those who intend to hold shares in the long-term. 
Considering various shareholders is important in the context of the company having 
to maximise shareholder wealth and JCAA thus suggest that companies take 
effective steps to ensure that they look after the interest of all their shareholders 
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(Nihon Kansayaku Kyokai, 2000). JCAA was aware of the need for independence of 
corporate auditors and therefore argued that it was desirable that the candidates for 
the position of corporate auditors should be approved by the board of corporate 
auditors before they are proposed for approval by the Annual General Meeting 
(AGM). 
JCAA carried out joint research with academics into the role of outside auditors in 
corporate governance in Japan. The report, which was published in 2007, stated that 
Japan had been affected by the expansion of globalisation, which it understood as 
coming from the U.S. Influenced by contextual and political circumstances, a series 
of amendments of the Commercial Code had taken place since 1993, which reflected 
U.S. laws. With the growing concern about corporate governance and the political 
pressure from the U.S. the corporate auditor system had thus been amended since 
1990s. According to the report, the Japanese government had attempted to complete 
the arrangement for corporate governance by strengthening the authority, 
responsibility and role of corporate auditors and not by introducing and strengthening 
non-executive directors. Further, the report argued that in order to respond to the 
pressure from the U.S. and globalisation more generally, qualifications of outside 
auditors have been tightened. Of significance in this context was the revision of the 
Commercial Code in 2002. The revised law now allowed Japanese companies to 
either choose the traditional Japanese corporate governance system with its board of 
corporate auditors, which now has to be dominated by outside auditors, or the Anglo-
American style corporate governance system. The report pointed out that the 
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majority of Japanese companies still maintained the traditional Japanese corporate 
governance system in 2007, which meant that outside auditors in Japan were 
expected to carry out the responsibilities of non-executive directors in the Anglo-
American corporate governance system, such as auditing the appropriateness and 
efficiency of business judgements made by management. In this context it was 
important to provide suitable environments so that outside auditors can properly 
fulfil their duty and central role in corporate governance. In order to achieve such an 
environment, the report suggested that several issues had to be reconsidered. The 
report stressed that, when selecting outside auditors, management should recognise 
that corporate auditors and the board of corporate auditors were not just an 
insignificant body but that they had an important monitoring role. At the same time, 
outside auditors should be aware of their significant duties and responsibilities and 
the need of being independent from the management and the board of directors. This 
is crucial, the report argued, in order for corporate auditors to be able to make 
adequate judgements of the activities of management. The report recommended that 
outside auditors should also offer their opinions on top management and their 
business activities. Further, it was suggested that outside auditors should assume the 
position of somebody outside of the company and maintain an objective view. 
Outside auditors should become familiar with the company concerned and should 
cooperate with corporate auditors and their support staff and attempt to support the 
board of corporate auditors (Nihon Kansayaku Kyokai Kansaishibu, 2007). 
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6.2.7. Nihon Kouninkaikeishi Kyoukai (The Japanese Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, JICPA) 
The Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants was established in 1949 as 'a 
self-disciplinary association and reorganized under the Certified Public Accountants 
Act in 1966. In order to practice as a CPA, a qualified person must register with the 
nCPA and join its membership' (The Japanese Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, 2009a). The nCPA engages in a whole range of activities, including 
self-regulation and offering membership services. One of its activities that is of 
special interest here is '[p Jroviding guidance on auditing, accounting and other 
related professional services and submitting comments on various exposure drafts 
published by other organizations' (ibid.). Interestingly, despite this emphasis on 
providing guidance and comment the ncp A has not been significantly engaged in 
the corporate governance debate during the period under consideration here (i.e. from 
1989-2007). A likely explanation for this is that the ncp A did not consider the key 
issues discussed in the corporate governance debate as particularly relevant to their 
activities. That is, external disclosure and the auditing of this disclosure were not 
discussed at a level of detail that would have either needed the input of the ncp A or 
would have significantly impacted upon the work traditionally done by the members 
of the ncp A. During 1989 to 2007, the ncp A was involved in the process of 
aligning Japanese accounting standards with International Accounting Standards 
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(lAS) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).81 The changes to 
accounting have, however, not attracted the attention of the corporate governance 
debate and were implemented with little controversy and the support of Nippon 
Keidanren. Interestingly, Nippon Keidanren did not see accounting and accounting 
disclosure as a controversial issue but saw this as an area that could significantly 
contribute to the success of Japanese businesses. Nippon Keidanren thus stressed that 
they 'fully support the acceleration of convergence of accounting standards among 
the IFRS, U.S. and the Japanese GAAP' (Nippon Keidanren, 2006). In the context of 
the above it was only in 2007 that the JICP A showed an interest in corporate 
governance when it established a project team in anticipation of a possible revision 
of the Companies Act in November 2007. According to JICPA, '[t]he project team 
considered the role of corporate governance from a wide range of perspectives, 
including who should appoint accounting auditors and determine audit fees, and how 
the disclosure and audit system should be improved under good corporate 
governance from a mid- and long-term perspective' (The Japanese Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, 2009a). The JICPA issued a report entitled "Role of 
Corporate Governance and Disclosure by Listed Companies", which was aimed at 
improving the credibility of the financial information of listed companies in May 
2009 (ibid.).82 
81 The JICPA is a founding member of the International Accounting Standards Committee (The 
Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 2009b). 
82 This report, which was published in 2009, falls outside of the period under focus here, i.e. 1989-
2007. A detailed analysis of this report is therefore not provided. 
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The above summary of the views of some of the key Japanese constituencies in the 
debate over corporate governance has brought out different positions in relation to 
how the pressure to change the Japanese corporate governance system had been 
perceived. The Tokyo Stock Exchange in their pronouncements reflected the Anglo-
American corporate governance model in their pronouncements on corporate 
governance. Their concern was with shareholders, which is in line with other stock 
exchanges. Nippon Keidanren, as the association of business, expressed especially a 
concern with the competitiveness of Japanese businesses in a global context. This is 
not surprising given the type of organisation Nippon Keidanren is. In their 
pronouncements on corporate governance, they generally supported the revisions of 
the law, especially the strengthening of the auditor system and the board of directors. 
The JPC-SED, an organisation that brings together academics, labour representatives 
and business people, took a different stance from the above constituencies. It was 
especially concerned about the employer-employee relationship in the context of the 
proposed changes and developments of corporate governance in Japan. This is 
because they view employees as particularly important stakeholders that significantly 
contribute to the success of the company. They thus suggested that employees should 
collaborate with employers in developing a Japanese corporate governance system. 
In addition, they expressed a concern about consumers. Interestingly, there is no 
reference in their pronouncements to shareholders and shareholder interest and rights. 
Kigyo Nenkin Rengokai (The Pension Fund Association) made several 
pronouncements on corporate governance. Given the character of the association it 
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stressed shareholders and was concerned that shareholder interests were pursued by 
management and that appropriate monitoring mechanisms were put in place. The 
issues addressed by Kigyo Nenkin Rengokai reflected key concerns of the Anglo-
American corporate governance system. Nihon Kansayaku Kyokai (Japan Corporate 
Auditors Association) mainly focused on the board of corporate auditors that is part 
of the Japanese corporate governance system. Their concern was to make 
recommendations that would strengthen the role of the internal auditor as well as 
making sure that internal auditors are appropriately qualified and independent from 
the company's decision makers. 
The organisations discussed above are key constituencies in Japan that contributed to 
the corporate governance debate. All these constituencies were established before the 
period under focus here and their main objectives are the representation of the 
interests of their members in policy debates and providing services to their members. 
These organisations engaged in the corporate governance in Japan debate because 
they perceived that a good corporate governance system would be of benefit to their 
members or they were generally interested in the outcomes in relation to this system. 
Their engagement was carried out within the existing frameworks of their 
organisations. In addition to these organisations, there is another Japanese 
organisation that significantly contributed to the corporate governance debate but 
that is different in several ways form the above organisations, namely, the Japan 
Corporate Governance Forum. The Japan Corporate Governance Forum is a private 
organisation consisting of academics, business people, lawyers and journalists that 
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was founded in October 1994 motivated by an interest in the establishment of a 
sound corporate governance system for Japanese companies. The Forum issued its 
own Corporate Governance Principles in 1998, which they hoped would set the 
standard for 'good' corporate governance. These Principles received international 
recognition, most notably from CaIPERS. The work of the Japan Corporate 
Governance Forum is of particular interest as it was an attempt at self-regulation, 
which was a new development in the Japanese context in which accounting and 
companies have traditionally been regulated by the law. Further, in contrast to the 
constituencies discussed above, the Japan Corporate Governance Forum was 
established in response to global pressure to change the Japanese corporate 
governance system and to what was perceived to be a corporate governance failure in 
Japan83 with the particular objective of establishing a set of principles that would 
constitute good corporate governance practice for Japanese companies. It is of note 
that the Japan Corporate Governance Forum does not represent the interests of a 
particular group, such, as for example, business or corporate auditors, but is a 
collection of individuals that got together to deal with the corporate governance issue. 
The Corporate Governance Principles thus do not represent the view of one single 
constituency but the shared view of a collective of people that have arrived at their 
shared position through debate and consultation with other interested groups. 
Because the Japan Corporate Governance Forum is different - as outlined above -
from other constituencies in Japan it has been chosen as a focus for one of the case 
83 The 1990s witnessed increased fraud and corporate failures. 
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studies here. The various versions of its Corporate Governance Principles published 
between 1997 and 2006 constitute the empirical material focused upon in Chapter 8. 
6.3. KEY TRENDS AND ISSUES IN THE PUBLIC DEBATE ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN 
In the following, the results of a content analysis of a sample of Japanese specialist 
financial and general newspapers are summarised in order to provide more insights 
into the growing public debate on corporate governance. 84 An appreciation of how 
the debate developed and what the key issues of the debate were is important for an 
understanding of the empirical material that forms the two case studies of chapters 
7 and 8. 
The academic literature on corporate governance m Japan has referred to an 
emerging concern about the Japanese corporate governance system during the 
1990s (see, for example, Aoki et aI, 2008). rere are different opinions as to when 
the term corporate governance was first mentioned in the media with researchers 
suggesting two key dates, 1991 and 1992 (Y oshimori, 2003, p.204). The analysis of 
the newspapers here confirms that the term corporate governance emerged in the 
early 1990s. The term was first mentioned by Nihon Keizai Shimbun on 13 May 
84 The objective of the content analysis here is to provide some insights into the general trend of 
corporate governance reporting of Japanese newspapers so as to facilitate the analysis of the empirics 
in the case studies. The content analysis therefore does not offer a detailed analysis of all the corporate 
governance themes and issues that were addressed in the newspapers. Such a detailed analysis would 
go beyond the scope of this study here. 
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1991. Nikkei Kinyu Shimbun (Financial Daily) first referred to corporate 
governance on 15 July 1992. In the same year, 6 September 1992, the term 
appeared in Asahi Shimbun, one of the four general newspapers surveyed. By the 
end of 1993, corporate governance had featured in all but one of the seven 
newspapers surveyed. Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun (Business Daily) was the last of the 
seven newspapers to refer to corporate governance for the first time in 1994. 
Analysis of the number of articles referring (at least once) to 'corporate governance' 
suggests three key periods in the reporting of corporate governance (Figure 3).85 
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85 Only summary figures, which provide information relevant for the development of the 
argumentation, are included here. Figures, from which the summary figures have been derived from, 
are included in the Appendix. 
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As Figure 3 indicates, the three key periods were: first period, from 1996 to 1998 
with the peak in the reporting in 1997; second period, from 2001 to 2004 with the 
peak in the reporting in 2003; and, third period, from 2004 to 2006 with the peak in 
the reporting in 2005. Until 1996 the reporting on corporate governance was not 
very significant. There was a small increase in the reporting in 1993 when the 
number of articles referring to corporate governance increased to 60 per year, the 
highest number between 1991 and 1995. During the first key period there was a 
steep increase in the reporting from 86 articles in 1996 to 588 articles in 1997. 
During the second period the increase was less sharp but during the peak of 2003 
the number of articles reached 1173. This constitutes the highest number of articles 
referring to corporate governance during the period surveyed here. During the third 
period, the level of reporting reached its peak in 2005 with 1161 articles referring 
to corporate governance. Figure 3 indicates that although the volume of reporting86 
was lower in the general newspapers compared to that of the financial newspapers, 
the reporting of both types of newspapers followed the same trend. 
The increase in corporate governance reporting during the above period reflects 
key contextual developments. A change of the Commercial Code, which became 
effective in 1993, had drawn attention to corporate governance issues especially 
through, for example, its simplification of shareholder lawsuits (Demise, 1997). 
86 During the period from I January 1990 to 31 July 2007, the general newspapers published 2737 
articles that referred to corporate governance, whereas the finailcial newspapers published 5487 
articles. 
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The significant increase in corporate governance reporting during the first key 
period reflects a new key direction in government policy. In 1996, the Japanese 
government had embarked on a deregulation programme, which covered the period 
from 1996 to 1998 (the so-called "Big Bang") (Hall, 1998, 139-158). The period 
from 2001 to 2004 saw debates over planned changes to the Commercial Code and 
the passing of the revised Commercial Code, which allowed companies to choose 
between the Japanese or Anglo-American corporate governance system. The 
revised Commercial Code had come into effect in 2003, the peak in the reporting 
during this period. During the third period, from 2004 to 2006, further amendments 
of the Commercial Code were discussed and implemented. Of significance here 
was the creation of a new Companies Act, which was passed by the Diet in 2005 
and became effective in 2006. It was, however, not the introduction of the new 
Companies Act, which seems to have impacted significantly on the corporate 
governance reporting but some high-profile attempts at takeovers during this period, 
which achieved media attention in 2005. In the context of these takeover attempts, 
the most high-profile one being Livedoor87, the Securities and Exchange Law was 
revised in 2005. This is evident from Figure 4, which shows the trends in the 
newspaper reporting on the Commercial Code and the Companies Act as well as the 
87 The Securities and Exchange Law was revised in order to clarify the scope of tender-offer rules. 
The issue had arisen because Livedoor had acquired around 35% of the outstanding shares of Nippon 
Broadcasting System 'in off-hollr trading on ToSTNet-1 [Tokyo Stock exchange Trading network] of 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange' (Nagashima et al., 2005). According to Nagashima et al. (2005), 
'Livedoor argued that the tender-offer rules did not appJy to off-hour trading and, as such, it was not 
required to comply with tender-rules in its acquisition of shares of Nippon Broadcasting System'. The 
law was changed and tender-offer rules from July 2005 have to be complied with in off-hour trading if 
it is intended to acquire more than one-third of the outstmding shares of a listed company. 
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reporting on takeovers and the Securities and Exchange Law during the period 
surveyed. 
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Figure 4: Reporting on Commercial Code, Companies Act and Takeovers in All Newspapers 
It is of interest to explore, which particular components of the corporate 
governance system were most widely debated and reported on during the period 
from 1990 to 2007. Table 8 provides a summary of the reporting of the financial 
and general newspapers of the following five main components of the corporate 
governance system: the board of directors, disclosure, the audit, internal control 
and takeovers. Of the 10,031 articles referring to at least one component of the 
corporate governance system, 4,758 (that is 47.4%) refer to the board of directors. 
This is the most referred to corporate governance component for both types of 
newspapers. In the case of the financial newspapers, over half of the articles 
(51.3%) refer to the board of directors and in the case of the general newspapers 
40.2% refer to it. Further, the data reveals that, in the case of the financial 
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newspapers, the board of directors has constituted by far the biggest part of the 
reporting since 1991, with financial disclosure, audit and takeovers all being 
referred to in around 15% of the articles respectively. This, however, is different 
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Table 8: Reporting of Key Components of the Corporate Governance System, 1990-2007, 
Financial and General Newspapers 
for the reporting of the general newspapers: 35% of the articles report on audit, 
12% on disclosure and 11 % on takeovers and only 1.5% on internal control. The 
least reported on component of the corporate governance system during the period 
surveyed here is internal control, with 3% of articles in the financial newspapers 
and 1.5% of articles in the general newspapers referring to internal control. 
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Content analysis has indicated that the most debated issue in the context of Japan 
being under pressure to change its traditional corporate governance system and to 
converge with the Anglo-American system was the board of directors. It is thus of 
interest to gain further insights into the reporting of issues related to the board of 
directors, such as non-executive directors, US-style board of directors and 
executive remuneration. As Figure 5 indicates, the reporting on the board of 
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Figure 5: Reporting on the Board of Directors, Non-Executive Directors, Executive Remuneration and US-
Style Board of Directors, All Newspapers in Sample 
directors and related issues follows the same trend as the corporate governance 
reporting more generally. From Figure 5, it is also evident that, during the period 
from 1990 to 2007, articles nearly equally referred to the board of directors and 
non-executive directors, 1867 and 1886 articles respectively. From 2002 to 2003 
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there is a sharp increase in the reporting on US-style board of directors, which 
reflects developments in Japan, i.e. the amendment of the Commercial Code in 
2003, which allowed companies to chose either the traditional Japanese corporate 
governance system or the U.S.-style corporate governance system with several sub-
committees and an increased number of non-executive directors. From Figure 5 it 
appears that executive remuneration did not attract as much attention with only 
7.5% of articles referring to executive remuneration. This is not surprising in the 
Japanese context, however, where monetary reward is less important than 
promotion within the company. 
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Any corporate governance system is embedded within a particular corporate system 
with which it interrelates, that is, which it reflects and impacts upon. The Japanese 
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corporate system is in many ways different from the U.S. and U.K. corporate 
system (see above). It is of interest to explore the extent to which the newspapers in 
their reporting of corporate governance refer to the Japanese corporate system 
during the period surveyed here. Figure 6 provides insights into the extent of the 
reporting of key components of the Japanese corporate system and contrasts this to 
the reporting of components of the Anglo-American corporate system. 
Japanese-style management, cross-shareholding and the main bank system, which 
sustain the Japanese corporate governance system and stakeholders, which are the 
key focus of the traditional Japanese firm, are rarely referred to in articles by the 
newspapers during the period from 1990 to 2007. This is in stark contrast with the 
reporting on issues related to the Anglo-American corporate system in which the 
emphasis is on shareholders. Whereas 8,409 articles refer to shareholders and issues 
related to shareholders in the typical Anglo-American corporate context, only 705 
articles refer to stakeholders and issues related to stakeholders in the typical Japanese 
corporate context. Figure 6 thus highlights the importance that was attributed to 
shareholders and their interests in the debate over corporate governance in the 
newspapers. 
The academic literature on corporate governance in Japan commonly refers to a 
challenge to the Japanese corporate governance system by the Anglo-American 
corporate governance system and a pressure to converge the Japanese corporate 
governance system with the Anglo-American corporate governance system. It is 
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thus of interest to explore whether there is an emphasis on either the U.K or the 
U.S. in the corporate governance reporting of the sample newspapers. The 
comparison of the frequency with which newspaper articles referred to either the 
U.S. or the U.K. in their corporate governance reporting during the period from 
1990 to 2007 highlights an emphasis on the U.S. (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: U.S. and U.K. Influence on the Corporate Governance Debate in all Newspapers 
Out of a total number of 4059 articles making reference to both countries, 90 % of 
the articles referred to the U.S. whereas only 10 % referred to the U.K. Moreover, 
the trend in referring to the U.S. mirrors the trend in the corporate governance 
reporting evident in the newspapers during the period under focus. Interestingly, 
there are no clearly identifiable peaks in the number of articles that refer to the U.K. 
The lack of engaging with corporate governance developments in the U.K. is also 
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reflected in the frequency with which newspaper articles refer to the Cadbury 
Committee, whose report constitutes a key document in the context of the 
development of the Anglo-American corporate governance system. Only 11 
articles during the whole period refer to the Cadbury Committee. 
The results of the content analysis of the newspapers thus indicate a strong 
emphasis on the engagement with developments in the u.s. in the context of the 
corporate governance debate in Japan. There are several contextual explanations 
for the dominance of the U.S. in the newspaper reporting. The U.S., especially 
since the end of the Cold War, has become the hegemonic power globally. It is 
therefore reasonable to argue that developments in the U.S. are generally of interest 
to weaker nation states in the global power structure. The U.S. also aims to exert 
influence and pressure over other nation states and this would be reflected in the 
debates in the media more generally. In addition, Japan has had a long standing 
relationship with the U.S. in terms of trade and national security that dates from the 
end of the Second World War. This particular relationship, however, has never 
been one on an equal basis with Japan being the weaker partner. In such a context, 
trade dependency and security dependency impact upon what a nation state can and 
cannot do. From that it follows that Japan needs to engage with demands made by 
the U.S. in terms of changes of the Japanese corporate governance system and 
developments in the U. S. corporate governance system. 
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6.4. SUMMARY 
Chapter six has provided a brief comparison of the main characteristics of the 
Japanese and Anglo-American corporate governance system and the Japanese and 
Anglo-American corporate system. It highlighted how the systems reflect the 
values of the two different cultures. The chapter also offered an analysis of the key 
trends and key issues in the public debate as evident in Japanese general and 
financial newspapers. And, it provided an analysis of the key positions taken by 
Japanese constituencies who are affected by changes in the corporate governance 
system. Based on this analysis it provided a rationale for the choice of the Japan 
Corporate Governance Forum's Principles of Corporate Governance as the 
empirical material for the analysis in chapter 8. The next chapter, chapter 7, 
focuses on the bi-Iateral trade negotiations between Japan and the U.S. during the 
period from 1989 to 2007. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE BILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE U.S. 
This chapter aims to gam insights into how corporate governance issues were 
embedded in the bilateral trade negotiations between the U.S. administration and 
the Japanese government during the period from 1989 to 2007. More specifically, 
what were the positions and roles of accounting disclosure and corporate 
governance practices in these negotiations? What tensions and issues arise in a 
context where one nation state puts pressure on another nation state, on the face of 
it, to change its corporate governance system in line with its own? And, more 
particularly, how far does the U.S. pressure on Japan to adopt an Anglo-American 
corporate governance system threaten cultural particularities of the Japanese 
context and way of life? Further, how might an individual nation state resist global 
power in relation to trade negotiations? And, how does an apparently weaker 
negotiating party act in the context of pressure to change its corporate governance 
practices and system so as to conform to what is perceived to be or portrayed as 
good corporate governance practice by the apparently stronger negotiating partner? 
Trade negotiations are an important aspect of international relations and have a 
significant impact on the well-being of people in individual nation states. Yet there 
has been a paucity of research that focuses on corporate governance (including 
accounting) practices as areas or issues addressed in these negotiations. This 
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chapter here alms to begin to fill the gap by offering contextual and 
interdisciplinary analysis of key documents in the context of the bilateral trade 
negotiations between the U.S. and Japan from the late 1980s onwards. The focus is 
on interpreting, consistent with a critical social analysis, how corporate governance 
issues are discussed in these documents. 
The first section of the chapter outlines key characteristics of the relationship 
between the U.S. and Japan from 1945, the end of World War II, onwards. An 
appreciation of the relationship between the two negotiating partners facilitates 
analysis as it helps shed light on the suggestions made by the U.S. administration to 
the Japanese government in relation to its corporate governance system and Japan's 
response to it. It also facilitates insights into the broader issues at stake, of which 
debates over corporate governance were part. In the analysis of the trade 
negotiations, a chronological approach is adopted as this helps to identify 
continuities and discontinuities in terms of strategies proposed and issues addressed 
during the period under focus. It also gives better insights into whether changes in 
administration and government had an impact on the nature of debates over 
accounting disclosure and corporate governance. 88 The documents that have been 
chosen for the analysis reflect a concern to gain insights into how corporate 
governance issues were discussed, what interests ostensibly motivated the way 
88 As this case study is interested in changes proposed and made to the Japanese corporate governance 
system and the impact of that on the Japanese way of life, the focus is only on the proposals made by 
the u.s. administration to the Japanese government during the bilateral trade negotiations. An analysis 
of the suggestions that the Japanese government made to the U.S. government in the context of the 
bilateral trade negotiations is thus not the focus of the elaborations here. 
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these discussions developed, how the Japanese government dealt with the apparent 
pressure to change the Japanese corporate governance system and what real and 
potential threats did these suggestions and changes constitute to the Japanese way 
of life and beyond. The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: a brief 
historical overview of the U.S.-Japanese relationship since World War II; analysis 
of the debate over corporate governance in relation to the research questions; 
summary of our insights from the analysis. 
7.1. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
U.S. AND JAPAN 
There are two issues that appear to have played a significant role in shaping the 
relationship between the U.S. and Japan after World War II: security and trade. The 
emphasis on these issues shifted variously during the period from 1945 to 2008 
reflecting changes in the broader global socio-economic and political context as 
well as specifically in the national context of the U.S. and U.K. (Vogel, 2002). 
After World War II, a close relationship developed between the U.S. and Japan in 
the context of the U.S. being the dominant force in the occupation army. The 
occupation authorities had a significant impact on Japan in terms of shaping the 
legal and administrative framework. Thus, the constitution of Japan, for example, 
reflected the U.S. notion of democracy as well as U.S. values. This close 
relationship between the U.S. and Japan also remained after Japan had gained 
independence on 8th September 1951 by concluding a treaty of peace, named the 
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San Francisco Peace Treaty, with forty eight countries. The relationship was 
motivated by a mutual interest of both partners. The U.S., concerned about security 
in the light of a recovering USSR, was keen to have military bases on Japanese 
territory. Japan in tum, having been isolated from its neighbours because of the 
position taken during World War II was keen to secure the help of the U.S. in the 
event of an invasion. Subsequently, Japan and the U.S. signed the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security, which gave the U.S. a special position amongst the other 
treaty partners of the San Francisco Peace Treaty: Japan allowed the U.S. to set up 
military bases in Japan and in return got assurance that the U.S. would help defend 
Japan in the case of an invasion by (an)other country(ies) (Green, 2002; Vogel 
2002, p.l). The U.S. helped integrate Japan into the Western bloc, which was 
acting as a force against communist countries. Having emerged as a member of a 
group of so-called democratic and capitalistic countries, Japan could now begin her 
recovery from the effects of World War II. 
As part of its strategies to recover her economy, which had been severely damaged 
during World War II, Japan began to seek overseas markets, especially in the U.S. 
Vogel (2002, p. 1) points out that 'the United States also supported Japan's 
economic recovery by allowing Japan to limit the reparations paid to war victims, 
by creating a liberal international trade regime, and by maintaining open markets at 
home while tolerating Japanese trade protection and an undervalued yen'. With this 
support from the U.S., which was in the interest of the U.S. because of the concern 
about security, Japan made a remarkable economic recovery after World War II. 
244 
Grimes (2002, p. 35) points out that Japan's economic recovery had a significant 
impact on the nature of the relationship with the U.S.: 
The U.S.-Japan relationship in the postwar era has been distinctly 
asymmetrical, particularly in macroeconomic terms, with Japan far more 
dependent on the United States than the other way around. Japan's 
extraordinary rise as a world economic and technological power changed 
the degree of asymmetry substantially, however, and created major 
friction in the bilateral relationship. 
The economic and industrial conflict between the U. S. and Japan already arose in 
the 1960s, evident in steel and agricultural conflicts. From the 1960s onwards, the 
U.S. government has aimed to improve access to the Japanese market especially for 
its corporations and investors. Lincoln (1999, p. 117) explains that during the 
1960s and 1970s, U.S. government officials had been able to negotiate agreement 
with the Japanese government 'on substantially eliminating quotas and lowering 
tariffs' (ibid.) These negotiations had taken place on two levels: the multilateral 
level of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the bilateral level 
between the two nation states (ibid.). The tensions between the two countries 
intensified in the 1980s, as Lincoln explains: 
... during the 1980s, the Reagan administration pursued a collection of 
tariff, quota, and other non-tariff issues with the Japanese government. 
Limited success on some of these problems and the highly public 
opposition of the Japanese government led to rising tension as the decade 
wore on. Trying to accelerate progress, the Reagan administration created 
the Market-Oriented Sector Selective (MOSS) negotiations in 1985, a 
process that involved intense negotiations on a number of impediments in 
four industries (forest products, medical equipment and pharmaceuticals, 
electronic products, and telecommunications equipment and services). 
(Lincoln, 1999, p. 117). 
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The shift away in the relationship between the U.S. and Japan from the primary 
focus of security as evident in the aftermath of World War II to a focus on 
economic issues from the 1960s is congruent with Japan's economic success. 
Further, the 1980s saw extraordinary growth of the Japanese economy whilst the 
U.S. experienced an economic down-tum during the same decade. Towards the end 
of the 1980s, the U.S. trade deficit had culminated to around fifty billion dollars a 
year (lha, 1991). In the context of the economic situation in the U.S., the Reagan 
administration came under criticism, especially from U.S. business interests, as it 
was perceived that they had not satisfactorily dealt with the issue of Japan. One 
suggestion thus was that the U.S. government should modify its attitude towards 
Japan and become more aggressive (Aoyagi, 1991, p. 91; Iha, 1991, p. 107). There 
was also pressure from industry on the government to deal with this issue (Schoppa, 
2002). In the context of this rising dissatisfaction, Congress, in which Democrats 
held the majority, passed the Trade Act of 1988. This Act significantly impacted on 
the U.S.-Japan relationship as it stipulated that the Reagan administration had to 
identify countries that were 'unfair traders' and aim to overcome any problems 
through negotiations.89 With this law, the Reagan administration lost control over 
the issues it wanted to address with Japan as well as its negotiating strategies (ibid.). 
Lincoln comments: 
Although Congress acted out of a partisan dissatisfaction with the Reagan 
administration's trade policies, many within the administration were also 
increasingly frustrated in their dealings with Japan. In this atmosphere of 
heightened awareness of continuing access problems in Japan, increasing 
frustration at the slow pace of progress in making markets more open, and 
89 This provision in the law is known as Super 301 (ibid.) 
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rising discontent in Congress, the Bush administration took office in 1989. 
(Lincoln, 1991, pp. 117-118) 
Changes in the global political context further gave impetus to those in the u.s. 
administration who were calling for a change in the U.S.-Japan relationship. Of 
significance was the end of the Cold War, which reduced the perceived threat to 
u.s. security thus impacting upon its relationship with Japan. As Green explains: 
In the first half of the 1990s the alliance suffered both from neglect and 
from crisis. The end of the cold war competition empowered those in the 
U.S. government who had wanted to focus on trade relations with Japan 
but had been constrained by strategic considerations. (Green, 2002, p.2S) 
The incoming Bush administration through pressure and the provision of Super 301 
labelled Japan as an unfair trader and identified three product areas for negotiation: 
government procurement of satellites, government procurement of super computers 
and technical barriers in forest products (Lincoln, 1991, p. 118). This act resulted in 
a complex set of trade negotiations between the U.S. administration and the 
Japanese government. 
In the following, a contextual and interpretive analysis of documents issued in the 
context of these initiatives during the period from 1989 to 2007 is offered. The 
focus of the analysis, as has already been explained (supra), is on how corporate 
governance featured in these debates in the situation whereby the U.S. government 
put pressure on the Japanese government to change the Japanese corporate 
governance system so as to reflect the Anglo-American corporate governance 
system. 
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7.2. THE BI-LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1989-2007) 
The bi-Iateral trade negotiations started in 1989 after Japan had been labelled as an 
unfair trader by the incoming Bush administration. The negotiations were carried 
out by the U.S. government and the Japanese government in the context of various 
frameworks and initiatives that were set up to either provide a coherent overarching 
structure for the negotiations or to focus on particular aspects within this broader 
structure. The objectives of these negotiations were to minimise the U.S. trade 
deficit with Japan and to open up the Japanese market for international, especially 
U.S., investors. In this context liberal reforms and marketisation were seen as vital 
for the successful opening of the Japanese market. Within these general objectives 
a key concern was with aspects of the Japanese institutional framework, which 
were perceived by the U.S. as constituting structural impediments in the context of 
trade between the two countries. One particular concern was the Japanese corporate 
governance system (including its accounting system). The trade negotiations were 
shaped by the different U. S. and Japanese governments and presidents/prime 
ministers in office during the period from 1989 to 2007. Table 9 offers a summary 
of the initiatives and frameworks, which addressed corporate governance issues 
and that constitute the empirics for the analysis here. 
The Structural Impediments Initiative was launched in 1989. This initiative is the 
first of a number of initiatives in the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty first 
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PRESIDENTS/ 
PRIME MINISTERS 
1989 -1992 President George W. Bush 
Prime Minister Uno 
1993 - 1995 President Bill Clinton 
Prime Minister Hashimoto 
1997 - 2001 President Bill Clinton 
Prime Minister Hashimoto 
2001- 2007 President George W. Bush Jor 
Prime Minister Koizumi 
INITIATIVE 
U.S.-Japan Structurallmpediments 
Initiative 
U.S.-Japan Framework for a New 
Economic Partnership (Framework) 
U.S.-Japan Enhanced Initiative on 
Deregulation and Competition Policy 
(Enhanced Initiative) 
U.S.-Japan Economic Partnership for 
Growth (Partnership) 
• The Regulatory Reform and 
Competition Policy Initiative 
(Regulatory Reform 
Initiative) 
Table 9: Bi-Iateral Trade Negotiations (1989-2007) 
century in the context of the bilateral trade negotiations between the U.S and Japan. 
Subsequent U.S. administrations also entered into bilateral trade negotiations with 
Japan. After the Clinton administration had come to power, it negotiated the US-
Framework for a New Economic Partnership in 1993 and launched another 
initiative with the Japanese government, the US- Japan Enhanced Initiative on 
Deregulation and Competition Policy (Enhancement Initiative), in 1997. The 
incoming Bush (Junior) administration launched a new partnership agreement with 
Japan in 2001, the US -Japan Economic Partnership for Growth (Partnership), 
and replaced the Enhancement Initiative with the Regulatory Reform and 
Competition Policy Initiative (Regulatory Reform Initiative). In the context of the 
various frameworks and initiatives, documents were issued that amongst other 
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YEAR DOCUMENT 
U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative 
1990 • Structural Impediments Initiative Interim Report 
• Structural Impediments Initiative Joint Report 
1991 • First Annual Structural Impediments Initiative Report 
1992 • Second Annual Structural Impediments Initiative Report 
U.S.-Japan Framework for a New Economic Partnership (Framework) 
1994 • Submission by the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan Regarding Deregulation 
and Administrative Reform in Japan 
1995 • Submission by the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan Regarding Deregulation, 
Administrative Reform and Competition Policy in Japan 
1996 • Submission by the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan Regarding Deregulation, 
Administrative Reform and Competition Policy in Japan 
U.S.-Japan Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy (Enhanced Initiative) 
1997 • Submission by the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan Regarding Deregulation, 
Competition Policy, and Transparency and other Government Practices in Japan 
1998 • Submission by the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan Regarding Deregulation, 
Competition Policy, and Transparency and other Government Practices in Japan 
• First Joint Status Report on the U.S.-Japan Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy 
1999 • Submission by the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan Regarding Deregulation, 
Competition Policy, and Transparency and other Government Practices in Japan 
• Second Joint Status Report on the U.S.-Japan Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy 
2000 • Annual Submission by the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan Under the U.S.-
Japan Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy 
• Third Joint Status Report on the U.S.-Japan Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy 
U.S.-Japan Economic Partnership for Growth: The Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative 
2001 • Annual Reform Recommendations from the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan 
Under the U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative 
• Fourth Joint Status Report on the U.S.-Japan Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy 
2002 • Annual Reform Recommendations from the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan 
Under the U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative 
• First Report to the Leaders on the U.S.- Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative 
2003 • Annual Reform Recommendations from the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan 
Under the U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative 
• Second Report to the Leaders on the U.S.- Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative 
2004 • Annual Reform Recommendations from the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan 
Under the U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative 
• Third Report to the Leaders on the U.S.- Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative 
2005 • Annual Reform Recommendations from the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan 
Under the U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative 
• Fourth Report to the Leaders on the U.S.- Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative 
2006 • Annual Reform Recommendations from the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan 
Under the U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative 
• Fifth Report to the Leaders on the U.S.- Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative 
2007 • Annual Reform Recommendations from the Government of the United States to the Government of Japan 
Under the U.S.-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative 
• Report to the Leaders on the U.S.- Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative 
Table 10: Documents Issued During the Bi-Lateral Trade Negotiations (1989-2007) 
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issues addressed corporate governance more generally and specific components of 
the corporate governance system. In addition, aspects of the Japanese corporate 
system were also addressed in these documents. Table 10 lists the documents, 
which are the focus of analysis of this chapter. In the following, an analysis of 
these documents is offered. The analysis is in chronological order so as to show 
developments and changes in the debate. 
7.2.1. The Structural Impediments Initiative (1989 -1992) 
In July 1989, the Heads of State of the U.S. and Japan, President Bush Senior and 
Prime Minister Uno, agreed to launch the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) in 
an attempt to overcome trade and economic issues and to thus strengthen the 
relationship between the two nations (Naka, N., 1996). In a press release, the White 
House claimed that "the SII talks represent... [ an] ... approach that may be unique in 
the history of bilateral trade and economic discussions. The talks were designed to 
identify and resolve the structural impediments that contribute to economic 
tensions between the two countries" (U.S.-Japan Working Group on the Structural 
Impediments Initiative, 1990a, p.l). 90 The main concern was to reduce the 
reduction of payments imbalances between the two countries (U.S.-Japan Working 
Group on the Structural Impediments Initiative, 1990b, p. 2). A U.S.-Japan 
Working Group was set up to investigate the issues and held plenary meetings in 
90 The Working Group issued an Interim Report (U.S.-Japan Working Group on the Structural 
Impediments Initiative, 1990a), which in the following is referred to as "Interim Report on SII". 
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September and November 1989 to identify specific structural impediments. In 
February 1990, the working group met again to explore policy changes that might 
facilitate a speedy resolution of the identified problems. The U.S. government 
identified the following structural impediments, which the Japanese government 
was requested to address: Japanese Savings and Investment Patterns, Land Use, 
Distribution System, Exclusionary Business Practices, Keiretsu Relationships and 
Pricing Mechanisms (ibid, p. 2). In an interim report released by the U.S.-Japan SII 
Working Group on 5 April 1990, the Japanese and U.S. delegations reported on the 
progress made so far by their respective governments in attending to the structural 
impediments identified. Below, the response of the Japanese delegation is analysed 
in relation to corporate governance issues. 
7.2.1.1. Structural Impediments (SII) Interim Report (1990) 
Of particular interest in relation to corporate governance is the response of the 
Japanese delegation to the structural impediment that the U.S. administration had 
identified as Keiretsu Relationships. Keiretsu have been especially seen by the U.S. 
government and by U.S. investors as contributing to the closure of Japanese 
markets to foreign investors. The Japanese delegation refers to this perception in its 
report: 
Certain aspects of economic rationality of Keiretsu relationships 
notwithstanding there is a view that certain aspects of Keiretsu 
relationships also promote preferential group trade, negatively affect 
foreign investment in Japan, and may give rise to anticompetitive 
business practices (Interim Report on SII, p. 15). 
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The Japanese government suggested that it would address this Issue III the 
following way: 
... the Government of Japan intends to make Keiretsu more open and 
transparent. The Government will take measures in its competition policy 
and enforce the Antimonopoly Act strictly, so that business transactions 
among companies with the background Keiretsu relationship would not 
hinder fair competition. The government of Japan will also promote a 
wide range of policies to facilitate the entry of foreign enterprises into the 
Japanese market (Interim Report on SII, p. 15). 
The concern with keiretsu was part of a broader concern that the U.S. government 
had also addressed in another structural impediment, which it had referred to more 
generally as Exclusionary Business Practices. In responding to both structural 
impediments, the Japanese government was concerned to highlight its willingness 
to address the issue of closed markets for foreign businesses and investors. In terms, 
for example, of the procurement practices of private Japanese companies '[t]he 
government of Japan believes that ... procurement by private firms should be non-
discriminatory against foreign goods' (Interim Report on SII, p. 15). The reference 
to openness and transparency indicates a link to corporate accounting disclosure, 
which is an important component of corporate governance systems.91 One of the 
measures to be taken in order to facilitate more transparent operations of keiretsu is 
91 It is of note that even if the term "corporate governance" was not used by the Japanese government, 
the reference to accounting disclosure implicitly was also a reference to the corporate governance 
system, of which disclosure and transparency are key components. Instances such as this can be found 
in history. For example, Jeremy Bentham was interested in accounting disclose and made it an integral 
part of his writings on management although he never used the word "accounting" as in his context, 
i.e. before the establishment of the accountancy profession, the word "publicity" was used to signify 
that practice that later became known as "accounting disclosure" (Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003). And, 
Bentham had a lot to say about "social accounting" without ever mentioning the term "social 
accounting" (ibid). 
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thus to enhance disclosure requirements. 92 Various measurements are here 
addressed. For example, the Japanese government was considering the introduction 
of 'the so-called 5 percent rule, which requires the disclosure of substantial 
ownership in shares'. In addition to this, further measures are proposed: 
With respect to the disclosure requirements related to the Keiretsu 
problem, the government of Japan will examine areas in which 
improvements are needed for their further enhancement, taking into 
account the disclosure requirements in the u.s. and Europe, and will reach 
a conclusion before the final SII report is submitted. It is envisaged that 
improvements in disclosure requirements will include enhanced reporting 
of related-party transactions as well as consolidated financial information 
(Interim Report on SIl, p. 17). 
Of interest here is the reference to accounting disclosure requirements not only of 
the u.s. but also of Europe, which indicates Japan's affinity with Europe and 
especially with Germany since the late nineteenth century (supra). The Japanese 
government also proposes a 'Reexamination of Company Law' in order to improve 
disclosure requirements and to streamline mergers and acquisition procedures 
(ibid.). The emphasis of the Japanese government on disclosure and the willingness 
to improve accounting disclosure seems to reflect the perception of accounting in 
the Japanese context. Japan has been a founding member of the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and the Japanese Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (JICP A) has been involved in attempts to converge Japanese 
accounting standards with International Accounting Standards (lASs) and 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). Further, there was a 
92 Other measures include the strengthening of the function of the Fair Trade Commission, increasing 
the openness to Foreign Direct Investment, and revision of the takeover bid system. 
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perception at the time of the bi-lateral trade negotiations that convergmg 
accounting standards and enhancing disclosure was beneficial for business and thus 
desirable. Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) (2003) explain that' [i]n 
the past few years, Japan has been energetically reviewing its accounting and 
auditing standards with an eye to harmonizing them with those in the West wherever 
possible' and stress that they have 'consistently supported the convergence of 
accounting standards' (Nippon Keidanren, 2006). Of interest here is the position 
taken by Nippon Keidanren, which highlights the importance of disclosure for 
Japanese businesses in the wider global context: 
With today's rapid advancement of globalization, the flow of people, 
goods, and funds is becoming ever more robust. Due to the instant traverse 
of funds in capital markets, companies and investors can now select the 
market with the best conditions and raise and invest funds at places they 
wish. Accordingly international comparability of accounting standards is 
becoming of increased importance as part of business infrastructure 
(Nippon Keidanren, 2006). 
Nippon Keidanren therefore suggest: 
Japan should vitalize the nation's capital market and strengthen corporate 
dynamism while nurturing and developing globally-competitive and high-
quality industry that creates products and services with high added value. 
The key tasks Japan has to tackle now, is to accelerate convergence and to 
realize the mutual recognition of standards among Japan, the United States, 
and Europe by 2009 (Nippon Keidanren, 2006). 
The suggestions made by the Japanese governments in relation to transparency and 
disclosure were congruent with the position taken by Japanese business as 
indicated above. 
255 
In its response to the report of the Japanese delegation, the U.S. delegation is 
positive about the 'substantial progress at this stage of the Structural Impediments 
Initiative (SII) talks' and holds that '[ m ]any of the measures in the interim report 
should contribute to the goals of opening markets, reducing trade and current 
account imbalances, and promoting consumer interests' (Interim Report on SII, p. 
19). At the same time, however, the U.S. delegation points to the need for further 
progress in these areas: 
Additional progress is needed in subsequent SII talks to develop the plans 
and actions more fully in some areas. The effectiveness of the measures 
and commitments will depend upon achieving greater specificity in the 
commitments, and, ultimately, on the actual implementation of measures 
to reduce or eliminate the structural impediments (ibid.) 
In terms of the keiretsu relationships, the U.S. delegation positively highlighted the 
Japanese government's suggestion to increase disclosure requirements and enhance 
the transparency of the keiretsu. At the same time, the U.S. delegation was, 
however, of the opinion that further measures needed to be taken: 
The U.S. government believes that it is essential for the government of 
Japan to build on the commitments enumerated above through additional 
actions and commitments in a number of areas, including: issuance of a 
broader policy statement encouraging the loosening of keiretsu ties; 
further actions to address the cross shareholding issue; measures to 
encourage opening of keiretsu procurement practices; further steps to relax 
or abolish the broad authority of the Government of Japan to restrict 
foreign direct investment and the importation of technology on broad-
economic grounds; and measures to bolster shareholders rights in Japan 
(Interim Report on SII, p. 24). 
Of particular interest in terms of corporate governance is the specific reference to 
'shareholder rights' in the statement of the U. S. delegation, which was not included 
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In the report of the Japanese delegation. The U.S. delegation's reference to 
shareholder rights points to the objective of the firm that underpins the Anglo-
American corporate governance system, namely maximising shareholder wealth. In 
the Japanese corporate governance system the focus is not on shareholder interest 
but employee interest and rights, which is reflected in practice in the objective of 
maintaining long-term growth. Of relevance for the argumentation here is that the 
different focuses evident in the Japanese and Anglo-American corporate 
governance systems (i.e. shareholder interest and employee interest) are linked to 
different employment and management practices (see, for example, Dore, 1998). 
Of significance here in the Japanese context are employment practices such as, for 
example, life-long employment and seniority based pay and promotion. In light of 
the above differences between the Japanese and U.S. corporate system and 
corporate governance system the potential significance of a shift away from 
employee interest and rights to shareholder interest and rights becomes evident. 
The request made by the U. S. government that the Japanese government should 
bolster 'shareholders rights in Japan' (Interim Report on SII, p. 24) thus constituted 
a potential threat to Japanese business practices and the Japanese community firm. 
Moreover, such a change in business practices could also have a significant impact 
on peoples' well-being, for example, if life-long employment was to be replaced by 
more short-term employment practices (subter). Iha (1991) explains that the 
suggestions made by the U.S. were a threat to the Japanese way of life because of 
the change in economic policy they implied. She points out that Japan's emphasis 
traditionally has been to put industry first and then customers. The argumentation 
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of the U.S., however, reversed this emphasis: customers had to be considered first 
and industry second. Such a change in focus, according to Iha (1991), potentially 
jeopardises policies that would protect employees. 
It is of note that in the Interim Report on SII the term corporate governance is not 
specifically mentioned although issues related to corporate governance are more 
evidently addressed. 93 These include shareholder rights, transparency and 
accounting disclosures and mergers and acquisition rules. These issues feature 
prominently in debates on the Japanese corporate governance system in the 1990s 
and the beginning of the twenty first century. In addition to corporate governance 
issues the Interim Report on SII also identifies characteristics of the Japanese 
business system, such as keiretsu and cross-shareholdings, as areas that needed 
change. In subsequent debates, these characteristics of the Japanese business 
system became even more of a focus of the U.S. critique of the Japanese corporate 
governance system. 
93 At first glance it might be surprising that there is no specific reference to the term "corporate 
governance" in the Interim Report on SIl, given that the Japanese corporat.e governance system 
subsequently became such an important issue of debate between the two natIOn states. A possible 
reason for this might be that, at the time of the talks, corporate governance had not yet reached the 
level of importance in public policy debate that it was to reach especially after the publication of 
the Cadbury Report in 1992 and in the light of spectacular corporate frauds in the U.S. and U.K. 
(Mallin,2006b). 
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7.2.1.2. Japan Structural Impediments Initiative Joint Report (1990)94 
The U.S.-Japan Working Group on the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) 
issued its Joint Report on SII on 28 June 1990 (U.S.-Japan Working Group on the 
Structural Impediments Initiative, 1990b). The Working Group points to the 
significance of the Structural Impediments Initiative at the beginning of its Joint 
Report: 
The Working Group believes that this report is a historic document that 
contains significant, extensive efforts and actions on both sides. These 
actions should complement the economic policy coordination efforts 
which have been made through multilateral fora and should contribute to a 
reduction in external payments imbalances. In this regard, it is to be noted 
that while the large external imbalances of the two countries have shown 
substantial reduction in recent years, the two Governments are strongly 
committed to make efforts for the further reduction of their respective 
external imbalances. The above mentioned actions [i.e. those related to the 
structural impediments] should also lead to more efficient, open and 
competitive markets, promote sustained economic growth and enhance the 
quality of life in both Japan and the United States. Both Governments are 
firmly committed to achieve these goals (Joint Report on SII, p. 2). 
The Joint Report on SII again contained the reports by the Japanese and the U.S. 
delegation. This time, however, neither delegation commented on the other party's 
report. These comments had ostensibly already been taken into account in 
finalising the Joint Report. 
The report of the Japanese delegation in the Joint Report on SII evidenced an 
important difference compared to its report in the Interim Report on SII: whereas 
94 This report (U.S.-Japan Working Group on the Structural Impediments Initiative, 1990b) is in the 
following referred to as Joint Report on SlI. 
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the Interim Report listed measures that were to be taken by the Japanese 
Government to resolve the structural impediments, the Joint Report already 
reported on specific measures that had already been taken since the publication of 
the Interim Report in April 1990. For example, the Interim Report mentioned that 
the Japanese Government intended to strengthen the function of the Fair Trade 
Commission (FTC) (Interim Report on SII, p. 15). In the Joint Report, just two 
months later, the Japanese Delegation already referred to the recommendations of 
the Advisory Group on Distribution Systems, Business Practices and Competition 
Policy, which had been established by the FTC to look into 'the continuity and 
exclusiveness of the transactions among companies in the same keiretsu group 
whether or not cross shareholding is involved' (Joint Report on SII, p. 14). The 
Japanese delegation also referred to measures already taken and still to be taken to 
facilitate and foster foreign direct investment in Japan with the objective of 
reducing preferential group trade, which had been highlighted as a negative 
characteristic of keiretsu relationships by the U.S. administration and U.S. business 
interests and investors. The Japanese delegation reported: 
Furthermore, advisory offices for the promotion of foreign direct 
investment in Japan are to be set up in the overseas representative offices 
of the Japan Development Bank (JDB) in order to support foreign 
companies investing in Japan in co-operation with Embassies, Consulates-
general and the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) offices 
(Joint Report on SII, pp. 15-165). 
The Japanese Government had also acted speedily and taken into account criticisms 
of its Take-Over Bid System. Whereas in the Interim Report the Japanese 
delegation referred to the Japanese Government's plan 'to submit a bill to this Diet 
260 
session' (Interim Report on SII, p. 16), in the Joint Report it could already report 
that the Japanese Government had submitted to the Diet a Bill, which had been 
approved on 15 June 1990 (Joint Report on SII, p. 16). The Interim Report referred 
to the Japanese Government's intention to enhance the disclosure requirements and 
to reach a conclusion on the introduction of the 5 percent rule before the final SII 
report is submitted (Interim Report on SII, p. 17), whereas the Joint Report on SII 
already stated that the Bill had been passed and that 'the new rule would also 
require continuing reporting as investors above the five percent threshold acquire 
and dispose of blocks of shares in an amount equal to one percent or more' (ibid, p. 
16). In addition to this change, the Japanese Government reported that it also had 
arrived at further measures to be taken to enhance the disclosure requirements of 
keiretsu. These measures were to cover, for example, related-party transactions, 
consolidated statements and segmental reporting (ibid.). 
An additional major and significant difference in relation to the Interim Report was 
that the Joint Report now contained a reference to shareholders' rights, which the 
U.S delegation in its comments on the Interim Report had highlighted as being 
missing from the report of the Japanese delegation. We thus can find in the Joint 
Report the following statement by the Japanese government: 
The Committee on Legislation will examine the Company Law with a 
view to enhancing disclosure requirements and shareholders' rights, and to 
simplifying mergers and acquisition processes (p. 16). 
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The reference to shareholders constituted a challenge to the traditional Japanese 
view whereby shareholders' rights were perceived as less important than the rights 
of employees. As has been explained above, although the Commercial Code 
emphasised the shareholders as owners of the company, in practice the perception 
of management and society more generally was that employees were the key 
constituents of the corporate organisation (Inagami and Whittaker, 2005). Company 
objectives were focused on achieving long-term and sustainable growth rather than 
immediately on short-term profit maximisation. The inclusion of shareholders' 
rights into the statement of the Japanese government was of significance for the 
broader debate as it could have been interpreted as a submission of the Japanese 
government to the view that Japanese practices should be changed through 
implementing U.S. practices. 
7.2.1.3. First Annual Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) Report (1991)95 
In order to monitor the progress of the SII the Working Group agreed a follow-up 
process. The group was to meet 'three times in the first year and twice a year 
thereafter' to review progress on the issues identified in its Final Report on S11 and, 
if necessary, discuss new plans for action in problem areas. In addition, the 
Working Group was to publish an Annual Report on SII in the spring of each year. 
It was planned to review this follow-up process three years after the release of the 
Final Report on S11 (Final Report on SIL p.2). In May 1991, the First Annual 
95 This report (U.S.-Japan Working Group on the Structural Impediments Initiative, 1991) is referred 
in the following as First Annual Report on SII. 
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Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) Report was issued. In its joint Press Release, 
the Working Group was positive about the progress made by both governments and 
its impact on the economy and people more generally: 
We believe that the attached report contains progress to date regarding the 
implementation of the measures of both governments listed in the Joint 
Report that should contribute to the reduction of payments imbalances. 
These measures should also lead to more efficient, competitive, and open 
markets, promote sustained economic growth and enhance the quality of 
life in both Japan and the United States (First Annual Report on SII, p. 1) 
In relation to the structural impediments associated with keiretsu relationships, the 
Japanese delegation highlighted the progress made in facilitating Foreign Direct 
Investment. A Bill to amend provisions of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign 
Trade Control Law with a view to minimise restrictions and to 'ensure fair and 
equitable access' to the Japanese market was submitted to the Diet on 26 February 
1991 and enacted on 19 April 1991 (First Annual Report on SII). 
In terms of the enhancement of disclosure requirements - referred to in the Final 
Report on S1I - the Japanese delegation could report significant progress. A Bill to 
amend the Securities and Exchange Law so as to introduce the 5 percent rule was 
approved by Diet in June 1990 with the new requirement becoming effective on 1 
December 1990 (ibid.). In addition, several other steps had been taken by the 
Japanese government since the publication of the Joint Report on SII: 
Among the measures to enhance the disclosure requirements related to the 
Keiretsu problem, in relation to enhancement of reporting of related-party 
transactions, disclosure of the consolidated financial statement in the 
primary annual statement and inclusion of sales amounts by major 
customers in unconsolidated financial report, the Government of Japan 
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promulgated a ministerial ordinance on December 25, 1990 that 
incorporated the whole contents that were stated in the SII Final Report. 
These measures have been implemented from the business year beginning 
on or after April 1, 1991. The rule of segmented financial reporting that 
incorporates the whole contents that were stated in the SII Final Report 
has also been implemented from the business year beginning on or after 
April 1, 1990 (First Annual Report on SII). 
The Japanese Government did not intend to stop here although all the Issues 
identified in the Final Report on S11 had already been addressed and solved: 
Recognizing the character and structure of segmental reporting 
requirements in other industrial countries the GOl thinks it important to 
make further enhancements of these requirements consistent with 
international efforts in harmonization of disclosure requirements (First 
Annual Report on SII). 
The above two citations indicate a great willingness of the Japanese Government to 
put measures into place to enhance the disclosure practice of keiretsu. Interestingly, 
such an eagerness to comply with the requirements of the U.S. administration is not 
evident in all areas of the structural impediments identified by the U.S. 
The Japanese government also appeared to have taken into account the request by 
the U.S. administration to focus on shareholders' rights. To this effect, the 
Legislative Council began to examine the Company Law with a view to enhancing 
'disclosure requirements and shareholders' rights' (First Annual Report on SII). In 
addition, the issue of simplifying merger and acquisition procedures was also 
discussed by the Legislative Council. In terms of the enhancement of shareholders' 
rights, the Japanese delegation could report: 
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The Legislative Council is also exammmg the enhancement of the 
disclosure requirements in the Company law [spelling in original], as well 
as the enhancement of the shareholders' rights. This includes facilitating 
the system of derivative lawsuits and improving shareholder access to 
corporate financial books and records (First Annual Report on SII). 
The Japanese delegation also pointed to the sense of urgency that the Japanese 
government appeared to have in terms of arriving at a speedy solution for these 
issues of concern: 
The Japanese Government will make its best efforts to accelerate the 
deliberation process of the Legislative Council so that the conclusions 
may be reached as soon as possible. Immediately after receiving the 
Legislative Council's recommendations, legislation will be introduced in 
the Diet. The GOJ will explain on the progress of the Legislative 
Council's review in the 1992 follow-up meeting of the SII (First Annual 
Report on SII). 
The comments of the U.S. delegation on the report of the Japanese delegation are 
of interest. The response begins by pointing to the benefits for Japan from 
implementing the commitments as summarised in the Joint Report on Sff: 
These measures, if fully implemented and extended, should result in a 
more open, fair and transparent Japanese economic system. They should 
also benefit Japanese consumers, shareholders, importers, potential 
homeowners and small producers (First Annual Report on SII). 
After acknowledging 'progress in a number of areas', the U.S. delegation argues 
that 'additional progress in all areas is necessary in order to contribute further to 
the goals of opening markets, reducing trade and current accounts balances, and 
improving the quality of life in Japan' (ibid.). The U.S. delegation argued: 
Among areas where progress has been disappointing are exclusionary 
business practices and - keiretsu. In particular, the Government of Japan 
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should take additional steps to reinforce the antimonopoly enforcement 
regime so that it will effectively deter anti competitive practices. In 
addition, substantial additional actions are needed to make keiretsu 
relationships more open and transparent, by, for example, addressing 
anticompetitive aspects of cross-shareholding, strengthening shareholders' 
rights, and encouraging stricter exchange listening requirements (First 
Annual Report on SII). 
It will be of interest to see if and how the Japanese government reacted to these 
criticisms and further demands by the U. S. delegation. 
Analysis of the First Annual Report on SII indicates that the Japanese government 
had made attempts to enhance disclosure and that it also had embraced 
shareholders rights. In contrast, the Japanese government had suggested little 
changes in relation to keiretsu and cross-shareholding. This is not so surprising if 
one considers that cross-shareholding is a key component of the Japanese corporate 
system. A change in cross-shareholding would mean a change of the corporate 
system, which in turn would affect the Japanese corporate governance system. 
7.2.1.4. Second Annual Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) Report (1992)96 
The Second Annual Report on SII is of interest as it further expands on disclosure 
requirements for keiretsu. This seems to be a response to the criticism voiced by 
the U.S. delegation about the rate of progress of the Japanese government in terms 
of implementing the commitments, which were outlined in the Final Report on SII. 
96 This report (U.S.-Japan Working Group on the Structural Impediments Initiative, 1992) is referred 
to in the following as Second Annual Report on Sll. 
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In the First Annual Report on SII the Japanese delegation had indicated that the 
Japanese government was concerned to further enhance segmental reporting. Now 
the Japanese delegation was able to be more specific in terms of the implications of 
the government's intention: 
The GOJ considers it important to further improve the scope of segmented 
disclosure requirements and recognizes that standards of disclosure in 
other major industrial countries include information by overseas 
subsidiaries by geographic regions (Second Annual Report on SII). 
In order to enhance 'the disclosure requirements and the shareholders' rights in the 
Commercial Law' the Legislative Council had continued discussing issues 
addressed in the last annual report, such as 'improving shareholders' access to 
corporate financial books and records by relaxing share requirements needed for 
access to a meaningful extent, and facilitating derivative lawsuits' (ibid.). The 
Legislative Council also continued 'its re-examination of restrictions on the 
companies' repurchase and holding of their own shares' (ibid). 
The Second Annual Report also makes reference to shareholder meetings, the 
character of which had been heavily criticised by Western commentators. They had 
held that these meetings were staged and did not allow shareholders to adequately 
address their concerns. In addition, all Annual General Meetings (AGM) were 
traditionally taking place at the same time, which made it impossible for 
shareholders to attend more than one AGM. In the Japanese context of cross-
shareholding and the main bank system, AGMs traditionally were not the main 
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source of shareholder control. In the light of such criticism, the Japanese delegation 
was concerned to give reassurance: 
The Government of Japan expects that the Japanese Companies will 
operate shareholders' meetings properly according to the provisions of the 
Commercial Law. The GOJ confirms that the Commercial Law enables 
shareholders to exercise their voting rights through their proxies and to 
exercise them disunitedly, and it also expects that the parties concerned 
will give their careful considerations to avoid possible obstacles to the 
exercise of shareholders' voting rights by foreign shareholders (Second 
Annual Report on SII).97 
In summary, similar to the First Annual Report the Second Annual Report put an 
emphasis on Japanese actions in relation to disclosure and to shareholder rights, 
especially voting rights. 
It is of interest that according to the initial agreement of the Japan-Us. Working 
Group on the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) in 1989 it had been envisaged 
that there would be another year of biannual meetings and the publication of a 
Third Annual Report in spring 1993, which would report on the progress made by 
the U.S. and Japanese governments in solving the structural problems, which had 
been identified in the Final Report on SI1. A Third Report, however, never 
materialised as the Bush administration was superseded by the Clinton 
administration in 1993. Consequently the Structural Impediments Initiative was 
terminated. 
97 The copy of the Second Annual Report on SII that is available does not include any comments of 
the U.S. delegation on the progress made by the Japanese government. 
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In summary, although the term "corporate governance" was not mentioned in the 
SII documents, characteristics of the Japanese business context and the Japanese 
corporate governance system were addressed in the documents issued during the 
initiative. As had been argued above, the concern with keiretsu, and relatedly cross-
shareholding, is a concern with aspects of the Japanese business context. 
References to disclosure requirements, merger and acquisition rules, the nature of 
shareholder meetings and voting rights, which were issues addressed in the 
negotiations are all important characteristics of the Anglo-American corporate 
governance system. These issues were deemed important by the U.S. 
administration in the context of its objectives to open up the Japanese market to 
U.S. investors and firms, to reduce the payments imbalances between the two 
nation states and to promote 'more efficient, open and competitive markets in 
Japan and the United States' (First Annual Report on SII). Changes implemented 
by the Japanese government regarding these areas were part of broader 
liberalisation attempts in Japan starting in the early 1980s (see, for example, Hall, 
1998; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001; Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008). They also reflect 
concerns especially expressed by Japanese business (Nippon Keidanren, 2006). 
The SII was not successful in terms of the basic objectives it had set out to achieve. 
There was some success in solving problems on the micro-level. Yet, the major 
macroeconomic issues that the U.S administration had been put under pressure to 
resolve in negotiations with the Japanese government still remained: Japan's trade 
surplus with the U.S. and the U.S. trade deficit with Japan had not altered with the 
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Japanese market still not fully open to foreign investors. It is of note that the 
bursting of the Japanese bubble economy in 1990 and the beginning of a recession 
had at this point in time not yet impacted upon the nature of the relationship 
between the U.S. and Japan. The incoming Clinton administration thus needed to 
urgently address the Japan problem (Tsushima, 2006, p.13l). The next section of 
the chapter focuses on the attempts of the Clinton administration to engage in trade 
negotiations with the Japanese government and aims to gain insights into the debate 
over corporate governance in the context of the new U. S. administration. 
7.2.2. Japan-United States Framework for a New Economic Partnership: The 
Framework Talks (1993-1995) 
The Clinton administration, being aware that the Structural Impediments Initiative 
(SII) had not achieved significant results for the U.S., began negotiations with the 
Japanese government in which it pursued a strategy of getting the Japanese 
government to accept numerical targets (Tsushima, 2006, p.13l). A new agreement 
with Japan, the Japan-United States Framework for a New Economic Partnership 
(Framework) 98, was negotiated. This framework was agreed by President Clinton 
and Prime Minister Miyazawa in their meeting in April 1993. The goals of the 
Framework were set out in a joint statement as follows: 
The Framework provides a structure for an ongoing set of consultations 
anchored in biannual meetings of the Heads of Government. The goals of 
98 The Japan-United States Framework/or a New Economic Partnership (1993) is in the following 
referred to as Framework. 
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this Framework are to deal with structural sectoral issues in order 
subsequently to increase access and sales of competitive foreign goods 
and services through market-opening and macroeconomic measures; to 
increase investment; and to promote international competiveness; and to 
enhance bilateral economic cooperation between the United States and 
Japan. 
The above statement reflects U.S. concern - as in the case of the SII - to achieve 
the further opening of the Japanese market to U.S. firms and investors and to 
reduce the trade imbalances between the two countries. The following commitment 
for Japan was outlined in the Framework: 
Japan will actively pursue the medium-term objectives of promoting 
strong and sustainable domestic demand-led growth and increasing the 
market access of competitive foreign goods and services, intended to 
achieve, over the medium term, a highly significant decrease in its current 
account surplus, and to promote a significant increase in global imports of 
goods and services, including from the United States (Framework). 
The Framework outlines areas of Sectoral and Structural Consultations and 
Negotiations, such as, for example, Government Procurement, Regulatory Reform 
and Competitiveness and Economic Harmonization. Specific arrangements made 
under the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) are to be absorbed into the areas 
covered by the Framework as appropriate. The Framework states that these areas 
will have working groups attached, which consider issues in detail. The area of 
particular interest in the context of corporate governance is Regulatory Reform and 
Competitiveness and its respective working group. Before an analysis of some of 
the documents, which were issued under the auspices of the Working Group on 
Regulatory Reform and Competiveness is provided, a brief discussion of the 
difficulties the Clinton administration experienced when changing its negotiating 
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strategy - from the Bush approach of emphasising macroeconomic issues to an 
approach of setting precise targets in specific areas of the Japanese economy - is 
offered. Insights into these issues provide interesting instances of resistance on the 
part of the Japanese government to proposals made by the U.S. government. 
Tensions soon arose between the negotiating partners because of the changes in the 
U.S. negotiating strategy and the new emphasis on targets. The Japanese 
government wanted to negotiate issues in an abstract way rather than negotiating 
issues on an individual basis as it was of the opinion that structural negotiations do 
not require specific numerical targets. 99 Satake (1994, 2000) argues that this 
difference in negotiating style reflected the different positions of the Republican 
Party and the Democratic Party in terms of trade policy, namely, free trade versus 
protective trade. Reflecting the Democrats' principle of protective trade, President 
Clinton extensively pressurised Japan to open its market, threatening to invoke 
Section 301 of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (Satake, 1994, 
2000). According to Satake (2000) and Shimizu (2007), the U.S. required the 
setting of a numerical target on each of the issues under discussion. The Japanese 
government, however, refused to set such targets, and the Japan-US summit 
meeting, which took place in January 1994, failed to come to an agreement over the 
setting of the targets (Shimizu, 2007). As no agreement had been reached on the 
automobile and automobile parts area at the summit meeting, President Clinton 
revived Section 301 of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act in order 
99 Satake (2000, p. 73) points out that the Japanese government seemed to anticipate that the 
Clinton administration would introduce its strategy of emphasising targets. 
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to adopt a hard-line attitude towards Japan (Tateyama, 2005, p.172). Satake (2000) 
argues that the U. S. strategy towards Japan seemed to have been affected by the 
refusal of the Japanese government to accept numerical targets in the negotiations 
and by its subsequent appeal to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) about the 
U. S. sanctions that had been imposed. This approach of the Japanese government 
was a change in strategy away from bilateral negotiations to multilateral 
negotiations utilising the WTO (Satake, 2000; Wakasugi, 2007). The Clinton 
administration's aggressive foreign policy towards Japan was criticised by other 
Asian and European countries (Satake, 2000, p.84). Within Japan there was also 
criticism of the way the Japanese government had dealt with the demands of the 
U.S. administration. Critics within had argued that although Japan had refused to 
set numerical targets the actions taken by the Japanese government had not been 
appropriate (Ikejima, 1994; Tateyama, 2005, Shimizu, 2007). 
The Japan- US Framework for New Economic Partnership (Nichibei Houkatsu 
Keizai Kyougi) was concluded in 1995 with agreements reached in some areas. 
Agreements in the automobile area and automobile parts, however, could not be 
reached, which resulted in the above crisis. 
This crisis was subsequently resolved in high level meetings with Hashimoto, the 
Minister of International Trade and Industry, and Kantor, the Head of United States 
Trade Representative (USTR), compromising their claims. Having reached an 
agreement in most areas, including government procurement of medical equipment, 
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telecommunications and financial services (Satake, 2000, pp.75-76), the Japan-US 
Framework for New Economy Partnership (Nichibei Houkatsu Keizai Kyougi) was 
terminated in 1995. Both governments, however, agreed to continue the dialogue 
on deregulation and competition policy. Many of the issues addressed in the 
Japan-US Framework for New Economy Partnership (Nichibei Houkatsu Keizai 
Kyougi) , however, remained unaddressed. Both governments did agree to monitor 
the degree of implementation of the issues that had been agreed in the negotiations 
(Satake, 2000). Having provided a brief summary of some of the main issues of 
conflict in the bilateral trade negotiations under the Clinton administration an 
analysis of documents issued in the context of the bilateral trade negotiations 
during the Clinton era is offered below so as to bring out developments and 
changes in the debate. 
The U.S. government made annual recommendations 100 regarding issues of 
deregulation and administrative reform in Japan to the Japanese government in the 
context of the Deregulation and Competition Policy Working Group, which had 
been established under the Framework (Submission, 1994). The Submission of 
1994 was written in a context where Japan, in the process of 'formulating a five-
100 The annual recommendations, entitled Submission by the Government of the United States to the 
Government of Japan Regarding Deregulation and Administrative Reform in Japan, are in the 
following referred to as Submission. Since the Submission in 1994, the U.S. government has issued 
recommendations and requests on an annual basis. These recommendations were issued even as 
new initiatives were launched and the Clinton administration was superseded by the Bush 
administration in 2001. In the context of new initiatives the titles of the Submissions were changed 
so as to reflect the new initiatives (see Table 10). The submissions of the U.S. government over the 
period from 1994 to 2007 and the reports of the actions taken by the Japanese government in light 
of the submissions are one part of the empirical focus of the remaining part of the chapter. The 
other part of the empirical focus are the documents published in the context of specific initiatives. 
The emphasis in the analysis is on the way in which corporate governance issues feature in these 
documents. 
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year deregulation action programme' 101, had asked foreign governments for inputs 
regarding deregulation matters (Submission, 1994). In its Submission the U.S. 
government states: 
The attached paper is intended as an initial list of proposals and requests 
made by the Government of the United States. Because deregulation needs 
to be an ongoing process responsive to the ever-changing marketplace, the 
United States may submit additional requests or proposals as the 
Government of Japan continues the process of formulating and 
implementing the action pro gam (Submission, 1994). 
The Submission of 1994 sets out recommendations regarding basic principles and 
the deregulation process as well as 'deregulation proposals' for specific sectors, 
such as, for example, 'Agricultural-Related, Automobile and Automotive Parts, 
Construction Materials, Distribution-Related, Energy Production and Delivery, 
Financial Services and Telecommunications/Information Systems' (Submission 
1994). This detailed listing of specific areas is indicative of a change in policy 
away from an emphasis on general macro-economic issues towards a more specific 
targeting of what were perceived to be problem areas. The Submission of 1994 
contains no specific reference to issues related to corporate governance. The 
Submission of 1995, 102 however, makes reference, although limited, to some 
characteristics of the Japanese business context and of corporate governance. In the 
Framework Agreement both governments had negotiated the deregulation of the 
Japanese insurance sector, which included 'measures relating to the distribution 
and purchase of insurance within "Keiretsu" groupings ... and a variety of measures 
101 The Japanese government intended to finalise its deregulation action programme by March 1995. 
102 "Submission 1995" refers to Submission of the Government of the United States to the Government 
of Japan Regarding Deregulation, Administrative Reform and Competition Policy in Japan (1995). 
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related to transparency' (Submission 1995). In its submission, the U.S. government 
announced that its 'focus, in the near term, will be on the effective implementation 
of this agreement' (Submission 1995). The Submission of 1996 contains more 
detailed and specific recommendations. Of interest in terms of corporate 
governance is that disclosure and accounting practices are recommended for the 
financial services sector: 'Enhance financial disclosure and accounting standards, 
as well as transparency of the financial regulatory process' (Submission 1996). In 
its Submission in 1997, the U.S. government states that deregulation of the 
Japanese financial services sector so far has been 'very satisfactory' and maintains 
that the '[ t ]he measures and liberalizations carried out under the agreement have 
resulted in substantially improved commercial opportunities for foreign financial 
services providers in the Japanese market' (Submission 1997, p. 6). The U.S. 
government, however, advocates that there is a need for 'improved transparency in 
the financial services sector' and recommends that the government of Japan should: 
Adopt international standards in the design and tax treatment of financial 
instruments so as to encourage the widest possible internationalization of, 
and foreign participation in, the Japanese financial market (ibid.) 
The reference to international standards of accounting in the context of financial 
instruments indicates that these standards are seen as playing a vital role in 
encouraging foreign investment. 
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7.2.3. U.S.-Japan Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy 
(Enhanced Initiative) (1997)103 
In 1997 Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton launched a new initiative, 
the u.s.-Japan Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy 
(Enhanced Initiative) (Nichibei Kisei Kanwa Taiwa).104 Both countries agreed to 
set up working committees in each of the areas that formed the basis of the 
negotiations (for example, information technology, telecommunications and 
agriculture). The negotiations focused on the micro-level rather than the macro-
level, which was different from the approach taken in the case of the SII (Yamazaki, 
2006, p.1). Yamazaki (2006, p. 9) argues that this time such an approach did not 
cause tensions because of the booming economy in the U.S. and the low standing 
of Japan as a trade partner and Japan's continuous commitment to economic reform 
(Yamazaki, 2006, p.9). Further, another important contextual factor shaping the bi-
lateral trade negotiations was a push towards further liberalisation and 
marketisation on the part of the Japanese government between 1996 and 1998 (the 
so-called Japanese Big Bang; see, for example, Hall, 1998, 139-158; Hoshi and 
Kashyap, 2001, pp. 267-304), a move especially welcomed by the U.S government. 
The Second Joint Report (1999) refers to the progress made by the Japanese 
government in terms of the deregulation of the financial system: 
103 The u.s.-Japan Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and Competition Policy (Enhanced 
Initiative) is in the following referred to as Enhanced Initiative. 
104 During this initiative joint status reports were issued after the end of each annual cycle, which 
summarised the progress made by both governments in implementing the measures of the Enhanced 
Initiative and outlined any measures that still needed to be taken. The U.S. government also 
continued its Submission to the Japanese government under the Enhanced Initiative (see Table 11). 
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The Japanese financial system reform program (the so-called Japanese 
"Big Bang"), which was started at the initiative of former Prime Minister 
Hashimoto in November 1996, aims at revitalizing the Japanese financial 
markets through fundamental financial liberalization and deregulation 
based upon the principles of "Free, Fair, and Global." The Financial 
System Reform Law, which incorporates most of the measures in the 
reform, went into effect on December 1, 1998. The Government of the 
United States welcomes this progress. 
In terms of financial disclosure, which was the main corporate governance issue of 
the first few years of the new initiative, this meant: 
And: 
Enhanced disclosure by financial institutions to market participants, such 
as adoption of disclosure standards for non-performing loans similar to 
those of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (phased in from 
the business year beginning on and after April 1, 1997) (Second Joint 
Report, 1999, p.11). 
Enhancement of the disclosure such as shift to the framework of the 
disclosure primarily based on consolidated accounting (phased in from the 
business year beginning on and after April 1, 1998) (ibid., p. 12) 
The above developments indicate a further move towards convergence in the area 
of accounting disclosure. 
Of particular interest in terms of possible challenges to the Japanese corporate 
system and the Japanese corporate governance system in the context of the bi-
lateral trade negotiations is the following passage from a joint statement by the U.S. 
and Japan: 
In today's increasingly integrated world economy, it is becoming more 
important to address consumers' interests in expanded choices of products 
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and services that are readily available at lower prices, through enhanced 
competition and improved market access opportunities. With a view to 
meeting consumers' interests and to improving market access for foreign 
companies and foreign goods and services, the President and the Prime 
Minister decided in April 1997 to strengthen the dialogue between and 
reinforce the efforts of their governments with regard to deregulation and 
competition policy under the US-JAPAN Framework for a New Economic 
Partnership ("Framework"). This Enhanced Initiative on Deregulation and 
Competition Policy ("Enhanced Initiative") is intended to carry out that 
decision. 
As Iha (1991) has argued the emphasis on consumers is a Western emphasis and 
challenges the Japanese emphasis on the company, which in Japan is an implicit 
emphasis on employees (cf. Dore, 1998). The focus on consumer interests as well 
as the previously introduced focus on shareholder interests potentially further 
challenges Japanese corporate systems and institutions. Emphasising consumer 
interests can also be seen as a further move towards an Anglo-American market 
philosophy in which consumers play an important role in facilitating the 
functioning of the market mechanism (Iha, 1991). 
A significant shift in the bi-Iateral trade negotiations, in terms of how corporate 
governance issues were discussed, occurred in 2000. In this year the U.S. 
government mentioned the term "corporate governance" for the first time in its 
Submission (Submission, 2000). This constitutes a shift away from a narrow focus 
on accounting disclosure as one component of the corporate governance system to 
the broader concept of corporate governance of which accounting disclosure is an 
important part. 105 There is another significant shift that can be observed in the 
105 This is the case even if in subsequent submissions disclosure requirements in the context of 
financial services were still discussed. 
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Submission of 2000: corporate governance issues are no longer discussed in 
relation to one particular sector (mainly the financial sector in previous documents) 
but for the corporate sector as a whole. This shift in focus can be explained with 
reference to a major development in the regulatory framework, namely the 
Japanese government's revision of the Commercial Code. 106 The U.S. government 
highlights the significance it attributes to the Commercial Code in its Submission of 
2000: 
The Commercial Code plays a central role in ensuring a positive business 
climate in Japan for both domestic and foreign firms. Revision of the 
Commercial code will have a profound effect on the ability of firms to 
structure themselves effectively for modern capital markets and to operate 
efficiently. If done, correctly, revision of the Code should introduce 
greater flexibility in the organization, management and capital structure of 
companies, and improve their efficiency and accountability. The revision 
will also have key implications on the ability of foreign firms to enter and 
operate in the Japanese market. Implementation of these improvements to 
the Commercial Code should have positive effects on revitalizing Japan's 
economy, and therefore should be adopted with the earliest possible 
effective dates within Japan's fiscal 2002. 
Although the U.S. government stresses that the revision of the Commercial Code if 
done properly (i.e. according to Western capitalistic principles, such as, efficiency 
and flexibility) will help Japan to improve its economic situation, it is evident that 
the U.S is itself interested in the opening up of what are perceived from a Western 
perspective to be 'secure' and 'safe' places for Western investors and firms. The 
implications of what is suggested in the above quotes are significant for the 
Japanese context. For example, 'the ability of firms to structure themselves 
effectively for modern capital markets and to operate efficiently' implicitly 
106 The reform of the Commercial Code was scheduled to be completed in 2002. 
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challenges the Japanese concept of the community firm with its emphasis on 
employees and long-term growth rather than an emphasis on efficiency with a view 
to maximisation of profit short-term. Further, modern capital markets referred to in 
the statement by the U.S. government refers to capital markets reflecting Anglo-
American capitalism and its inherent values, i.e. an emphasis on management 
operating in the interests of shareholders rather than as in the Japanese context 
where there is a greater emphasis on management operating in the interests of 
employees (Dore, 1998; Inagami and Whittaker, 2005). The recommendations of 
the U. S. government thus constitute a significant threat to characteristics of 
Japanese management practices (for example, life-long employment and seniority 
based pay) and its corporate system. For the U.S. government, as evident in the 
above citation, the revision of the Commercial Code constitutes an opportunity 'to 
remove the substantial impediments to investment and financial transactions in the 
current Code and to make corporate management more accountable and efficient' 
(Submission 2000, p. 46). The reference to accountability here has to be understood 
in the Western context, namely accountability to shareholders. If one looks at the 
accountability of management of a Japanese firm from a Japanese perspective then 
accountability in practice would mean accountability to employees (Inagami and 
Whittaker, 2005). Further, the call for efficiency by the U.S. government seems to 
be somewhat displaced in the Japanese business context where long-term survival 
of the firm and life-long employment are the objectives that managers have to 
pursue: the Western context of efficiency in the Japanese context seems to thus be 
somewhat misplaced and irrelevant. 
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The U.S. government in its recommendations urges the Japanese government: 
... to ensure that Commercial Code revision takes full account of global 
trends in corporate governance and transactions and to incorporate greater 
flexibility now to anticipate future trends, the Japanese government should 
provide for broad participation in the revision process by both domestic 
and foreign interests affected by the revisions (Submission 2000, p. 46). 
Again, recommending to the Japanese government to 'take full account of global 
trends in corporate governance' can be read as suggesting that the Japanese 
government should take full account of the Anglo-American corporate governance 
system, which has achieved a hegemonic position globally. It is thus reasonable to 
argue that the U.S. government in the context of bilateral trade negotiations has put 
significant pressure on the Japanese government to change the traditional Japanese 
corporate governance system to reflect the Anglo-American corporate governance 
system. 
The U.S. government was quite specific in its recommendations regarding the 
revision of the Japanese Commercial Code. It recommended that the following 
items needed to be considered: corporate capital structure; corporate governance; 
shareholder derivate legislation; facilitating corporate transactions and public input 
into the Commercial Code revision process (Submission 2000, pp. 46-49). The 
detailed recommendations again constitute threats to traditional Japanese practices. 
Interestingly, accounting disclosure is seen as an important means to protect 
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shareholder and markets. In this context, the U.S. government recommends that the 
Japanese government: 
Eliminat[es] many of the current restrictions on a company's capital 
structure, relying instead on improved corporate disclosure - such as 
through new accounting standards and the Securities Exchange Law - to 
address shareholder and market protection concerns (ibid., p. 46). 
In relation to corporate governance, the U. S. administration focuses on the 
following key items of the Anglo-American corporate governance system: the 
composition and role of the board of directors; the role of independent directors; 
shareholder meetings; the disclosure of information; and incentive structures. The 
U.S. government 'recommends that the Japanese Government ensures that [these] 
items are addressed in the revision' (ibid., p. 46). 
The U.S. government highlights the importance of 'increasing the independence, 
responsibility and accountability of corporate boards, including by adopting 
enabling mechanism and establishing appropriate incentives' (ibid, p. 47). The 
suggestions concerning the composition of the board of directors, i.e. increase the 
number of independent directors on the board, reflects the Anglo-American 
perception that independent directors are an important, if not most important, 
control mechanism or monitoring mechanism in the context of the corporate 
governance system (Mallin, 2007). This emphasis on the control role or monitoring 
role of independent directors is also reflected in the recommendation that '[b ]oard 
committees composed of independent directors' should be introduced, which would 
make decisions on important governance items such as compensation, nomination 
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of officers and directors, and audits' (ibid., p. 47). Further, reflecting Anglo-
American views, the U.S. government also recommends incentive structures to 
encourage the introduction of such committees: 
Incentives to use such committees could be in the realise from other 
mechanisms that serve the same purpose. For example, a company opting 
to have an audit committee of independent directors would not need to 
have statutory auditors (kansayaku). This change would be part of a 
general effort to make corporate management more transparent, 
accountable and efficient (ibid.) 
With regard to shareholder rights it is recommended that the Japanese government 
take 'measures to ensure that shareholders meetings for public companies are 
scheduled on dates which are not clearly inconvenient for many shareholders to 
attend' (ibid.). In terms of disclosure, the U.S. government suggests: 
... [i]ncreasing the information that publicly listed companies are required 
to disclosure and make available to shareholders, directors and auditors. 
Consistent with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, at a 
minimum, corporations should disclose information, the omission of mis-
statement of which would influence the economic decisions taken by users 
of that information (ibid, p. 48)'. 
Of interest is the way in which the U. S. government recommends that the 
Commercial Code should be revised: 
Revising the Commercial Code so that it flexibly enables and supports 
market-driven transactions, rather than set overly proscriptive rules for 
both governance and transactions ... (ibid.). 
One example of such an approach would be: 
Requiring the use of outside statutory auditors (shagai kansayaku) for 
those publicly listed companies that choose to retain the "kansayaku" 
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system rather than using an audit committee of independent directors 
(ibid). 
Reliance on incentives and market mechanisms' again reflects the Anglo-American 
context and challenges the traditional Japanese reliance on government regulation 
through the law (Oguri and Hara, 1990). This is also evident in the 
recommendation regarding the regulation of the disclosure of accounting 
information. The suggestion is made to the Japanese government to: 
... [s]upplement recent progress in adopting internationally acceptable 
accounting standards with strict enforcement of the implementation of 
those standards (through outside audits and proactive government 
supervision) in order to ensure that a financial statement accurately 
represents the financial position of a company. Provide the flexibility in 
the Commercial Code to allow for the establishment of rules consistent 
with internationally acceptable accounting standards without necessitating 
further changes to the Code itself (ibid., p. 49) 
The emphasis on 'internationally acceptable accounting standards' - lASs and 
lFRSs - again has to be read as 'Anglo-American' (Gallhofer and Haslam, 2007). 
The suggestion that there should be the possibility of establishing accounting rules 
without the due process of changing the Commercial Code indicates a move away 
from the traditional Japanese mode of regulating the disclosure of accounting 
information, i.e. through the state, to a mode in which private sector bodies and the 
accountancy profession would be the dominant forces (Puxty et aI., 1987). Again, 
this reflects the way in which the disclosure of accounting information is regulated 
in the Anglo-American context. Such a move would thus further reduce the control 
of the Japanese government in a socially and economically important area. 
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There is no response in the Fourth Joint Report (June 2001) to these extensive 
corporate governance recommendations made by the U.S government in October 
2000. One reason for this is probably that the work of the committee was 
interrupted by events in the political context of the U.S. 2001 saw a change in 
government in the U.S. - the Clinton administration was superseded by the Bush 
administration. Another, and similar, reason might have been a change of Prime 
Minister in Japan with Prime Minister Koizumi taking office in August 2001 
(Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008, p. 17). Prime Minister Koizumi's term of office had a 
significant impact on the Japanese economy and on Japanese society. Although the 
party in power did not change with the election of Koizumi to Prime Minister, 
policies did change significantly because of the political position of the new Prime 
Minister, who was a strong proponent of market liberalisation (ibid.). 
7.2.4. U.S.-Japan Economic Partnership for Growth (Partnership) (2001-2007) 
The Bush administration quickly resumed its engagement with Japan. President 
Bush and Prime Minister Koizumi launched a new partnership, the Us.-Japan 
Economic Partnership for Growth (Partnership) (June 2001).107 In the context of 
the Partnership the Enhancement Initiative (previously negotiated by the Clinton 
administration in 1997) was replaced by the Regulatory Reform and Competition 
Policy Initiative (Reform Initiative) (Nichibei Kisei Kaikaku oyobi kyousou Seisaku 
Inishiachibu) in June 2001, which was 'designed to promote economic growth by 
107 This agreement is in the following referred to as Partnership. 
286 
focusing on sectoral and cross-sectoral issues related to regulatory reform and 
competition policy' (Partnership, p. 2). The Reform Initiative issued annual 
reports 108, which outlined progress made during the annual cycle. The U.S 
government continued to issue its recommendations to the Japanese government 
regarding its regulatory reform but under the new title of Annual Reform 
Recommendations from the Government of the United States to the Government of 
Japan under the Us. -Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy 
Initiative. 109 In terms of corporate governance issues, it is of interest to gain 
insights into what issues the Annual Reform Recommendations highlighted as 
necessary to be considered by the Japanese government in order to improve the 
Japanese corporate governance system and how the Japanese government 
responded to these requests. The responses of the Japanese government may be 
ascertained from the annual reports for each Regulatory Reform Initiative Cycle. In 
the following, an analysis is offered of these issues raised by the U.S. government 
and the reactions of the Japanese government for the period from 2001 to 2007. 
In its Annual Reform Recommendation of 2001 the U.S. government agam 
highlighted the need for the Japanese government to strengthen the Japanese 
corporate governance system. It particularly stressed that Japanese companies 
should have the option to adopt an Anglo-American corporate governance system: 
108 These annual reports, which were issued as Report to the Leaders on the u.s. -Japan Regulatory 
Reform and Competition Policy Initiative are referred to in the following as Reports. 
109 These documents are in the following referred to as Annual Reform Recommendations. 
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Provide publicly traded companies the option of adopting a corporate 
management structure that includes an executive office system and a board 
committee system in which at least the audit, nomination and 
compensation committees include, at a minimum, a majority of outside 
directors, instead of continuing to use the traditional kansayaku (statutory 
auditor) system (Annual Reform Recommendation 2001, Annex - 35). 
The U.S. government further requested that the term 'outside director' be carefully 
defined and recommended that the Japanese government: 
... [m ]odify the definition of "outside directors" to ensure that such 
directors are truly "independent", including by excluding employees and 
ex-employees of companies with significant cross-shareholders with, or in 
the same keiretsu as, the company (Annual Reform Recommendation 
2001, Annex - 35). 
The U.S. government's concern with keiretsu has been evident since the first 
document issued in the context of the Structural Impediments Initiative in 1989. 
Although concerns about their disclosure practices had been satisfactorily 
addressed by the Japanese government during the bi-Iateral trade negotiations and 
the way it had dealt with the issue of cross-shareholding had not so far met the 
expectations of the U. S. government. The above quote of the U. S. government is of 
particular interest as it indicates that a change in the Japanese corporate governance 
system, i.e., the particular definition of 'truly "independent'" (Annual Reform 
Recommendation 2001, Annex - 35) would constitute a challenge to a key 
component of the Japanese corporate system. 
The First Report to the Leaders on the u.s. -Japan Regulatory Reform and 
Completion Policy Initiative (2002) provides a summary of how the Japanese 
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government had addressed the U.S. recommendations on corporate governance. 
The Report stated that the 'Commercial Code was amended to ~ : 
Introduce a new system of corporate governance, consisting of the board 
of directors, executive or corporate officers, and three committees (the 
audit committee, nominating committee, and compensation committee) 
composed of at least a majority of outside directors, for large corporations. 
If a corporation chooses the new system, there is no requirement to have 
statutory auditors (Kansayaku). This new system enables the board of 
directors to properly delegate substantial management authority to officers 
(Report 2002, p. 33). 
As is evident from the above statement the Japanese government allowed 
companies to introduce an Anglo-American style corporate governance system. It 
is of interest to note that the 'flexible approach' that the U.S government had 
referred to in its 2002 Submission (supra) had been applied in revising the 
Commercial Code as the Code now gave companies the option to change their 
corporate governance system rather than requiring them to change it. The Japanese 
government thus had left it to 'market mechanisms' to provide incentives to 
companies to adopt Anglo-American style corporate governance. Further, the 
Japanese government confirmed that it 'will continue to implement high quality, 
internationally acceptable accounting standards' and also strengthen the 
enforcement of such rules (ibid.). The inclusion of the Anglo-American corporate 
governance system into the Commercial Code in addition to the traditional 
Japanese corporate governance model was portrayed as a major success for the 
Bush junior administration. This success, however, it can be argued, has been 
especially possible because Prime Minister Koizumi himself was influenced by 
neo-liberalism. Cargill and Sakamoto (2008, p. 202) argue that Koizumi's 'policy 
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platform was similar to the market reform and deregulation carried out by Margret 
Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the United States in the 
1980s' and explain that: 
... [t]he central themes of Koizumi's freeform programs were small 
government, deregulation, liberalization, privatization, and devolution. 
These reforms would transform the Japanese economy into a more open 
and flexible market economy with less government intervention and 
regulation, in which free-acting economic actors drive innovation, 
investment, and economic growth through market competition. Typical of 
conservative or neoliberal policy makers in other industrial democracies 
(not necessarily Japanese conservatives), Koizumi wanted to reduce 
government intervention and the amount of resources the government took 
from the private economy (Cargill and Sakamoto, 2008, p. 202). 
It is of note that although the decision to allow Japanese companies to choose 
either the Japanese or the Anglo-American corporate governance system might 
have been motivated by a neoliberaal market philosophy, the way it worked out in 
practice ensured that the Japanese traditional corporate governance system 
remained the dominant corporate governance system by 2007 as only few 
companies chose to adopt the Anglo-American corporate governance system 
Yoshimori (2005, pp. 447-448) reported that in a survey carried out in May 2004 
by the Japan Corporate Auditors Association '86% of member firms in the Japan 
Corporate Auditors Association ... had expressed no intention of adopting this 
structure' . 
In the following years up until 2007 the U.S. government in its Annual Reform 
Recommendations attempted to build on this success and to further refine and 
improve the Japanese governance system with reference to specific corporate 
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governance items. The following key corporate governance items of the Anglo-
American system were addressed during this period: active shareholder and proxy 
voting (adoption of proxy voting policies by pension funds and mutual funds, better 
disclosure of information to facilitate proxy voting; promotion of active 
shareholder, especially institutional investor, voting); protection of minority 
shareholders; protection of whistle blowers (changes in legislation to this effect); 
strengthening of the executive committee and corporate auditor system; and, 
definition of independent directors. 
There are two issues in the Annual Reform Recommendations between 2002 and 
2007 that are of interest in the context of aiming to gain insights into how the U.S. 
government recommendations threaten and challenge the traditional Japanese 
corporate governance system, the Japanese business context and Japanese culture 
more generally. Stressing the need for improved corporate governance in its Annual 
Reform Recommendations of 2002 the U.S. government suggested: 
Good corporate governance will lead to improvements in the performance 
of companies, as management strives to maximize shareholder value 
through increased productivity and sound commercial decisions. Ensuring 
that management is accountable to shareholders, through disclosure of 
information necessary for intelligent voting of proxies and encouragement 
of active shareholder voting; is one of the fundamental aspects of a good 
corporate governance system (Annual Reform Recommendations 2002, 
Annex - 33). 
This statement is of interest as it links good corporate governance with the role of 
managers to maximise shareholder wealth. This statement implicitly suggests that 
any corporate governance system that does not ensure shareholder wealth 
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maximisation is not a good corporate governance system. In other words, the 
traditional Japanese corporate governance system with its emphasis on long-term 
firm survival is by implication not a good corporate governance system. Defining 
the objective of the firm as shareholder maximisation thus potentially threatens the 
Japanese concept of the community firm and Japanese employment practices (such 
as life-long employment and seniority-based pay). Such a threat is also evident in 
the suggestions by the U.S. Government that the Japanese government should 
ensure that' outside directors ... [are] ... truly independent' by: 
Revising the definition of 'outside director' in the Company Law to also 
exclude, at a minimum, persons who (i) have had significant transactions 
with the company or are employees of other companies that have a 
significant business relationship with the company, or (ii) have an 
immediate family member who has had significant transactions with the 
company or is an executive officer in a company that has an significant 
business relationship with the company;... (Annual Reform 
Recommendations 2007, Annex - 27). 
7.3. SUMMARY DISCUSSION 
This chapter has shown that from 1989 to 2007 the U.S. government had ostensibly 
put continuous pressure on the Japanese government to change its corporate 
governance system and adopt the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. 
The pressure to change the corporate governance system was articulated by the U.S. 
government in the context of a concern to achieve deregulation of the Japanese 
economy in order to gain access to the Japanese market for U.S. and other foreign 
investors and firms. Shimizu (2007, p. 33) argues that the structural reforms Japan 
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was undergoing were not motivated from inside Japan but they were, disguised by 
a rhetoric of globalization, undertaken so as to converge the Japanese system 
towards the U.S. system (Shimizu, 2007, p.33). 
It has been argued that the history of the bilateral negotiations between the U.S. 
government and the Japanese government is the history of Japan consistently 
making concessions in response to U.S. demands (Shimizu, 2007p. 27). Satake 
(1994) refers in this context to two interesting interpretations of Japan's positive 
response to U.S. pressure in the context of the SII. First, as Japan always appeared 
to yield to the demands of the U.S., the impression was created that Japan accepted 
U.S. demands without counter arguments. However, Japan's willingness to yield to 
U. S. demands can be interpreted as the Japanese government taking advantage of 
the pressure from the U.S. government (i.e. pressure from outside, Gaiatsu) to 
further pursue its own objective of market liberalisation and deregulation. In other 
words, the Japanese government used Gaiatsu as a rhetorical device to achieve its 
own objectives. Satake (1994) makes here the point that without Gaiatsu it would 
have been difficult for the Japanese government to achieve the market liberalisation 
that it was aiming for. 
On the other hand, criticisms have been made that the U.S. government's attitude 
can be seen as interference into the internal affairs of another country and analyses 
were offered to show that this series of negotiations was intended by the U.S. 
government to achieve a reconstruction of the Japanese system along the lines of 
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the u.s. system. The argument has a particular weight as various aspects of the 
Japanese system and of Japanese practices, which did not relate to the u.s. trade 
deficit problem, also became the subject of the U.S.'s unreasonable demands 
(Satake, 1994, p.117, Shimizu, 2007 p. 27). Shimizu (2007) argues that Japan's 
willingness to yield to U. S. pressure emanated from Japan's unique economic 
development model since the end of W orId War II with its excessive dependency 
on the U.S. in terms of trade and national defence (Shimizu, 2007, p.27). As Dore 
(2003) has pointed out 'trade dependencies are real dependencies'. It was in the 
context of the unequal power relationship between the U.S. and Japan that Japan's 
response to U.S. demands has to be understood (Suzuki, 1989, p.56). 
Ikejima (1994) argues that SII recommendations were reflected in the revision of 
the Commercial Code, which took effect from 1 st October 1993. In this respect he 
points to three issues in the amended Commercial Code: first, the reinforcement of 
the monitoring function by shareholders, especially minority shareholders; second, 
the strengthening of the audit function; third, the revision of the corporate board 
system. The revised Commercial Code contained simplified class action lawsuit 
procedures (i.e. reduction in costs), the extension of the term of a corporate auditor, 
an increase in the number of corporate auditors in large companies and the 
establishment of external auditors and a board of corporate auditors (Ikejima, 1994, 
p.75). For Ikejima (1994), the changes in the revised Commercial Code indicated 
that the Japanese government had accepted the U.S. demands. Demise (1997, p. 13) 
also holds that the extension of the term of corporate auditors, an increase in the 
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number of corporate auditors in large companies, the establishment of external 
auditors and the board of corporate auditors were the result of the U.S. pressure 
(Gaiatsu). Kikuchi (1991) refers to the Bill for amending the Securities and 
Exchange Law, which was passed on lSth June 1990 and was promulgated 22nd 
June 1990, as evidence of the Japanese government taking into account U.S. 
recommendations. An important aspect of this revision of the law was the set of 
regulations concerning mergers and acquisitions. As the U.S. government had been 
interested in increasing direct investment in Japan it had been keen to improve the 
information disclosure in the context of takeover bids (Kikuchi, 1991, p.S1). 
Tateyama (200S) points out that the U.S. had identified over two hundred structural 
items in the context of the SII negotiations, which it had required the Japanese 
government to address and that the Japanese government generally accepted these 
suggestions. Further, Tateyama (200S, p. 171) concludes that the pressure of the 
U.S. administration on the Japanese government had facilitated the crisis of 
Japanese capitalism. 
The next chapter of this study, chapter 8, focuses on the attempt of a private 
interest group, the Japan Corporate Governance Forum, to respond to the pressure 
to change the Japanese corporate governance system and to adopt the Anglo-
American corporate governance system by establishing a set of Japanese Corporate 
Governance Principles that would constitute good practice. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES OF THE JAPAN 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FORUM 
During the 1990s, the Japanese corporate governance system had become the focus 
of critique as a consequence, on the one hand, of developments in Japan, notably 
the economic crisis, corporate failures and corporate scandals (supra), and, on the 
other, a more general concern about corporate governance, which was at the time 
especially evident in the U.K. and the U.s. (see, for example, Mallin, 2007; 
Solomons, 2007). Much of the critique of the Japanese corporate governance 
system from outside of Japan especially reflected a particular perspective, which 
took as its benchmark the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. 
Comparing the Japanese system of corporate governance with what was perceived 
in this perspective to be a more effective and thus better UK/US model led to an 
increase in argumentation that Japanese companies should be required to especially 
adopt the Anglo-American model of corporate governance (Yoshikawa and Phan, 
2003; Egawa, 2005). Seki (2005) has pointed out that the contextual developments 
and the wider global debate about corporate governance issues increased the 
awareness of Japanese managers of the importance of corporate governance: for 
Seki (2005), public officials and corporate executives began to understand that 
good corporate governance practices can strengthen corporate competitiveness and 
also contribute to attracting foreign investors to the Japanese capital market. It was 
in this context of crisis and global pressure to change Japanese corporate 
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governance practices and the increased appreciations of the importance of good 
corporate governance practices by Japanese managers that the Corporate 
Governance Forum of Japan, which was later renamed the Japan Corporate 
Governance Forum,110 was founded in 1994. 
The Japan Corporate Governance Forum is the focus of the analysis offered in this 
chapter, which aims to gain insights into how the above pressures for change and 
their associated challenges to national cultural values impacted upon and were 
reflected in the development of a set of Corporate Governance Principles for 
Japanese companies that the Japan Corporate Governance Forum had issued 
during the period from 1997 to 2006. The structure of the chapter is as follows: 
brief overview of the history and the aims and objectives of the Japan Corporate 
Governance Forum; analysis of the initial draft and the various revisions of the 
Corporate Governance Principles,· and, critical elaboration upon the main insights 
that can be gained from the analysis of the development of the Corporate 
Governance Principles. 
8.1. NIHON COPOREITO GABANANSU FORAMU (JAPAN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FORUM) 
In 1994 the Japan Corporate Governance Forum was established as an 
organisation comprising academics and business people. Ariyoshi Okumura from 
110 In this study the current name "Japan Corporate Governance Forum" is used throughout for 
reasons of clarity. 
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the Industrial Bank, who was a member of the Japan Corporate Governance 
Forum, explained that Kaneo Nakamura, his mentor and a member of the board of 
General Electric had made him realise that it was necessary to change the Japanese 
corporate governance system. Nakamura had gained his insights in tenns of the 
importance of corporate governance from a stay in the U.S. (Jacoby, 2007, p. 8). 
Tadao Suzuki, the Chairperson of the later Committee for the Settlement of 
Corporate Governance Principles, describes the impetus for the formation of the 
Japan Corporate Governance Forum as follows: 
Early in 1994, when corporate governance was still not a major topic of 
discussion, Mr Kaneo Nakamura, Counsellor of The Industrial Bank of 
Japan, invited a number of senior businessmen to debate the issues ... , and 
myself. We stayed one weekend at Tokyo Bay Hilton Hotel in Uraysu, and 
discussed and exchanged views on corporate governance day and night 
(Suzuki, 1998, p. 33-34). 
As a consequence of these initial discussions 'The Japan Corporate Governance 
Forum was formally inaugurated in November 1994' (Suzuki, 1998, p. 34). The 
inaugural co-chairpersons were Mr Kaneo Nakamura, representing the business 
world, and Dr Takayasu Okushima, President of Waseda University, representing 
the academic world (ibid.). The forum was concerned to contribute to the corporate 
governance debate through proposing corporate governance principles that would 
through discussion develop 'into a "Code of Best Practice'" (Suzuki, 1998, p. 35). 
Suzuki describes the process as follows: 
In December 1996, the forum decided to draw up and propose its 
Corporate Governance Principles of Japan. I was designated Chairperson 
of the Committee for the Settlement of Corporate Governance Principles, 
which comprised seventeen participants, drawn from forum members 
representing corporate executives, institutional investors, law and 
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economics academics, the mass media and lawyers. The committee has 
met 22 times in total between January 1997 and April 1998. Twelve of 
these meetings were held after the publication of the Corporate 
Governance Principles - Interim Report on October 30th of 1997, their 
aim being to hear and consider opinions and critiques of the report from 
domestic and overseas bodies. 
The above statement is of interest as it clearly sets out the process envisaged in 
arriving at the Corporate Governance Principles. Further, it gives insights into how 
a private sector body, initiated by industry, aims to get legitimacy as a guardian and 
regulator of "best practice" through the inclusion of various constituencies in the 
d .. k' 111 eCISlOn rna lng process. The Committee for the Settlement of Corporate Governance 
Principles, for example, included not only those who were directly affected by 
corporate governance mechanisms in the day to day running of companies but also 
those who were critics of the current system, for example, the mass media. In 
addition, the Committee also included experts in state regulation, i.e. lawyers. The 
inclusion of institutional investors reflects concerns raised about the Japanese 
corporate governance system by especially those subscribing to a UKIUS version 
of corporate governance. Of particular interest is the strong representation of 
academics on the Committee, which indicates the important role of academics in 
policy making in Japan. There was also a concern that not only domestic but also 
overseas bodies would comment on the proposed principles. The Japan Corporate 
Governance Forum issued several versions of its Corporate Governance Principles, 
which are discussed below. 
111 Constituencies commenting on the draft included, for example, corporate auditors, academics, 
Australian Institute of Company Directors, Director of Coopers and Lybrand, Head of Investment 
Affairs - Association of British Insurers (U .S.A.), Vice President & Chief Strategist, Goldman Sachs 
(Japan) and Chainnan of the OMRON Corporation. In addition, there were comments from 'others 
who chose to remain anonymous' (Final Report, 1998, pp. 57-58). 
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8.2. ANALYSIS OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND 
THEIR DEVELOPMENT 
The Japan Corporate Governance Forum issued four documents during the period 
from 1997 to 2006, which are listed in Table 11. 
Year. Japanese Name of Document English Name of Document 
r 
1997 Koporeito Gabanansu "Corporate Governance 
Gensoku - Atarasii Principles - A Japanese View" 
Kigyoutouchi wo Kangaeru- (Interim Report) 
(Chukan Houkoku) 
1998 Koporeito Gabanansu "Corporate Governance 
Gensoku - Atarasii Principles - A Japanese View" 
Kigyoutouchi wo Kangaeru- (Final Report) 
(Saishu Houkoku) 
2001 Kaitei Koporeito Gabanansu "Revised Corporate Governance 
Gensoku Principles" 
2006 Shin Korporate Gabanansu "New Corporate Governance 
Gensoku Principles" 
Table 11: Development of the Corporate Governance Principles 
Below the four versions of the Corporate Governance Principles are analysed. For 
each version an overview of the content is provided, which is followed by an 
analysis of the key issues addressed in the documents. An emphasis in the analyses 
is on the similarities and differences between the Japanese corporate governance 
system and corporate system and the Anglo-American corporate governance 
system and corporate system. 
300 
8.2.1. "Corporate Governance Principles -A Japanese View" (Interim Report) 
The first publication of the committee was an Interim Report published on 30 
October 1997 (Interim Report, 1997). The Interim Report consisted of four 
sections: first, an 'Introduction', which provided some insights into the importance 
of globalisation and some of the characteristics of the Japanese corporate 
governance system and corporate system; second, a section on the 'Japanese 
Corporate Governance System', which listed the main areas that needed attention; 
third a section on 'Accountability and Disclosure', which elaborated these issues in 
the context of corporate governance, and, fourth, a section on 'Governance 
Structure', which highlighted the key components of a governance structure. 
Sections 1 and 2 are introductory and explanatory, whereas Sections 3 and 4 are 
prescriptive and offer sixteen Corporate Governance Principles (Interim Report, 
1997, pp. 2-10). Suzuki, the Chairperson of the Committee for the Settlement of 
Corporate Governance Principles explained the aims of the Principles as follows: 
Our" 16 Standard Principles" are aimed at positioning entrepreneurs and 
the board of directors at the heart of the corporate governance debate, and 
will give us appropriate standards against which we can judge ourselves 
(Suzuki, 1998, p. 34). 
The Interim Report offered a 'two-step formula for realising effective corporate 
governance'. The two steps were expressed in two categories of principle: 
• Principles that should be adopted in approximately five years, along with 
legal reforms, are "Step A Principles", ... 
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• "Step B Principles" are those which should be aimed for in the early 21 st 
Century, are necessary (with amendments) to illuminate the path towards 
the globalized market, and which require legal reform on a grand scale 
(Interim Report, 1997, p. 1). 
The introduction of the Interim Report set out some key issues in relation to 
corporate governance, including, the globalisation of the economy, the emphasis on 
shareholders, the role of the board of directors, the contribution of employees in 
shareholder value maximisation and the role of the Japanese shacho (President of a 
Japanese company) (ibid., pp. 2-4). This general introduction was followed by a 
brief outline of problems of the Japanese corporate governance system that 
according to the Japan Corporate Governance Forum needed to be resolved. 
Specific problems were identified in relation to the dual structure of the 
'conventional Japanese corporate governance model' (ibid. p. 5), i.e. the board of 
directors and the board of corporate auditors and some of the components of the 
Japanese corporate system, including the Japanese concept of the community firm 
and its objective and Japanese management practices. The sixteen Standard 
Principles reflect the above considerations in focusing upon disclosure and 
accountability to shareholders, the board of directors, the Auditors and board of 
corporate auditors and Shareholder meetings. 
The Interim Report is of particular interest to this study here as it offers insights 
into the tensions between the conventional Japanese corporate governance system 
and the Anglo-American corporate governance system. These tensions reflect the 
different corporate and cultural contexts in which the two corporate governance 
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systems are embedded. The Interim Report also indicates how certain aspects of the 
conventional Japanese corporate governance system were being replaced in the 
elaboration by aspects of the Anglo-American corporate governance system. In the 
following, the Interim Report is analysed so as to bring out these tensions. The 
analysis is divided into parts: first, an elaboration of key concepts and issues in 
relation to corporate governance as identified in the Interim Report; and, second, a 
discussion of how these issues are reflected in the proposed Corporate Governance 
Principles. 
8.2.1.1. Key Concepts and Issues in Relation to Corporate Governance 
The influence of globalisation on the debate about corporate governance in Japan is 
evident in the Interim Report. Indeed, reference is made throughout to globalisation 
in explaining the need for changes in the corporate governance system and in 
justifying the proposed principles. It is argued that the globalised market that 
Japanese companies are part of has replaced the national market place. There is a 
clear recognition and acceptance in the Interim Report that the success of Japanese 
companies is linked to their standing in the globalised market. The importance that 
is placed on the globalised market place is evident in that it is globalisation that is 
the focus of the first paragraph of the Interim Report: 
The globalization of the marketplace has ushered in an era in which the 
quality of corporate governance is a crucial component of corporate 
survival. The compatibility of corporate governance practices with global 
standards has also become an important part of corporate success. The 
practice of good corporate governance has therefore become a necessary 
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prerequisite for any corporation to manage effectively in the globalized 
market. (Interim Report, 1997, p. 2) 
Interestingly, effective and high quality corporate governance is linked to corporate 
success. This view reflects UK/US emphasis in the debate on corporate governance 
and attempts made especially by UK/US academics to empirically establish this 
link through their research. I 12 Further, the recognition of the need to have national 
standards that are compatible with global standards points to the increased 
legitimacy that global standard setters, such as, for example, The International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), are gaining worldwide. At the same time it 
also points to the increasing power that global standard setting bodies have over 
national standard setters (cf. Gallhofer and Haslam, 2006, 2007). As will be shown 
later, the need to comply with global standards seriously threatens national 
characteristics of governance systems, including their cultural specificities. 
Key to the wider debate on corporate governance is the consideration of who has 
the right to govern the company and who do management have to be accountable to. 
There are two theoretical positions that can be found in such debates: one position 
holds that shareholders are the only group of importance here and the other points 
to the significance of a whole range of stakeholders. In line with such concerns 
found in debates more generally the Interim Report also addressed the 
shareholder/stakeholder issue: 
112 A clear link between the quality of corporate governance practices and firm performance has, 
however, not been established by such research. 
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The publicly owned corporation, a basic component of corporate society, 
is actually a system of cooperative relationships between various 
stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, clients, suppliers, 
creditors, and management. But shareholders in particular are given a 
special position. As owners of the company they are the last risk takers 
who are entitled to claim the residual profits of the company. Under the 
system of private ownership, shareholders are granted the right of 
governance over the company for the benefit of their own interests. This 
idea forms the foundation of the corporate governance concept (Interim 
Report, 1997, p. 2). 
It is worthwhile to look more closely at how the shareholder/stakeholder issue is 
addressed in this quotation as it can give insights into particular tensions that might 
arise in aims to clarify the relationship between shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Interestingly, the first reference in this paragraph is to stakeholders. Indeed, it is the 
way in which stakeholders are variously interlinked that constitutes the publicly 
owned corporation. This particular system of relationships is described as being 
'cooperative', a reference to working with each other rather than against each other. 
It is within this group of stakeholders that shareholders assume a special position 
because of their particular legal status as owners of the company, which implies 
that if something goes wrong shareholders are the stakeholder group that is most 
affected. Such argumentation, which is typically linked to agency theory, justifies 
the privileged role of shareholders and is referred to in the Interim Report as 'the 
foundation for the corporate governance concept'. Although the Interim Report 
clearly points to the importance of shareholders in corporate governance, there are 
interesting tensions in its argumentation here, which point to different kinds of 
governance systems operating in practice. For example, the first reference in 
addressing the shareholder/stakeholder issue is to stakeholders and it is only within 
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an understanding of the firm as being constituted of the relationships between 
various stakeholders that shareholders hold their special place as a privileged 
stakeholder group. In the section headed 'The Japanese Corporate Governance 
System: Problems to be Solved', the Interim Report points to two corporate 
governance systems, which are understood to be opposites: 
The European (Continental)/Japanese model vs. the Anglo-American 
model: 
• the concept of the company as a community vs. the concept of the 
company owned and governed by shareholders, who are the last 
risk takers. (Interim Report, 1997, p. 5) 
In the context of these different perceptions of the concept of the company in the 
continental European/Japanese and Anglo-American model, the Interim Report's 
justification for the privileging of shareholders in the corporate governance system 
is thus a clear reference to the argumentation evident in the Anglo-American model. 
This argumentation is, however, embedded in a context where the company is 
initially defined as a community of stakeholders, which is a reference to the 
traditional Japanese system of corporate governance. It is reasonable to interpret 
the tension in argumentation here between the two opposites of the European 
(Continental)/Japanese model of corporate governance and the Anglo-American 
model as reflecting a tension between the different values and cultures inherent in 
the two models. Indeed, the Interim Report refers to a competition between these 
two models of corporate governance evident in the globalised market: 
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The globalized market: A competitive arena for two systems 
• the Euro-Japanese vs. Anglo-American model 
• system of seeking profits for 'pluralistic-oriented' constituencies vs. 
system of seeking profits for "individualistic-oriented" shareholders: 
(Interim Report, 1997, p. 5) 
In 1997, when the Interim Report was published, there seems to have been a 
perception amongst members of the Japan Corporate Governance Forum that both 
governance systems were competing with each other. There is no reference in the 
above statement, however, to the situation whereby as a result of that competition 
one model might gain supremacy in the global market. With hindsight, one may 
suggest that the 'competitive arena' the Interim Report was referring to was more 
of a battlefield to establish the supremacy of one of the two governance systems. It 
will thus be interesting to see if and how the various versions of The Corporate 
Governance Principles of the forum reflect the increasing global influence of the 
Anglo-American system (subter). 
Having established the position of shareholders as the key motivation for 
introducing corporate governance systems, the Interim Report considers who would 
be best placed to oversee and guarantee the functioning of a proper corporate 
governance mechanism: 'In publicly-owned corporations, the board of directors is 
the most effective vehicle of corporate governance' (Interim Report, 1997, p. 2). 
The Interim Report stresses that, from a Japanese perspective, the board of 
directors has a key role to play in corporate governance: 
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· .. corporate governance by defmition rests with the conduct of the board 
of directors, who are chosen on behalf of the shareholders. The directors 
are entitled to govern the company, and to supervise and monitor the 
company's management in order to promote effective management and 
ensure prudent accountability to the shareholders. The board of directors 
therefore is the primary overseer in the company, monitoring management 
to ensure that it is a) always endeavouring to maximize corporate value in 
the long term for the shareholders, and b) always prepared to be 
accountable for its actions to all the stakeholders and - in particular - to 
shareholders. (Interim Report, 1997, p. 2) 
The key role that the board of directors plays in the corporate governance model in 
the Interim Report again reflects UK/US debates. Much of the work on corporate 
governance by policy makers as well as academics has argued that the board of 
directors has been key to the success or failure of corporate governance 
mechanisms (Bonn et aI., 2004). Failures of the board of directors to monitor and 
effectively control management's operations have been linked to corporate failures 
with significant negative global socio-economic implications. Committees set up in 
the UK and US to investigate the effectiveness of prevalent corporate governance 
systems have thus consistently come up with proposals for the improvement of 
corporate governance that put an emphasis on strengthening and reforming the role 
of the board of directors. Relatedly, legislation has also provided a framework to 
support any changes in the composition and duties and responsibilities of the board 
of directors (Clarke, 2007, 139-144; Monks and Minow, 2008, pp. 223-228). Again, 
reflecting UK/US debate, the Interim Report offers a critique of the functioning of 
the board of directors of Japanese companies in practice: 
It is a fact, however, that in practice the role of the board of directors and 
that of the management executives has not always been defined. 
Furthermore, the board of directors has not necessarily been equipped with 
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sufficient governance authority and capabilities (Interim Report, 1997, p. 
3). 
The problem lies in the particular role prescribed for the board of directors within 
the dual structure of the conventional Japanese governance model. The board of 
directors 'carries out the functions of strategic decision-making' whereas the board 
of corporate auditors 'audits management's execution of business activities'. The 
problem identified here was that although the board of directors concerns itself 
with strategic decision-making, it 'does not have real decision-making power'. 
According to the Interim Report (ibid., p. 5): 
... decisions tend to be actually taken by the "management board", or by 
the "management board of directors". 
A further problem of the Japanese corporate governance system that the Interim 
Report referred to was the composition of the board of directors: 
Indeed, most members of the board of directors are "executive" directors 
(inside the company) and therefore are often "employees" of the company. 
In this situation the realization of meaningful governance is difficult. (ibid., 
p.6) 
A concern about the composition of the board of directors and the lack of its 
independence from the company management has been variously addressed in 
debates in practice and by research in especially the Anglo-American context (see, 
for example, Ahmadjian, 2003; Clarke, 2007). Many proposals for changes in 
corporate governance mechanisms have indeed suggested that an effective 
309 
corporate governance system can only be established if the independence of 
members of the board of directors is significantly improved (Solomons, 2007). 
Having elaborated a critique of the operations of the Japanese board of directors, 
the Interim Report attempted to improve the role of the Japanese board of directors 
through issuing a specific corporate governance principle. This principle aimed to 
strengthen and clearly define the role and function of the board of directors: 
The corporate governance principle described herewith proposes that the 
governance powers of the board of directors be firmly established, thereby 
guaranteeing both the effective management and prudent accountability 
the company needs to survive in the globalised market place (Interim 
Report, 1997, p. 3). 
Suggestions were made as to how such an effective board of directors could be 
achieved: 
The function of the board of directors should be rejuvenated to i) cope 
with the more complicated global market; and ii) to be honest advisors for 
management, which could be trapped with a dilemma whereby stronger 
managers could become more complacent. (Interim Report, 1997, p. 6) 
The Interim Report stressed the important role of the board of directors especially 
in a context where 'the market mechanism does not function perfectly due to 
market failure and to administrative regulations' (Interim Report, 1997, p. 3). In 
this context, the Interim Report suggested that the board of directors had to take on 
an important role in monitoring management: 
.. , the board of directors' governance takes on even a social responsibility: 
through their duty of supervising management's actions, the directors are 
310 
contributing towards the transparency of the market (Interim Report, 1997, 
p.3). 
The recognition that an imperfect market necessitates governance echoes the 
argumentation of the general debate on corporate governance concerning the need 
for information disclosure and transparency (Solomon, 2007). This concern about 
transparency thus also underpins the corporate governance principles of the Interim 
Report. 
Another key issue addressed in the Interim Report is profit maximisation by 
shareholders. It is of interest here to look in more detail at how profit maximisation 
by shareholders is defined: 
Profit-seeking conduct by shareholders means that they expect to 
maximise residual profits after other stakeholders have already been given 
a fair share of the profits according to the market mechanism. (Interim 
Report, 1997, p. 3) 
The above definition of shareholders' profit-seeking reflects the European 
(Continental)/Japanese model of corporate governance with its emphasis on 'the 
concept of the company as community' (Interim Report, p. 5). The model works 
with a notion of profit-seeking, which according to the Interim Report, is in a 
dichotomous relation to the notion of profit-seeking in the Anglo-American model 
of corporate governance. The two systems are: 
... [a] system of seeking profits for "pluralistic-oriented" constituencies vs. 
[a] system of seeking profits for "individualistic-oriented" shareholders. 
(Interim Report, 1997, p.5) 
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Indeed, it was this tension between the different profit-orientations of the Japanese 
and the Anglo-American corporate governance models that the Interim Report had 
identified as one of the 'Problems to be Solved' in its attempt to provide a blueprint 
of governance for Japanese companies (Interim Report, 1997, p. 5). The following 
quote indicates the tensions between the community orientation of the Japanese 
firm and the shareholder orientation of the Anglo-American firm: 
... the role of management is to strive to maximize shareholders' profit, 
while simultaneously coordinating the appropriate profit level for other 
stakeholders in the market. (Interim Report, 1997, p.3) 
Further, the Interim Report stressed the important role of employees in the context 
of shareholder wealth maximisation: 
Without duly stable cooperation between employees and management, 
shareholders' value as such will never be maximized. (Interim Report, 
1997, p. 4) 
In recognition of the need to secure the cooperation of employees, Japanese 
companies have devised various schemes aimed at profit-sharing: 
To achieve smoother and more effective co-operation, Japanese companies 
have introduced ... devices such as "bonus system" and "stock-holding 
plans", which basically share profits with employees (Interim Report, 
1997,p.4) 
All the various schemes are aimed at the following: 
The goal of these systems is to achieve compatibility between maximizing 
shareholders profits, and maximizing the profit "pie" for all stakeholders 
(Interim Report, 1997, p. 4). 
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The above attempts to emphasise shareholders as the major beneficiaries of the 
wealth created by the company and at the same time also refer to the need to get 
employees on board reflect the broader community oriented culture in Japan, which 
is in stark contrast to the emphasis that is placed in UK/US society on the 
individual. The latter concern is epitomised in Margaret Thatcher's view that there 
was no such thing as society - only individuals and families. This tension is further 
evident when the Interim Report aims to explicate the roles of management and the 
board of directors. Management has to 'strive to maximize shareholders' profit, 
while simultaneously coordinating the appropriate profit level for other 
stakeholders in the market' (Interim Report, 1997, p. 3), and, similarly, the board of 
directors 'functions[s] simultaneously as the shareholders' delegates and as the 
promoters of the benefits of all concerned stakeholders' (Interim Report, 1997, p. 
4). 
The emphasis in Japan on employees and their interests and wellbeing is reflected 
in the practice of "life-long employment". The Interim Report identifies this 
practice as one that contrasts with the kind of employment practices that are typical 
of the UK/US context. Life-long employment is a feature of the Japanese system 
that according to the Interim Report should not be changed: 
The Japanese model does not allow hasty labor restructuring. This model 
should be preserved. Economic ineffectiveness should be corrected not by 
terminating employees, but instead by redeploying them in the wider 
interests of society. (Interim Report, 1997, p. 5) 
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Such a stance is clearly diametrically opposite to especially UKIUS HR practices, 
which put a high value on restructuring and down-sizing in their attempts to 
address inefficiencies and to cut costs (Jacoby, 2005). How strong this Japanese 
notion of employment relations is becomes evident in the following statement in 
the Interim Report: 
Labor adjustment can represent an easy transfer of business risks to 
employees, a practice that violates the basic ethics of capitalism and the 
Japanese notion of corporate governance. (Interim Report, 1997, p. 5) 
The reference to the ethics of capitalism points to the particular understanding of 
capitalism that is characteristic of the Japanese context (Dore, 2000). 
The last characteristic of the Japanese system that the Interim Report draws 
attention to is 'the unique feature of the Japanese shacho (president), in the context 
of the shacho's style of corporate governance' (Interim Report, 1997, p. 3). The 
role of the shacho is described as follows: 
And: 
The Japanese shacho is the CEO, and often the chairperson of the board of 
directors. As the leader of his or her company, an effective shacho is hard 
working, spirited, reliable, level headed, has good communication skills 
and a comprehensive grasp of. .. where the company is headed in the future. 
(Interim Report, 1997, p. 3) 
All these qualities, however, are insufficient unless he or she is a person of 
responsibility, firmly determined to maximise long-term corporate value. 
(Interim Report, 1997, p. 3) 
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According to the Interim Report: 
The legitimacy of the shacho is really derived from and recognized only 
by his or her sense dedication to be fully responsible to the shareholders, 
whose desire is the maximization of shareholder value. (Interim Report, 
1997,p.4) 
Interestingly, this statement shows how the Interim Report sought to establish the 
legitimacy of a Japanese characteristic of corporate governance by linking it to the 
UKIUS notion of shareholder wealth maximisation. This strategy is evident 
throughout the Interim Report. Indeed, the report, after having outlined the 
important issues that need to be addressed in the Japanese corporate governance 
debate and having drawn attention to important characteristics of the Japanese 
system of corporate governance, then goes on to outline principles of corporate 
governance so as 'to present a Japanese model of corporate governance' (Interim 
Report, 1997, p. 4). These principles reflect UK/US practice in especially 
emphasising the role of shareholders and the board of directors in their corporate 
governance model for Japan but this is done in a context in which the board of 
directors functions 'simultaneously as the shareholders' delegates and as the 
promoters of the benefits of all concerned stakeholders' (Interim Report, 1997, p, 
4). Below it is shown how the tension between Japanese characteristics of 
corporate governance and UK/US characteristics of corporate governance IS 
reflected In the Corporate Governance Principles that the Interim Report 
prescribes. 
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8.2.1.2. The Proposed Corporate Governance Principles 
The Interim Report lists its proposed corporate governance principles under the 
following two main headings: (i) Accountability and Disclosure, and, (ii) 
Governance Structure. Under these two headings, issues concerning shareholders 
and issues concerning the board of directors are discussed respectively. It is of 
interest here that the Interim Report offers a brief definition of two kinds of 
disclosure that have to be considered in the context of a general concern about 
accountability and disclosure: an '''offer of information" within a closed loop of 
immediate directors and shareholders', and, '''information disclosure'" to 'outside 
parties, or "constituencies'" (Interim Report, 1997, p. 7). It is reasonable to suggest 
that this particular way of categorising provision of information reflects the 
particular Japanese context in which a close relationship between certain large 
shareholders traditionally exists. The report stressed that these two types of 
information although different in the sense defined above 'are usually treated as 
identical' (Interim Report, 1997, p. 7) but held: 
... the fundamental difference between the two types of information 
certainly exists. Therefore the "information offer to the 
shareholders" ... and a general "information disclosure to the stakeholders" 
should be recognized as two different concepts. (Interim Report, 1997, p. 
7) 
Given this distinction in terms of different types of information provision, Principle 
2A also stated that there should be different forms of information disclosure to 
shareholders other than the formal business reports. Such disclosure, it ws stated, 
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was particularly important in the context of events that might impact upon the 
particular interests of shareholders (Interim Report, 1997, p. 7). Further, reflecting 
the concern of being successful in the global market place, Principle 3A stated that 
prevalent/current regulations should always 'be swiftly adjusted to new global 
accounting rules' (Interim Report, 1997, p. 7). Global accounting rules, which can 
also be read as the rules set by the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), were here - as was the case in the context of the bi-Iateral trade 
negotiations between Japan and the u.s. -not seen as a controversial issue. 
The board of directors' responsibility to coordinate the various interests of all other 
shareholders manifests itself in Principle 4A, which requires directors to 'undertake 
wider disclosure of company information for the benefit of non-shareholder 
stakeholders' (Interim Report, 1997, p. 8). 
In proposing principles for the governance structure of Japanese corporations, the 
following areas are addressed in the Interim Report: directors and the board of 
directors; auditors and the board of corporate auditors; shareholders' meetings 
(Interim Report, 1997, pp. 9-10). The suggestions made in these principles were all 
aimed at separating the functions of the board of directors from that of the 
executive board. Particular emphasis was placed in this context on non-executive 
directors. Following the UKJUS model, it was proposed that 'non-executive 
directors should comprise a majority on the board'. It was also proposed that a 
committee structure of the board of directors be implemented and legislated for: 
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Within the board of directors, several committees should be established, 
such as those for designating directors, setting directors' remuneration, 
business auditing etc ... Remuneration of the shacho and other 
"representative" directors is to be decided only by non-executive directors. 
(Interim Report, 1997, p. 9) 
Principle 10B dealt with characteristics of the Japanese corporate structure, which 
had been especially subjected to critique: namely that in many traditional Japanese 
companies there was no separation between governance and business execution: 
The chairperson of the board of directors - as the highest responsible 
member of the governance structure - and the chairperson of the board of 
executives - as the highest responsible officer of business execution - are 
not to be the same person (Interim Report, 1997, p. 9). 
Reflecting the Japanese context at the time, however, Principle 10B also suggested: 
When the combination of the two functions is necessary, an explanation 
should be offered to the shareholders (Interim Report, 1997, p. 9). 
In terms of auditors, it was proposed that the independence of auditors should be 
strengthened through abolishing the 'five year rule, by which a virtually inside 
officer could be designated as an auditor after five years of absence from the 
company or related company' (Interim Report, 1997, p. 10). 
Shareholders' meetings were also to be improved, especially through enhancing the 
dialogue between shareholders and the board of directors. It was further suggested 
that 'separately from the shareholders' meeting, information meetings for major 
shareholders may be held for more detailed discussions' (Interim Report, 1997, p. 
10). This principle was a response to criticism that had been variously made of the 
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practice of Japanese companies to generally hold shareholder meetings at the same 
time. 
The above analysis of the Corporate Governance Principles of the Interim Report 
has shown how a self-regulatory body attempted to respond to pressures to change 
the conventional Japanese corporate governance system. Of particular interest here 
is that the Interim Report reflects the tensions between a particular local corporate 
governance structure and the globally promoted Anglo-American model. The 
proposals made for changes in the corporate governance system of Japan 
incorporate features of the Anglo-American model. There appears to be, however, a 
concern to argue that certain characteristics of the local Japanese system are 
equivalent to characteristics of the Anglo-American system or that they can be 
modified and built upon in such a way as to resemble characteristic features of the 
Anglo-American system. Pointing to the tensions and contradictions in the Interim 
Report, Jacoby (2007, p. 8) made the following comment: 'The document is a 
marvel of diplomacy.' It is of note, that the way in which the Interim Report aimed 
to find a way of change, which would allow valued Japanese particularities to 
remain whilst also introducing some Anglo-American characteristics into the 
system, more generally reflects a particular stance to change evident in Japan at the 
time. Inagami (2001, p. 229), for example, in this respect quotes Nikkeiren's view 
that the main thrust of corporate governance reform in Japan should be 'not to 
negate everything Japanese, but instead to preserve those basic features of 
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Japanese-style management which are laudable, such as its consideration for human 
beings and its long-term outlook, while modifying what needs to be modified'. 
The Japan Corporate Governance Forum is of particular interest as it constitutes 
an initiative by industry to set the standard for what is deemed to be good corporate 
governance practice. This attempt at self regulation attracted wide interest 
nationally as well as globally, with the California Public Employees' Retirement 
System (CaIPERS) most prominently endorsing the Corporate Governance 
Principles of the Japan Corporate Governance Forum as best practice for Japanese 
companies (Jacoby, 2007) and recommending that they 'should be adopted as a 
benchmark for Japanese corporations' (Suzuki, 1998, p. 33). CalPERS had been 
interested to introduce and strengthen the shareholder-value approach in overseas 
markets. One of the markets identified was Japan, which according to CaIPERS: 
' ... has a structure that is least like the United States. There, shareholder 
returns are subordinated to the growth of the company and the interest of 
the keiretsu and affiliated shareholders' (CalPERS, quoted in Jacoby, 2007, 
p.8). 
CaIPERS, following a strategy of finding local partners in their attempts to change 
the corporate governance structures of countries they invested in, had seen an 
opportunity in working together with the Japan Corporate Governance Forum in 
its attempt to change Japanese corporate governance in line with the Anglo-
American model. Through such an approach it was hoped that hostilities against 
foreign interference could be minimised. CalPERS also issued its own corporate 
governance principles for Japan shortly after the Interim Report had been published. 
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One significant difference between the Interim Report and the CalPERS principles, 
as Jacoby (Jacoby, 2007, p. 9) has pointed out, was that CalPERS did not include 
any of the 'language related to stakeholder' that the analysis above has shown is 
evident in the Interim Report. The partnership between CalPERS and the Corporate 
Governance of Japan, however, did not materialise as the differences between the 
two approaches to reform were too significant (Jacoby, 2007, p. 9). 
8.2.2. Corporate Governance Principles - A Japanese View (Final Report) 
Seven months after the publication of the Interim Report, the Corporate 
Governance Principles - A Japanese View (Final Report) was published on 26 
May 1998 (Final Report, 1998). Tadao Suzuki, the Chairperson of the Corporate 
Governance Committee, pointed to developments in Japan as well as in the global 
context during these seven months: 
... developments in the business environment have been more rapid than 
we anticipated: the bankruptcy of Yamaichi Securities and Hokkaido 
Takushoku Bank, the amendment of the Foreign Exchange Control Law, 
and the commencement of the Japanese Big Bang have all had significant 
influences on the Japanese market. 
Turning to overseas developments during this period, in April the 
OECD ... published its report entitled Corporate Governance: improving 
competitiveness and access to capital in global market, whilst in March 
the Hampel Committee in the UK published its corporate governance 
report. Also in March, CaIPERS ... published its own Principles of 
Corporate Governance for Japan (Suzuki, 1998, p. 33). 
There are some interesting differences between the Interim Report and the Final 
Report, which reflect developments referred to above and the feedback received on 
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the Interim Report. The feedback received was from within Japan as well as from 
outside of Japan, especially from the u.s. Respondents included academics, 
corporate auditors, lawyers, accountants, analysts and CEOs (Final Report, pp. 58-
59). More generally, there is a stronger and clearer emphasis on shareholders and 
their interests and a playing down of stakeholders and their interests. The tension 
that was evident in the Interim Report between accommodating shareholders and 
stakeholders in the corporate governance principles has thus been reduced. Already 
on the first page of the introduction the duty of managers is clearly spelled out: 
... managers ought to be responsible for the long term maximization of 
shareholders' profit and should exercise fiduciary duty towards 
shareholders (Final Report, 1998, p. 36). 
It is of note that the Interim Report only referred to shareholders' profit (Interim 
Report, 1997, p. 2) but did not mention 'maximization' of shareholders' profit. 
There is further reference to maximisation of shareholder value and in contrast to 
the Interim Report, again without reference to stakeholders in the following quote 
in the context of a concern about the motivation of the board of directors: 
Thus the motivation of board of directors is a prime concern; the key 
importance of shareholders within the corporation, and the goal of a going 
concern as being the maximization of shareholders' long-term value, need 
to be clearly understood and strongly shared amongst all of the company's 
participants (Final Report, 198, p. 42). 
A similar shift away from stakeholders is also evident in relation to a component of 
the Japanese corporate system, namely, Japanese employment practices. In relation 
to labour restructuring, the Interim Report noted: 
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The Japanese model does not allow hasty labor restructuring. This model 
should be preserved (Interim Report, 1997, p. 5) 
The last sentence of the above quote did not appear anymore in the Final Report 
although there was still an emphasis on the value of the Japanese practice to 're-
allocate employees to newly created profitable sectors' (Final Report, p. 41). 
Interestingly, the Final Report still links such practices to an 'irresponsible transfer 
of business risks to employees' and suggests: 
It is common Japanese management practice to subscribe to such ethical 
principles of personnel management, and we believe this notion could add 
certain values to the Anglo-American model of corporate governance 
(ibid.). 
Further, there is more explicit reference to U.S. practices, for example, 'executive 
committees' (ibid. p. 42) and the proposed structure for the board of directors 
reflects the Anglo-American version. Similarly, the principles covering disclosure 
now more directly refer to developments internationally: 
The board of directors should begin to report globally consolidated semi-
annual accounts based on the mark to market accounting system as soon as 
the "international standard" now under consideration is finalized. 
Quarterly reporting of accounts should also be introduced as soon as 
possible (Final Report, 1998, p. 45) 
In summary, the Corporate Governance Principles of the Final Report indicate a 
further move away from the conventional Japanese corporate governance and 
corporate system towards to Anglo-American corporate governance and corporate 
system. They now clearly specify the objective of the firm as shareholder value 
maximisation and propose an Anglo-American style of board of directors with 
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various committees, including an Audit Committee, a reduction in the size of the 
board of directors and an increase in the number of independent Directors. In terms 
of disclosure the need to adopt international standards is further emphasised. 
8.2.3. Kaitei Koporeito Gabanansu Gensoku (Revised Corporate Governance 
Principles) 
Since the publication of the Corporate Governance Principles in 1998, important 
changes in the context had taken place, which necessitated a revision of the 
Principles. According to Yoshihiko Miyauchi (2001, p. 33)113: 
Since that time [i.e. publication of the Principles in 1998], however, there 
have been a multitude of further changes, including a greater 
understanding of corporate governance in Japan, the introduction of 
executive officers to separate the functions of corporate boards and day-
to-day management, new trends in the revision of the Commercial Code, 
and greater exercising of voting rights by institutional investors. In short, 
Japanese companies as well as the environment in which they operate 
have undergone a dramatic transformation. 
In 2001 a revised set of principles, the Revised Corporate Governance 
Principles, 114 was issued to reflect the above changes in the context, including 
global pressure on Japan to adopt a US style corporate governance model. 
Miyauchi (2001, p. 33) pointed out that the Committee had held meetings between 
1998 and 2001 'in order to keep abreast of these developments' and that '[t]hese 
new Principles are part of a forward-thinking movement to improve Japanese 
\13 He was the Chairperson of the Japan Corporate Governance Committee responsible for the revision 
of the principles in 2001. 
114 The Revised Corporate Governance Principles are I the following referred to as Revised 
Principles. 
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corporate policy' and that they 'are the result of earnest and vIgorous debate 
between the practical and academic sides of this topic'. 
The Revised Principles further embraced aspects of the Anglo-American Corporate 
Governance system. The most significant move in this direction was the 
abolishment of two principles, which referred to the Japanese system of corporate 
auditors and the board of corporate auditors. The Japanese board of corporate 
auditors is independent of the Japanese board of directors and has a monitoring 
function. The independence of the corporate auditors has been a key feature of 
critique. In response to this criticism, the Interim Report as well as the Final Report 
had made proposals as to how the independence and effectiveness of the board of 
corporate auditors could be strengthened. Such suggestions were contained in 
Principle 11 A and Principle 12A. Both principles as well as the section entitled 
'Corporate Auditors and the board of corporate auditors' (Final Report, p. 51) were 
not included in the Revised Principles. Principle 13A, which recommended the 
establishment of an Audit Committee within the board of directors and which had 
previously been included in the section on corporate auditor was, however, 
incorporated into the Revised Principles. By only including the Anglo-American 
style board of directors in its Revised Principles the Japan Corporate Governance 
Forum abolished a key feature of the conventional Japanese corporate system, 
namely the monitoring role of the board of corporate auditors. 
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The Revised Principles in general provide more detail on the various issues that 
should be taken into account in the context of setting up a good corporate 
governance system. An area, where this detail is significant is that of 
'Accountability and Disclosure' (Final Report, 1998, p. 45). The Final Report 
stated: 
It is the responsibility of the board of directors to oversee the company's 
entire information network in particular the shareholder relation 
mechanism (ibid.). 
In the Revised Principles the more general reference to the 'company's entire 
information network' was replaced by the introduction of a Principle concerned 
with 'internal control' (Revised Principles, 2001, pp. 65-66) and another concerned 
with disclosure (ibid, pp. 67-68). The emphasis on internal control again reflects 
concerns of the Anglo-American debate on corporate governance, especially in the 
context of corporate collapses (Clarke, 2007, p. 62). 
In summary, the Revised Principles constitute a further move away from the 
conventional Japanese corporate governance system and the Japanese corporate 
system. The Revised Principles cover the typical areas of the Anglo-American 
corporate system, namely, mission and role of the board of directors, mission and 
role of the committees established within the board of directors, leadership 
responsibility of the CEO addressing shareholder derivative litigation, securing 
fairness and transparency for executive management, reporting to the shareholders 
and communicating with investors (Revised Principles, 2001, p. 35). 
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8.2.4. Shin Koporeito Gabanansu Gensoku (New Corporate Governance 
Principles) 
In December 2006, New Corporate Governance Principles were approved and 
subsequently published in March 2007. In the message from the Chairperson 
Professor Ochiai stated that after the publication of Kaitei Koporeito Gabanansu 
Gensoku (Revised Corporate Governance Principles) there have been many 
developments domestically as well as globally. In Japan, for instance, the 
amendment of the Commercial Code in 2002 has enabled Japanese companies to 
choose either the traditional Japanese style corporate governance system with a 
Board of Auditors (consisting of a majority of outside auditors) or the Anglo-
American style corporate governance system with an Audit Committee. Furthermore, 
the Company Act had been standardised by combining laws related to company 
regulation in May 2006. In addition, there has been a growing concern about 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and a rise of hostile takeovers as a business 
control approach. In the global context, mainly the U.S., there had been recurrent 
corporate scandals such as, for example, Enron, World. Com, which led to the 
introduction of the legislation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Shin Koporeito Gabanansu 
Gensoku, 2001). 
The Chairperson pointed out that despite the amendment of the Commercial Code, 
only a small number of Japanese companies had moved to the Anglo-American style 
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of corporate governance with its Audit Committee. In light of these developments, 
the Japan Corporate Governance Forum had thus decided to publish new corporate 
governance principles, which also considered those companies that had chosen the 
traditional Japanese style of corporate governance with its board of corporate 
auditors. The Chairperson pointed out, however, that the basic philosophy had 
remained the same as in the Revised Principles. 
The New Principles are of particular interest as they specifically refer in their 
recommendations to both types of companies, those with an Audit Committee and 
those with a board of corporate auditors. For the case of companies with a board of 
corporate auditors, for example, the Principles suggest that they should also 
establish committees such a remuneration or nomination committees and that these 
committees should consist of at least three members, the majority of which should be 
non-executive directors (New Principles, 8). Reflecting contextual developments, the 
New Principles thus constitute a hybrid corporate governance system that aims to 
incorporate components of the conventional Japanese corporate governance system 
in a system, which is basically the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. 
The Corporate Governance Forum had to adopt this position of compromise if it 
wanted its Corporate Governance Principles to be acceptable to Japanese companies. 
The New Principles also added some new areas that were now deemed to be relevant 
because of contextual developments. These areas included corporate social 
328 
responsibility, accounting auditl15 (or external audit), hostile takeovers and the role 
of employees in establishing an appropriate corporate governance system .. 
8.3. SUMMARY DISCUSSION 
The analysis of the four versions of the Corporate Governance Principles that the 
Japan Corporate Governance Forum published during the period from 1998 to 
2006 has highlighted how, through global pressure, local corporate governance 
rules and regulations were questioned and how attempts were made to align the 
local and national regulations with what was perceived good practice globally. The 
analysis has shown that, in the process of such alignments, tensions can arise with 
what are perceived to be valued particularities of the local, i.e. in the case here the 
Japanese system of corporate governance. Developments of the corporate 
governance principles, which were initially outlined in the Interim Report of 1997, 
indicate how, through increasing pressure in the global market place, Japanese 
characteristics more and more were either modified or diminished and were 
replaced by characteristics of the Anglo-American corporate governance system. 
Local characteristics of the Japanese corporate governance system were challenged 
and threatened by powerful Western institutions to conform to what was perceived 
to be good corporate governance practice from a Western perspective. The changes 
in the Corporate Governance Principles of the Japan Corporate Governance 
Forum highlight this Western influence and a shift towards a corporate governance 
115 "Accounting audit" is the Japanese term for external audit, that is, an audit carried out by a CPA. 
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with strong Anglo-American elements. As a consequence, valued local corporate 
governance characteristics were displaced. In the Japanese case, it can be argued, 
that it is the emphasis on community and a duty of care, which is under threat by a 
global move towards individualism and a reliance on market forces. In light of the 
global move towards the Anglo-American corporate governance it is of particular 
interest that the Japan Corporate Governance Forum felt that it had to step back 
from prescribing principles that embraced the Anglo-American type of corporate 
governance. Especially with the amendment of the Commercial Code, which 
allowed companies to choose their respective corporate governance system, it had 
become untenable to uphold the Anglo-American corporate governance system as 
"best" practice. In the New Principles both types of corporate governance - the 
Japanese and the Anglo-American - are included. On the face of it this step 
constitutes a going back to the positions taken in the Interim Report and the Final 
Report. A comparison of the way in which Japanese and Anglo-American 
characteristics interrelate in the different versions of the Principles indicates, 
however, a significant difference between the Interim Principles and the Final 
Report on the one hand and the New Principles on the other. In the Interim Report 
and the Final Report a clear tension between the values underpinning the Japanese 
and the Anglo-American corporate governance model was evident and there 
appeared to be a struggle over supremacy of one of the systems. In contrast, in the 
New Principles aspects of the Japanese corporate governance system were 
integrated into the Anglo-American framework of corporate governance. It can be 
argued that the New Principles thus constitute a hybrid system. Interestingly, 
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although there is still an emphasis on the Anglo-American model in the New 
Principles, capture has not been complete. The next chapter, chapter 9, offers 
concluding comments, makes some suggestions for a way forward of Japanese 
corporate governance and highlights areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND WAYS FORWARD 
Chapter nine summarises the insights gained from the analysis. It considers the 
threats to and opportunities for the Japanese corporate governance system 
emanating from the global pressure to change and to adopt a corporate governance 
system that is underpinned by different cultural values. The chapter is also 
concerned to consider manifest and potential consequences on the well-being of the 
people living in Japan emanating from changes to the Japanese corporate 
governance system and the Japanese corporate system. And, the chapter offers 
suggestions for possible ways forward for Japanese corporate governance in the 
glo bal context. It also points to the need for the West to critically reflect upon its 
own practices and begin to question and challenge the taken-for-granted supremacy 
of the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. The chapter concludes by 
arguing that a global corporate governance system, which is concerned with well-
being globally, needs to take into account the global as well as the particular and 
points to further areas of research. 
The study here employed a critical theoretical perspective in the analysis of debates 
over Japanese corporate governance. Corporate governance was understood as an 
embedded practice and through historical and contextual analysis the aim was to 
appreciate the local characteristics of the Japanese context and its interrelationship 
with the wider global context. The understanding of corporate governance here thus 
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goes beyond a focus solely on the relationship between ownership and management 
in isolation of their prevalent context. Such a position echoes Abe's (2004, p. 1) 
view that although the separation of ownership and management is 'a fundamental 
base of economic institutions in all advanced capitalistic societies' the form this 
relationship takes differs between countries. It is precisely because of these 
differences that corporate governance needs to be analysed as embedded in its 
prevalent socio-economic, political, cultural and historical context. As Abe (2004, 
p. 1) has argued: 
In addition it is not enough to consider only the relation between 
shareholders and management, for the role of employees, suppliers, 
customers, banks, or, in other words, stakeholders is also important. By 
extension, state policy, laws, economic environment, culture and historical 
background affect the character of corporate governance as specified by 
the relationship between numerous stakeholders. 
Informed by the above theoretical considerations, the study offered an analysis of 
two empirical sites, the bi-lateral trade negotiations between the u.S. and Japan 
during the period from 1989 to 2007 and the Japan Corporate Governance 
Forum's attempt during the period from 1998 to 2006 to arrive at a set of corporate 
governance principles for Japanese companies that would constitute "good 
practice". In order to embed these two case studies in the broader Japanese public 
debate over corporate governance the following two analyses were carried out: first, 
an analysis of the reporting on corporate governance of Japanese newspapers 
during the period from 1989 to 2007; and, second, an analysis of the positions 
taken in relation to corporate governance by key Japanese constituencies, which 
were directly affected by changes in the corporate system. Through a content 
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analysis of a sample of general and financial Japanese newspapers, trends and 
issues in the corporate governance reporting of these newspapers were identified. 
The analysis highlighted three key periods in the reporting: first period, from 1996 
to 1998 with the peak in the reporting in 1997; second period, from 2001 to 2004 
with the peak in the reporting in 2003; and, third period, from 2004 to 2006 with 
the peak in the reporting in 2005. Until 1996 the reporting on corporate governance 
was not very significant. The three key issues of concern as evident in the sample 
newspapers were: board of directors, audit (including the Japanese board of 
corporate auditors) and disclosure. 
The content analysis also indicated a major influence of developments in the u.s. 
and the U.S. corporate governance system on the debate, with little reference to 
debates taking place in the U.K. This emphasis on the U. S. was a result of the close 
relationship between Japan and the U.S. since the end of the Second World War, 
reflecting U.S. hegemony. In summary, the content analysis provided evidence for 
an emphasis in the debate over corporate governance in Japanese newspapers on 
the Anglo-American, especially U.S., corporate governance system and the issues 
of concern in debates over corporate governance from an Anglo-American 
perspective. 
The analysis of corporate governance proposals issued by key Japanese 
constituencies indicated various positions and most importantly, changes in these 
positions during the period from 1989 to 2007. On a continuum, the views ranged 
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from suggestions that the Japanese corporate governance system should converge 
with the Anglo-American model (e.g. the Tokyo Stock Exchange) or embrace key 
components of the Anglo-American model - especially the Anglo-American style 
board of directors with its sub-committees and disclosure requirements reflecting 
requirements specified by the International Accounting Standards Board (e.g. 
Pension Fund Association; Japan Association of Corporate Executives, initially) -
to suggestions that the traditional Japanese corporate governance system needed to 
be revived (The Japan Productivity Center). There was also the view that Japan 
needed to meet a certain global standard but that at the same time it was important 
to improve the features of the Japanese corporate governance system (e.g. Japanese 
Business Federation, Japan Association of Corporate Executives, later). The Japan 
Corporate Auditors Association, given its own location in the traditional Japanese 
corporate governance system, were concerned to preserve but to improve the 
Japanese system. The Japan Productivity Centre was the strongest proponent of the 
Japanese corporate governance system and has during the whole period under focus 
here stressed the importance of life-long employment and the important role of 
employees in corporate governance. The Japanese Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants was at the margin of the public debate over corporate governance 
during most of the period focused upon here, mainly concentrating on Issues 
related to International Accounting Standards and International Financial 
Reporting Standards. They only very recently set up a committee that was 
specifically concerned with corporate governance. The analysis has also indicated 
that at the earlier stages of the debates over corporate governance there was more 
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of a concern to embrace the Anglo-American corporate governance system whereas 
towards the end of the period a more critical stance towards the Anglo-American 
corporate governance system had begun to emerge (Japan Association of 
Corporate Executives). Further, and most significantly, aspects of traditional 
Japanese management practices were highlighted in a way that began to question the 
appropriateness of applying the Anglo-American model of corporate governance to 
the Japanese context. This change in view towards the end of the period under focus 
here can be understood to be part of a more general trend emerging in Japan since the 
end of Prime Minister Koizumi' s term in office when politicians as well as the public 
had begun to critically reflect upon the liberalisation attempts from the late 1990s to 
2005 and the view had emerged that liberalisation had gone too far. 
The two case studies, which were understood to be embedded in the above broader 
public corporate governance debate of the Japanese context, provided a whole 
range of insights into what happened to the local Japanese corporate governance 
system in the context of global hegemonic pressure to change and to converge with 
the Anglo-American corporate governance system. 
The analysis of the bi-Iateral trade negotiations between the U.S. and Japan has 
shown how in the context of a concern on the part of the U.S. to open the Japanese 
market to foreign investors, especially U.S. investors, and to reduce the trade 
deficit between the two countries, corporate governance issues were debated. The 
U.S. put significant pressure on the Japanese government to change the Japanese 
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corporate governance system to the Anglo-American corporate governance system. 
This change was deemed to be necessary as the Japanese corporate governance 
system was perceived to be lacking as compared to the Anglo-American system. It 
can be argued that such an attitude was Westerncentric and ethnocentric as it took 
as a standard for good corporate governance practices the Anglo-American model 
of corporate governance. It is reasonable to suggest several reasons for such a 
stance: first, the U.S. was concerned to make the Japanese market "safe" for 
foreign, and especially U.S. investors; second, U.S. hegemony globally was 
concerned to solidify its position through the establishment of further global 
standards, which in effect would be U.S. standards; third, the U.S. government, 
through a push for Anglo-American corporate governance, aimed to change aspects 
of the Japanese corporate context that were less reflective of a market mechanism. 
The analysis of documents issued in the context of the bilateral trade negotiations, 
indicated a continuous push to change the Japanese corporate governance system, 
with its emphasis on stakeholders - especially employees - and its rootedness in 
Confucian ethics, to a corporate governance model that emphasises shareholders 
and is based on neo-liberalism reflecting an ethics of a narrow individualism. It can 
be argued that changing the Japanese corporate governance system poses a serious 
threat to the Japanese corporate structure and the Japanese way of life. The 
emphasis on shareholder wealth maximisation in the Anglo-American model would 
significantly alter the focus of the decision-making process in Japanese companies 
if it was introduced in Japan. For example, the focus on short-term profit 
maximisation that the Anglo-American model of corporate governance encourages 
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would entice managers to reduce the workforce in times of economic down-tum 
thus making the concept of long-life employment redundant. As a consequence of 
changes in employment practices, Japanese people's attitudes towards others would 
also be potentially threatened: others might no longer be perceived as part of a 
community one is also a member of but as competitors in a context where the 
individual has to fight alone for his/her survival. Such a change in attitude would 
clearly have a significant impact on welfare provisions and on people's well-being. 
Commentators within Japan on the changes proposed by the U.S. government in 
relation to corporate governance have pointed to such a threat to the Japanese way 
of life (Iha, 1991). 
The analysis of the reactions of the Japanese government to the pressure from the 
U.S. to change its corporate governance system has indicated that especially in 
relation to accounting disclosure (one important component of the corporate 
governance system) the Japanese government had implemented most of the 
changes suggested by the U.S. government. In terms of corporate governance more 
generally, a major move towards the Anglo-American model was made when the 
government in the revised Commercial Code of 2003 introduced the option for 
companies to introduce the Anglo-American corporate governance model. It is 
interesting again to consider the reasons for this apparent willingness on the part of 
the Japanese government to comply with the requests of the U.S. government. One 
reason is possibly what Dore (2003) referred to as 'the real pressure' of trade 
dependency. In the context of the bursting of its bubble economy having been 
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followed by a recession in the 1990s, the Japanese government was in a weak 
negotiating position. Some commentators have, however, pointed to different 
reasons for the willingness of the Japanese government to comply with U.S. 
recommendations: certain powers in Japan who wanted to further liberalise the 
economy were using the argument of foreign pressure to pursue their own 
liberalising agenda. Whatever the very particular reason or reasons for the move to 
introduce changes to the Japanese accounting and corporate governance system 
were, it remains the case that replacing the Japanese corporate governance model 
constitutes a threat to the Japanese way of life and to valued particularities of the 
Japanese system. 
It is of interest to consider the way in which the Anglo-American corporate 
governance model was implemented into the Commercial Code. At first sight it 
appears that, with the changes in the Commercial Code, Japan had surrendered to 
the global hegemonic pressure to change its corporate governance system and to 
converge with the Anglo-American corporate governance system. Such a 
perception, however, changes, if one considers that it was optional for Japanese 
companies to follow the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. 
Commentators have variously pointed out that up-take of the Anglo-American 
model was IOW. 116 Many Japanese companies had decided to keep the traditional 
Japanese corporate governance system. This is an indication of a form of resistance 
116 Such a view, as the analysis of the Corporate Governance Principles has indicated, motivated the 
Corporate Governance Forum of Japan to amend its Principles and to include com~on~nts of the 
Japanese corporate governance system, which had been previously excluded from the Pnnclples. 
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to global hegemonic pressure. Interestingly, the U.S. administration had celebrated 
the changes to the Commercial Code as a victory. One explanation for this is that in 
the context of the neoliberal free-market ideology dominant in U.S. policy it was 
felt that market pressure would engender the desired change. From such a 
perspective it is not surprising that the U.S. administration saw the decision of the 
Japanese government to allow Japanese companies to follow either corporate 
governance model would have been perceived as a clear victory. 
The analysis of the various versions of the Corporate Governance Principles of the 
Japan Corporate Governance Forum during the period from 1998 to 2006 showed 
that because of contextual developments the way in which the Anglo-American 
model of corporate governance was promoted in the Principles changed in a 
number of ways. Of particular interest to this study here was the Interim Report, 
which the Japan Corporate Governance Forum had published in 1998 and which 
was the first draft of the Principles. This document provides particularly interesting 
insights into the tensions arising where there was pressure to change the traditional 
Japanese corporate governance system and converge with the Anglo-American 
corporate governance system, which was underpinned by different cultural values. 
Analysis of the Interim Report indicated awareness on the part of the Japan 
Corporate Governance Forum of the significant differences between the traditional 
Japanese corporate governance system and the Anglo-American corporate 
governance system and a concern to find a position that would somehow, in some 
practical sense, reconcile both systems. It is of interest that although the Interim 
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Report promoted some of the components of the Anglo-American system, such as 
enhanced disclosure and the board of directors with its associated committee 
structure, it came out in strong support of Japanese employment practices, which 
significantly impact upon the Japanese way of life and people's well-being. For 
example, life-long employment means greater certainty and security for the 
employee and in the context of the Japanese community firm it reflects key aspects 
of Japanese culture. At the same time, the Interim Report was concerned to 
acknowledge criticism of aspects of the traditional Japanese corporate governance 
system and corporate system, such as, for example, the two tier board structure. 
The position of the Japan Corporate Governance Forum, however, changed and, in 
the Revised Principles of 2001, concerns to maintain aspects of the Japanese 
corporate governance system as well as the Japanese corporate system had been 
replaced by a concern to promote the Anglo-American corporate governance model. 
As a consequence no reference was made to the desirability of maintaining 
traditional Japanese employment practices. Further, the traditional Japanese board 
of directors and board of corporate auditors were now replaced by the Anglo-
American board of directors with its associated committees, including the audit 
committee. This move away from the Japanese system and the embracing of the 
Anglo-American system took place in a context in which the Japanese government 
had embraced further deregulation policies and was to enhance deregulation and 
marketisation especially after the election of Prime Minister Koizumi in 2001. A 
further revision of the Corporate Governance Principles occurred as a reaction to 
change in the Commercial Code, \vhich allowed Japanese companies to follow 
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either the Japanese or the Anglo-American model. In light of this change in the law 
it was now unattainable for the Japan Corporate Governance Forum to maintain its 
position of promoting the Anglo-American corporate governance system as best 
practice. The Japan Corporate Governance Forum thus issued its New Corporate 
. Governance Principles, which reintroduced the traditional Japanese board of 
corporate auditors. The way in which the Japanese board of corporate auditors was 
incorporated into the New Principles is noteworthy: the board of corporate auditors 
was incorporated into the framework of the Anglo-American corporate governance 
model. Companies were, however, encouraged to introduce an Anglo-American 
style board of directors with its associated committees even in a context were the 
company already had a traditional Japanese board of corporate auditors. This 
hybrid system can be understood as constituting an attempt on part of the Japan 
Corporate Governance Forum to gain support for its Principles from Japanese 
companies whilst still promoting convergence with the Anglo-American corporate 
governance system. A further indication of the Japan Corporate Governance 
Forum's attempt to reflect global developments in its Principles was the 
introduction of corporate social responsibility in 2006. 
In summary, the two case studies and the analysis of aspects of the broader public 
debate on corporate governance in Japan provided insights into processes at work 
during the period of 1989 to 2007 when Japan had been put under global pressure 
to change its traditional and culturally specific corporate governance system and to 
converge with the culturally specific Anglo-American corporate governance system. 
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The analysis provided insights into how the Japanese government on the one hand 
because of a weaker negotiating position in relation to the U.S. and on the other, 
motivated by its own concerns to pursue a neoliberalist marketisation policy, 
accommodated requests made by the U.S. government. Further, the analysis 
provided insights into how various constituencies more generally and the Japan 
Corporate Governance Forum more specifically dealt with the global pressure to 
change. In relation to this, the study showed that what was and what was not 
possible in terms of corporate governance was affected by changes in the context 
(e.g. changes in the Japanese law). Further, the reactions of the Japanese 
government and the Japan Corporate Governance Forum constituted a threat to the 
traditional Japanese corporate governance system and the associated Japanese 
corporate system as they promoted the Anglo-American corporate governance 
system: through various changes to the law, and the issuance of the Corporate 
Governance Principles as an instance of good practice, the traditional Japanese 
corporate governance system had to begin to change. Some of the changes were 
compulsory, for example enhanced disclosure requirements, others were voluntary, 
for example the choice of board of directors. 
In light of the analysis here, what are the threats and opportunities for the local 
including culturally specific aspects of the Japanese corporate governance system 
in the context of global pressure to adopt a corporate governance system 
underpinned by different cultural values reflecting the prevalent global hegemony? 
As has been explicated, the value systems underpinning the Japanese and the 
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Anglo-American corporate governance model are significantly different. Pressure 
to change the Japanese corporate governance system thus constitutes a threat to the 
system itself as well as the context it is embedded in and interrelates with. This 
would even be the case if only one component of the Japanese corporate 
governance system was to change as this would affect the whole system. For 
example, the concern to maximise shareholder wealth underpins the Anglo-
American model whereas the emphasis in the Japanese model is on employees, 
which reflects the community orientation of Japanese culture. A shift away from an 
emphasis on employees to an emphasis on shareholders would also impact on the 
broader corporate system in which the corporate governance system is embedded. 
One particular aspect of the Japanese corporate system that would be affected by an 
emphasis on shareholders and their wealth maximisation would be Japanese 
employment practices, more specifically life-long employment. This would be the 
case because a focus on shareholder wealth maximisation would implicate 
employment practices such as restructuring and lay-offs during periods of poor 
performance, even if they are cyclical, and various forms of out-sourcing and other 
flexible employment practices. In such a context, life-long employment cannot be 
maintained. The ethos of the community firm would thus also be under threat. At 
the same time, there are opportunities for the Japanese corporate governance 
system that arise in the context of pressure to change. For example, if the number 
of independent members of the board of directors was to increase in line with the 
Anglo-American context, this could have a positive impact. It would introduce 
more critique and a challenging of senior management as independent directors are 
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not, as is the case with internally promoted members of the board, morally obliged 
to refrain from challenging their superiors who have supported them as company 
employees. It is thus reasonable to argue that the particular pressure to change that 
the Japanese corporate governance system was exposed to during the period from 
1989 to 2007 constituted threats as well as opportunities. Whether the threats or the 
opportunities are dominant depends on the broader context, which would affect the 
way in which choices can be made in terms of the components of the Japanese 
corporate governance system that one wishes to change. In the context of the study 
here, the hegemonic pressure to change coupled with the willingness of the 
Japanese government to embrace neoliberal reforms constituted mainly a threat to 
Japanese values as the choice in terms of which components of the Japanese 
corporate governance system to change was severely restricted. 
The above considerations raise an important question: What are and will be the 
consequences of the implemented and proposed changes on the well-being of the 
people living in Japan? There is already evidence to date that the emphasis on 
shareholder wealth maximisation coupled with the neoliberal reforms more 
generally have brought about changes in the corporate system that had a negative 
impact on people's well-being. Japanese companies that follow the Anglo-
American model of corporate governance have been involved in restructuring 
activities, which have left thousands of people unemployed (such as, for example, 
Sony). Such developments might become more frequent in the future, especially if 
the economic crises continues further. In addition, flexible employment practices 
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have increased, which have further enhanced uncertainty and insecurity for many 
people. Interestingly, the Japanese public has become aware that the neoliberal 
reforms had an undesirable impact on people's well-being. They expressed their 
discontent with neoliberal policies in the latest election to the Lower House where 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) who had been the ruling party from 1955 
experienced a land-slide defeat. I 17 This public perception is clearly a challenge for 
the new government. It will be of interest if there is an attempt made by the new 
government to change some of the neoliberalist reforms, which potentially could in 
turn improve people's well-being in the Japanese context. 
The analysis here has focused on Japanese corporate governance in the context of 
global pressure to change and has explored how this pressure has already 
manifested in some specific changes of the traditional corporate governance system 
and relatedly in the Japanese corporate system. In the current global political and 
economic environment and complex interdependencies further change seems to be 
inevitable. The important question for today, therefore is not, should Japan change 
its corporate governance system, but, how should Japan change its corporate 
governance system? Below some suggestions are made for a way forward for 
Japanese corporate governance. It is not possible in the context of this study to 
provide a blueprint for Japanese corporate governance but instead an attempt is 
117 With the exception of a short period between 1993 and 1994 the LOP had uninterruptedly been in 
power from 1955 (Lincoln, 1999, pp. 139-140) until the last election on 30 Au~ust 2.009 .. As a result 
of this election the LDP's seats in the Lower House dropped from 296 to 119 (Fmanclal TImes, 2009, 
p.6). 
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made to point to issues that need to be taken into account in the context of attempts 
to improve the Japanese corporate governance system. 
An issue that needs to be addressed is that of convergence. As the literature review 
has indicated, researchers have suggested that the traditional Japanese corporate 
governance system is in the process of converging with the Anglo-American model 
and that convergence is therefore unavoidable. In contrast to this view, especially 
Japanese researchers writing in the Japanese language have argued that the 
Japanese corporate governance system should not converge with the Anglo-
American corporate governance system but should be improved in away, which is 
compatible with the Japanese context and Japanese culture. From a critical 
theoretical perspective, suggestions for a way forward for the Japanese corporate 
governance system would also stress the importance of valuing other cultures and 
aiming to preserve all those elements in systems and institutions that facilitate well-
being of people and the planet. 
Attempts to change the Japanese corporate governance system should be based on a 
thorough analysis of the positive and negative impacts that the current Japanese as 
well as the traditional Japanese corporate governance system have and had. These 
debates should take the form of a broader public discourse. In the current context it 
is particularly important to understand how changes to the Japanese corporate 
governance system have impacted upon the Japanese corporate context and their 
manifest and potential threats to the Japanese way of life and Japanese culture. 
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In attempts to arrive at proposals for change, careful consultation and engagement 
with those affected is vital (Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003). That means all those 
having a stake in the company and being variously affected by the company should 
be able to express their opinions. Here it is particularly important that the West -
and in the context of corporate governance, especially the Anglo-American West -
listens to the Japanese voice and refrains from imposing the hegemonic Anglo-
American corporate governance system as the global standard. 
In attempting to change the Japanese corporate governance system there has to be a 
recognition that Japan is embedded in a global context and that there are 
dependencies that are real and thus limit the way in which Japan can freely decide 
upon its own corporate governance system. A way forward in reducing 
dependencies and especially those from the global hegemonic power is to challenge 
the practices of the global hegemonic power. In the context of the Japanese 
corporate governance system this would imply forming alliances with other 
countries and develop critiques of the Anglo-American corporate governance 
system. There is clearly a general need to challenge and question the supremacy of 
the Anglo-American model of corporate governance. 
In addition, there is a need for the West to rethink its own corporate governance 
systems and to critically engage with the Japanese and other non-Western corporate 
governance systems. Insights gained from such an engagement should then inform 
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the redesign of Western systems. Corporate failures, redundancies on a large scale, 
tax avoidance and corporate fraud in the context of the Anglo-American corporate 
governance system are a clear indication that this model of corporate governance 
has its faults and should be improved (Sikka, 2004; 2005; 2008). 
Researchers can make a valuable contribution to enhancing the Japanese as well as 
any other corporate governance systems through providing insights into and 
critiques of current and past corporate governance practices. In the Japanese 
context there is a need for more research, which explores the impact that changes to 
the Japanese corporate governance system had and still have on people's well-
being. Further, studies are needed that explore from a critical theoretical 
perspective the various contributions to the corporate governance debate in Japan. 
And, more insights into the processes at work in shaping Japanese corporate 
governance are needed. In this context, studies should further explore how 
Buddhist thought and Shinto thought have shaped and still shape the Japanese 
corporate system and the Japanese corporate governance system as well as which 
groups and institutions within as well as outside of Japan are most influential and 
why in shaping Japanese corporate governance. 
Finally, and most importantly, any attempts to change the Japanese corporate 
governance system and any research into the Japanese corporate governance 
system should adopt a holistic perspective and be concerned to enhance well-being. 
In this context it is important to also consider the impact that possible changes to 
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the Japanese corporate governance system might have on well-being globally. The 
above considerations should constitute the framework within which policy debates 
and changes to the Japanese and other corporate governance systems are taking 
place. 
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